Why teens take risks ... : a neurocognitive analysis of developmental changes and individual differences in decision-making under risk by Leijenhorst, L. van
WHY TEENS   
  TAKE RISKS... 
A Neurocognitive Analysis of Developmental Changes and 
Individual Differences in Decision-Making      
             under Risk.
 
ISBN 978-90-9024953-7
© 2009 Linda van Leijenhorst
All rights reserved
Printed by Print Partners Ipskamp B.V., Enschede
WHY TEENS   
  TAKE RISKS... 
A Neurocognitive Analysis of Developmental Changes and 
Individual Differences in Decision-Making      
             under Risk. 
PROEFSCHRIFT
ter verkrijging van 
de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden,
op gezag van Rector Magnificus prof. mr. P. F. van der Heijden,
volgens besluit van het College voor Promoties









Prof. Dr.  E. A. Crone 
Prof. Dr. P. M. Westenberg 
OVERIGE LEDEN
Prof. Dr. H. Bekkering (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen)
Prof. Dr. J. Jolles (Vrije Universiteit)
Prof. Dr. M. W. van der Molen (Universiteit van Amsterdam)
Prof. Dr. J.T. Swaab-Barneveld 
Contents
Chapter 1     General introduction                  7
        
Chapter 2     Neural correlates of developmental differences                
         in risk estimation and feedback processing               19
        
Chapter 3     What motivates the adolescent? Brain regions                 
                     mediating reward sensitivity in adolescence                     45
                    
Chapter 4     A developmental study of risky decisions on the        
                     Cake Gambling Task; Age and gender analyses 
                     of probability estimation and reward evaluation              69
        
Chapter 5     A heart rate analysis of risky decision-making,             
         reward sensitivity and outcome monitoring in                   
         adolescence                                      89
        
Chapter 6     Adolescent risky decision-making: neurocognitive                
         development of affective and control regions        113
             
Chapter 7     Developmental trends for object and spatial working     
         memory: A psychophysiological analysis                    147
Chapter 8     Summary and conclusions                                     175
        
         Summary in Dutch                                185
         References                                                            199
          Propositions          223
!            Curriculum Vitae                  ! ! ! !        225






1.1  The scope of this thesis
This thesis aims to gain insight  into risky behavior in adolescence by 
contributing to our knowledge about the development of decision-
making skills in relation to brain development. Adolescence is a 
fascinating period in life. In a relatively short  period of time, roughly 
between 10 and 20 years of age (Dahl, 2004; Spear, 2000), children 
transform into adults. This transformation has implications for the way 
teens look and behave, and for their cognitive and psychosocial 
functioning. Adolescents are often characterised as impulsive and prone 
to take risks. Already at the beginning of the 20th century G. S. Hall, 
who is often regarded as the founder of adolescent  psychology, 
described an increase in risky behavior and sensation seeking in 
adolescence. He saw adolescence as a period of "storm and stress"; 
characterized by conflict with parents, mood swings, and impulsive 
behavior (Hall, 1904). Similarly, more recent  studies show that 
adolescents report a greater need for sensation seeking compared to 
children and adults (Arnett, 1996; Zuckerman, 1994), and that more 
teens than children or adults end up in emergency rooms because of 
(traffic) accidents, or because of problems related to experimentation 
with drugs or alcohol (Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992; Steinberg, 2004). 
While the consequences of adolescent risk-taking can be grave, most 
children pass through adolescence relatively calmly (Arnett, 1999; 
Dahl, 2004; Masten et al., 1999).  Nevertheless, during adolescence 
many decisions are made that will have long term consequences; 
smoking for example, often starts during adolescence, and adolescents’ 
choices with regards to their education can have consequences in 
adulthood. These possible negative consequences underline the 
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importance of understanding the developmental changes that 
characterize adolescent risky behavior. 
Even though the development of risk-taking behavior has been studied 
from different  perspectives, and using different  methods (for an 
extensive review see Boyer, 2006), the stereotypical adolescent risky 
behavior has been difficult to capture in experiments. The development 
of non invasive neuroimaging techniques such as Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (MRI) and functional MRI (fMRI) have enabled us to study 
structural and functional brain maturation in children, adolescents and 
adults in vivo. These techniques have transformed both our 
understanding of the neurological changes that  occur during 
adolescence and the way in which we think about  adolescent 
development. Neuroimaging data can reveal age related changes in 
brain function, which are not always apparent based on behavioral 
measures. When combined with behavioral experiments, the ability of 
these imaging techniques to increase our understanding of the 
development  of risk-taking behavior is promising. However, because 
this approach is new, many questions still need to be answered. In 
addition to behavioral measures (accuracy, choice and reaction time 
data), we used measures of heart rate changes and fMRI to gain insight 
into the development of the neural correlates of decision-making during 
development. In the absence of differences in behavior, these measures 
can reveal age related differences in the processes that  underlie this 
behavior. The remainder of this chapter will give a short overview of the 
theoretical background of the studies that are presented in this thesis.
1.2  Imaging the developing brain
The results from a large scale longitudinal study on the structural 
development  of normal developing brains in which 145 healthy children 
and adolescents ranging in age from 4 to 22 years participated revealed 
a more protracted developmental trajectory than was previously 
thought. Important changes still take place throughout adolescence 
(Giedd et al., 1999; Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 2004). Even 
though the overall size of the brain of a 9-year-old is comparable to the 
size of an adult’s brain, there are important differences in brain 
structure. MRI studies have shown that gray matter volume, or the total 
amount of neurons and connections between neurons, follows an 
inverted U shaped developmental trajectory (Giedd et  al., 1999). The 
number of neurons and connections increases from birth on and reaches 
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a peak at the beginning of adolescence; from this point on the amount of 
gray matter will decrease. The adolescent brain begins to change, 
neurons and connections that are not  necessary disappear, and important 
connections are strengthened, allowing the brain to function more 
efficiently. In contrast, the volume of white matter, which is made up of 
myelin that  supports communications between neurons, shows a linear 
increase which continues into adulthood (Giedd et al., 1999). 
Importantly, the rate at which the brain matures differs between brain 
regions (Shaw et al., 2008). Regions in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and 
parietal cortex are among the last  regions in which gray matter volume 
reaches its peak. These regions continue to change throughout 
adolescence, which is much later than was previously thought (Casey  et 
al., 2005; Gogtay et al., 2004; Sowell et al., 2004). 
In addition to these measures of structural brain maturation, the 
emergence of fMRI has enabled us to see the brain in action. fMRI's 
high spatial resolution has vastly increased the ability to map cognitive 
functions on different brain regions. Importantly, because healthy 
children and adolescents can participate in fMRI studies, hypotheses 
about  the relation between brain development  and cognitive 
development  could be tested. The first developmental fMRI studies 
revealed that  children and adults recruit  similar brain regions when they 
perform cognitive tasks (Casey et  al., 1995; Thomas, 1999; Nelson, 
2000). Functional brain development mirrors structural brain 
development, and follows a different developmental trajectory in 
different  regions. Brain regions associated with basic (motor and 
sensory) processes mature before regions associated with more complex 
cognitive processes (for a review see, Casey et al., 2005). While 
children and adults recruit similar brain regions, the way in which these 
regions are recruited changes with development. That  is, brain 
activation seems to reflect  more efficient processing with development 
(Casey et  al. 2005). For example, some studies have found activation in 
prefrontal brain regions that are associated with a specific task in adults 
to increase with development, suggesting that these regions are engaged 
more with age (Crone , Wendelken, Donohue, Van Leijenhorst, & 
Bunge, 2006; Klingberg  et al., 2002; Kwon, 2002). In addition, other 
studies have found that  with development activation in brain regions 
that are not  correlated with task performance decreases (Casey et al., 
1997, 2000; Durston et  al., 2006; Luna, 2001). Because cognitive 
functions map onto similar brain regions across development, age 
related differences in the patterns of brain activation can help gain 
 General Introduction | 9
insight  into developmental changes in cognitive processes that underlie 
age related changes in behavior. Even when participants from different 
age groups show similar behavior, the patterns of brain activation 
associated with this behavior can differ. Because of this, fMRI holds the 
potential to reveal differences between children, adolescents and adults 
in experimental tasks of decision-making in the absence of behavioral 
differences in risk-taking. Differences in brain activation patterns 
between children and adolescents from different  ages may provide 
insight  into the seemingly conflicting findings from observation and 
experimental studies on risk-taking in adolescence. 
1.3 Examining decision-making development to understand 
 risk-taking
While studies using self-report  and observation methods report a peak 
in risk-taking and sensation seeking in adolescence (Arnett, 1996; Furby 
& Beyth-Marom, 1992; Steinberg, 2004; Zuckerman, 1994), studies 
using experiments have provided almost no evidence of this peak. In 
contrast, the results from these studies generally show a decrease in 
risk-taking from childhood to adulthood (Boyer, 2007). It has been 
argued that during development learning to avoid excessive risks is one 
of the most  important  skills that has to be acquired (Byrnes, 1998; 
Boyer, 2007; Garon & Moore, 2004; Steinberg & Scott, 2003). An 
influential approach to the study of human behavior in risky or 
uncertain situations is the study of decision-making. In this thesis, 
decision-making is defined as the process of choosing between 
competing courses of action. Often these choice alternatives are 
associated with possible undesirable consequences, and therefore 
involve risk. These undesirable consequences can range from mild (e.g. 
not winning 5 cents in a gambling task) to severe (being in a traffic 
accident). Decision-making is a complex construct and age-related 
changes in numerous cognitive abilities contribute to its development. 
This thesis will focus on the development of three abilities that are 
requirements for mature decision-making. First, the probabilities of 
positive and negative outcomes associated with a risk have to be judged. 
Second, the potential negative consequences of a risk have to be 
weighed against  the potential benefit associated with it  given these 
probabilities. And Third, to allow behavior to be oriented towards 
reaching long term goals, impulses have to be controlled, or cognitive 
control has to be applied.
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The development of these three abilities has been studied by 
developmental psychologists, using different experimental paradigms. 
The literature on the development of the ability to judge probabilities 
shows mixed results. Piaget  and Inhelder argued that  children are 
unable to use probability information in their decisions until they reach 
the stage of formal operations around early adolescence (Piaget and 
Inhelder, 1975). However, the results of more recent studies suggest  that 
well before puberty children, as young as 5 years old, have at  least  a 
basic understanding of probabilities, and can use this information when 
making decisions (Acredolo, O'Connor, Banks & Horobin, 1989; 
Schlottmann, 2001). In contrast, the ability to weigh short-term rewards 
against long-term rewards has been shown to improve throughout 
adolescence (Crone & Van der Molen, 2004; Hooper, Luciana, Conklin 
& Yarger, 2004) in studies in which participants were asked to complete 
age appropriate versions of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The IGT  is 
a widely used neuropsychological task that simulates real-life decision 
making in the way rewards, punishments and future consequences of 
decisions need to be considered. Young children’s behavior has been 
shown to be primarily driven by the magnitude of immediate rewards 
(Crone & Van der Molen, 2004). In sum, the behavioral literature to 
date suggests that  in straightforward risky situations children as young 
as 5 years of age can accurately estimate risks when making decisions, 
but decision-making in more complex situations increases gradually 
during development, which suggests that  mature decision-making 
emerges over the course of adolescence. With age, participants are more 
able to choose the behavior that  is most  advantageous in the long run 
and focus on their long term goals. 
Cognitive control, refers to the cognitive processes that enable us to 
control our behavior and perform goal-directed actions. It encompasses 
processes such as working memory (WM), inhibition, and selective 
attention. Cognitive control has been shown to improve with age (Eigsti 
et  al., 2006; Mischel, Shoda & Rodrigues, 1989), and has been shown to 
continue to mature during adolescence (Davidson, Amso, Anderson & 
Diamond, 2006; Diamond, 2002; Huizinga, Dolan & Van der Molen, 
2006). It is associated with late maturing brain regions in the prefrontal 
and parietal cortex (Casey, Galvan & Hare, 2005), and an influential 
view in the literature on the development  of risk-taking behavior 
suggests that the increase in cognitive control over the course of 
childhood and adolescence, enables an increase in the ability to make 
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decisions and control impulses. As a consequence, the development of 
cognitive control would lead to a decrease in risk-taking with age.
1.4 The insufficient cognitive control hypothesis of adolescent 
 risk-taking
Adolescents’ immature cognitive control abilities have been proposed to 
underlie their impulsivity, risky behavior, and sometimes seemingly 
irrational decisions. For example, the ability to reject an immediate 
reward (such as chatting with friends on MSN) in favor of a larger but 
delayed reward (getting a good grade because you did not  chat  with 
friends but did your homework) develops slowly. This ability begins to 
develop in pre-school aged children. In a classic series of experiments 
Mischel et al. gave 4 year olds a small reward (e.g. a cookie or 
marshmallow), and told them that they would receive another reward 
(an additional cookie or marshmallow) when they managed not to eat 
the cookie until the experimenter, who left  the room for 15 minutes, 
would return. When 4 year old children are faced with this choice 
between a small immediate reward, and a larger, more desirable reward, 
many (approximately 70%) are unable to wait (Mischel et al., 1989). 
Similarly, when given a choice between a small immediate reward, and 
a larger delayed reward, children are more likely to prefer the delayed 
reward with age. This increase in the preference for larger delayed 
rewards and the ability to wait  for rewards has been reported until 
adolescence (Scheres et  al., 2006). The ability to delay gratification at 
age 4 appears to be predictive of inhibition abilities (Eigsti et al., 2006), 
and school performance (Shoda, Mischel & Peake, 1990). Children who 
are more able to control themselves at  an early age perform better in 
adolescence. Several studies have shown that  the ability to resist  the 
need for immediate reward improves throughout  adolescence (Crone & 
Van der Molen, 2004; Garon & Moore, 2004; Hooper et  al., 2004; 
Overman et al., 2004). Indirect neuroscientific support for this theory 
comes from developmental fMRI studies on cognitive control abilities 
which show that brain regions associated with cognitive control are 
among the last  to mature (Casey et  al., 2005). In adults, damage to PFC 
regions, that  are implicated in cognitive control, has been shown to 
result in impaired decision-making (e.g. Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & 
Damasio, 1997; Bechara, Tranel & Damasio, 2000). Taken together 
these findings suggest that immature cognitive control, as a 
consequence of the protracted development  of PFC brain regions 
contributes to immature decision-making, and possibly to adolescent 
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risky behavior. However, few fMRI studies examined the role of these 
PFC regions in the development of risk-taking directly. The studies that 
did have not included children; May et al. (2004) examined the neural 
correlates of decision-making in a group of adolescents, and Ernst et al. 
(2005) and Bjork et al. (2004) compared adolescents to adults. 
However, these studies focused on brain regions that  were implicated in 
the processing of rewards, not  on regions associated with cognitive 
control. A limitation of the insufficient cognitive control account of 
risky behavior is that  it would predict that children, who have the least 
mature reasoning skills and cognitive control abilities, should show 
even more risk-taking behavior than adolescents. This would be in 
contrast  to the self-report data which suggest an increase in risk-taking 
in adolescents compared to children. Therefore, the cognitive control 
hypothesis can only account for the change in behavior that  occurs with 
the transition from adolescence to adulthood, but cannot  explain why 
risk-taking would increase from childhood to adolescence. A second 
view explains adolescent  risky behavior not  as a consequence of the 
ability to control behavior, but  emphasizes the increased sensation-
seeking that has been reported by adolescents.
1.5 The increased arousal hypothesis of adolescent risk-taking 
Adolescence can roughly be subdivided into two phases; the beginning 
of adolescence is marked by the onset of puberty around 10 years of age 
and lasts until about 15 years of age. During puberty the physical 
transformation from child to adult  occurs under the influence of gonadal 
hormones; children undergo growth spurts and the secondary sex 
characteristics develop (Spear, 2000; Dahl 2004). The second phase of 
adolescence follows puberty and lasts until approximately 20 years of 
age. This phase is characterised by the maturation of psychological and 
psychosocial abilities (Steinberg, 2005). While physical changes are 
most apparent during puberty, important developmental changes in both 
brain structure and function take place throughout adolescence. 
Biological and physiological changes that  start  at  the onset of puberty 
have been proposed to underlie the increase in sensation seeking and 
risky behavior in adolescence. At the onset of puberty gonadal 
hormones influence the brain, especially neurotransmitter systems in 
brain areas that are important for the processing of rewards (Spear, 
2000). These areas are part  of the brain's limbic system which is 
implicated in the experience of excitement, arousal and emotions 
(Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure & Pine, 2005). When these regions are 
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more sensitive to appetitive stimuli in adolescents, this would make 
them more sensitive to the potential benefits associated with a risk, and 
as a consequence, adolescents would be more willing to try something 
new, and explore their environment. On the one hand, this gives them 
the opportunity to develop skills they need as adults (Kelley et al., 
2004), but on the other hand leaves them vulnerable to risks. Because 
these hormonal changes are specific to adolescence, the increasing 
emotion and arousal hypothesis predicts a non linear pattern of risk-
taking behavior, with a peak in adolescence, which is consistent with 
the findings from self-report and observation studies. 
One of the first  developmental imaging studies focusing on adolescent 
risk-taking examined adolescents in a guessing task in which 
participants could win money by guessing whether a playing card would 
be higher or lower than five (May et al., 2004). This study reports more 
activation in the ventral striatum (VS) and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in 
response to rewards compared to losses. While the May et  al. study did 
not include adults, the VS had previously been shown to play an 
important  role in processing rewards and in motivating behavior in 
adults (Knutson, Adams, Fong & Hommer, 2001; McClure, Berns, 
Montague, 2003). Similar findings have been reported by Ernst  et  al. 
(2005). In this study activation of brain regions associated with the 
processing of gains and losses was compared between adolescents and 
adults in a decision-making task. The VS response to rewards was larger 
in adolescents than adults. Together these findings suggests that reward 
related regions in the brain are more activate in adolescence, and this 
supports the hypothesis that adolescents take more risks because they 
are more sensitive to the potential benefits associated with that risk. In 
contrast, a study by Bjork et al. (2004) reported the opposite pattern. In 
this study reward processing was examined in adolescents and adults in 
the context  of a monetary incentive delay task. Adolescents showed less 
activation in the VS in response to rewards compared to adults. These 
authors explained the increase in sensation seeking and risky behavior 
in adolescence as a consequence of this diminished sensitivity of reward 
systems. According to these authors, adolescents need more exciting 
experiences to achieve the same sense of reward as adults, and therefore 
take risks. It could be that differences in the behavioral requirements 
between the tasks used in the studies reported above account  for 
differences in the observed patterns of brain activation. Adolescents’ 
risk-taking behavior could be influenced by differences in the strategies 
used by participants from different  ages when they approach a risky 
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situation. For example, the task used by Bjork and colleagues was more 
difficult compared to the tasks used by May et  al (2004) and Ernst et al. 
(2005), in that  it required more cognitive control. Taken together, these 
findings show that we cannot  explain adolescent risk-taking when we 
study the development of reward related brain regions, or neuroimaging 
results in isolation. The studies described in this chapter suggest that in 
order to fully understand adolescent risky behavior the development of 
risk estimation, reward processing, cognitive control and age related 
changes in brain regions associated with these functions should be 
studied separately, and once it  is possible to investigate how these 
processes can be isolated, it  is important to examine how they work 
together. 
Real-world adolescent risk-taking behavior is sometimes extreme and 
potentially fatal, but usually more subtle. Most adolescents engage in 
more accepted forms of risky behavior, such as listening to loud music, 
wearing "extreme clothing", engaging in dangerous sports, or studying 
for a test  at the very last  minute. In addition to experiments that can 
capture subtle age related differences in risk-taking in the scanner, fMRI 
studies require testable hypotheses on the development of the neural 
correlates of cognitive processes that  underlie the changes observed in 
behavioral ad self-report  studies. The studies discussed in this chapter 
form a starting point to tackle these questions.
1.6 Outline of this thesis and publications
This chapter has given an overview of the theoretical background of the 
studies that are presented in this thesis. The six chapters that  report 
empirical studies (Chapters 2-7) aimed to examine the developmental 
trajectory of decision-making, in order to gain insight  into risky 
behavior in adolescence. Chapters 2 and 3 describe two developmental 
fMRI experiments that  each focus on the neural correlates of cognitive 
processes that are considered basic components of decision-making 
under risk; the ability to judge probabilities (Chapter 2), and reward 
sensitivity (Chapter 3). Chapter 2 describes the first  fMRI study that 
examined age differences in brain activation patterns in control related 
regions, between children and young adults (9-12 and 18-26 years old) 
in a decision-making context. In this chapter we introduce a new child 
friendly two-choice decision-making paradigm; "the Cake Gambling 
Task". Chapter 3  describes a second developmental fMRI study in 
which neural responses between early adolescents, middle adolescents, 
 General Introduction | 15
and young adults (10-12, 14-15, and 18-25 years old) were studied in 
response to rewards. This study examined the hypothesis that 
adolescence is characterised by a peak in the brain's responsiveness to 
rewards, and aimed to resolve conflicting findings of earlier studies. 
While these first  two chapters each focus on one of the processes that 
underlie decision-making; Chapters 4, 5 and 6 describe experiments in 
which these processes were combined and participants had to weigh 
risks against potential rewards. Chapter 4 describes a behavioral study 
on the development  of decision-making under risk, using a modified 
version of the Cake Gambling Task that  was introduced in Chapter 2. 
Children, adolescents and adults from five age groups (8-9, 11-12, 
14-15, 17-18, and 25-30 years old) participated in this study, in which 
both the probability of winning and the size of the reward that  could be 
gambled with were manipulated. The results from this study motivated 
the experiments described in Chapter 5 and 6, in which we examine the 
relative contributions of reward sensitivity and cognitive control to 
decision-making under risk. In the study described in Chapter 5 we 
used behavioral and psychophysiological measures to test  the 
hypothesis that  adolescent  decision-making is biased towards taking 
risks because of an increased sensitivity to possible rewards paired with 
immature cognitive control. Adolescent participants from three age 
groups (11-12, 14-15, and 17-18 years-old) were included, and the Cake 
Gambling task was modified to enable us to measure heart  rate changes. 
In addition, we introduced monetary rewards. Chapter 6 describes the 
third developmental fMRI study in which we directly test  the hypothesis 
that brain regions associated with reward processing and cognitive 
control follow different developmental trajectories, and underlie 
adolescent risk-taking. Children, adolescents and young adults from 4 
age groups (8-10, 12-14, 16-17 and 19-26 years old) gambled for 
monetary reward in an adapted version of the Cake Gambling Task. In 
addition, this study examined the relation between brain activation 
patterns and individual differences in risk-taking behavior. 
The final empirical chapter does not  focus on decision-making directly. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the development of an important  cognitive 
control component, and describes a behavioral study on the 
development  of working memory for object and spatial information in 
children, adolescents and young adults (6-7, 9-10, 11-12 and 18-26 
years old). In addition to behavioral measures this study describes 
measures of heart rate changes, which provide an index of covert 
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cognitive processes. Finally in Chapter 8 the findings described in the 
empirical chapters are summarized and discussed.
All empirical chapters that this thesis consists of have been published 
in, or submitted to peer reviewed journals, to acknowledge the 
contributions of the co-authors the full references to these papers are 
presented below: 
Van Leijenhorst, L., Crone, E. A., & Bunge, S. A. (2006). Neural 
 correlates of developmental differences in risk anticipation and 
 feedback processing. Neuropsychologia, 44, 2158-2170. 
 (Chapter 2)
Van Leijenhorst, L., Zanolie, K., Van Meel, C. S., Westenberg, P. M., 
 Rombouts, S. A. R. B. & Crone, E. A. (in press) What motivates 
 the adolescent? Brain regions mediating reward sensitivity in 
 adolescence. Cerebral Cortex. (Chapter 3)
Van Leijenhorst, L., Westenberg, P. M. & Crone, E. A. (2008) A 
 developmental study of risky decisions on the Cake Gambling 
 Task; Age and gender analyses of probability estimation and 
 reward evaluation. Developmental Neuropsychology, 33, 
 179-196. (Chapter 4)
Van Leijenhorst, L., Westenberg, P. M., Crone, E. A. (manuscript in 
 revision) A heart  rate analysis of risky decision-making,  reward 
 sensitivity and outcome monitoring in adolescence. (Chapter 5)
Van Leijenhorst, L., Gunther Moor, B., Op de Macks, Z. A., Rombouts, 
 S. A. R. B., Westenberg, P. M., & Crone, E. A. (manuscript in 
 revision) Adolescent risky decision-making: neurocognitive 
 development of affective and control regions. (Chapter 6) 
 
Van Leijenhorst, L., Crone, E. A. & Van der Molen, M. W.  (2007). 
 Developmental changes in object and spatial working memory: 
 A psychophysiological analysis. Child Development, 78, 
 987-1000. (Chapter 7) 
Chapters 1 & 8 are based on a book chapter and paper (in Dutch) that 
were published as:
Van Leijenhorst, L. & Crone, E. A. (2009). Paradoxes in adolescent 
 risk-taking. In:  Zelazo, P. D, Chandler, M. & Crone, E. A. 
 (Eds). Developmental Social Cognitive Neuroscience. Oxford 
 University Press.
Van Leijenhorst, L. & Crone, E. A. (2009). Het  adolescentenbrein: 
 Inzichten in risicovol gedrag in de adolescentie uit de 
 cognitieve neurowetenschappen. Neuropraxis, 1, 3-7.
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2.
Neural correlates of developmental 
differences in risk estimation and 
feedback processing
The primary aim of this study was to compare the neural substrates of 
decision-making in middle-aged children and adults. To this end, we collected 
fMRI data while 9-12-year-olds and 18-26-year-olds performed a simple 
gambling task. The task was designed to tap two important aspects of decision 
making: risk estimation and feedback processing. We examined how 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) contributed to risk estimation, and how 
ventrolateral and medial prefrontal cortices (VLPFC and medial PFC) 
contributed to negative feedback processing in children and adults.  Region of 
interest analyses revealed differences in brain activation between children and 
adults for ACC and lateral OFC. ACC was recruited more for high-risk than 
for low-risk trials, and this difference was larger for children than for adults. 
In contrast,  children and adults did not differ in activation for OFC or DLPFC. 
These data suggest that children's decision-making under uncertainty is 
associated with a high degree of response conflict.  Both age groups exhibited 
bilateral VLPFC (BA 47) and medial PFC/ACC (BA 6/ BA 32 (dorsal) and 24 
(ventral)) activation associated with negative feedback processing.  Relative to 
adults, children engaged lateral OFC more strongly for negative relative to 
positive feedback.  These results indicate that children may find negative 
feedback more aversive than adults do. In summary, children aged 9-12 and 
adults recruit similar brain regions during risk-estimation and feedback 
processing, but some key differences between the groups provide insight into 
the factors contributing to developmental changes in decision-making
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.2.1 Introduction
Decision-making, which involves the ability to choose between 
competing actions that  are associated with uncertain benefits and 
penalties, is a key component  of human cognition and behavior. 
Throughout  childhood, we learn and develop the ability to make choices 
that are beneficial in the long run. The ability to make decisions that 
require the delay of gratification to receive a larger reward in the future 
begins to emerge during the pre-school period (Mischel, Shoda and 
Rodriguez, 1989). Interestingly, the ability to delay gratification at  age 
four was found to be predictive of socially competent behavior in 
adolescence (Mischel et  al., 1989). Even though four-year-olds can 
choose delayed over immediate rewards (e.g., Thompson, Barresi, & 
Moore, 1997; Prencipe & Zelazo, 2005), children show difficulties with 
delay of gratification that may persist  into adolescence on tasks in 
which one must  make a decision between immediate and future reward 
(e.g., Hooper , Luciana, Conklin & Yarger, 2004; Crone & Van der 
Molen, 2004; Overman, 2004). Thus, the ability to make advantageous 
decisions under conditions of uncertainty does not fully develop until 
early adulthood. 
The mechanisms underlying developmental changes in decision-making 
are not  well understood. The interpretation of behavioral findings is 
difficult because of the complexity of many decision-making tasks. For 
example, most  decision-making tasks not only require an estimation of 
risk (Critchley, Mathias & Dolan, 2001), but  also require participants to 
process performance feedback (O’Doherty, Critchley, Deichmann & 
Dolan, 2003), and keep an appropriate strategy on-line (Barraclough, 
Conroy & Lee, 2004). Developmental changes have been observed in 
all of these functions, namely risk estimation, feedback monitoring, and 
strategy (or task-set) maintenance. Behavioral data indicate that 
children and adolescents make more disadvantageous decisions, 
suggesting that they are prone to risk-taking (Overman, 2004; Crone et 
al., 2003). Additionally, when it  is necessary to learn from external 
feedback, young children are more likely than older children to 
perseverate in their behavior, which suggests that they may also be less 
able to use the informative value of performance feedback than older 
children and adults in order to change their behavior (Kirkham & 
Diamond, 2003). Finally, a large body of evidence indicates that there 
are developmental improvements in the ability to keep relevant 
information online (e.g. Diamond, 2002; Casey, Giedd & Thomas, 
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2000; Barcelo, 1999; Thomas et  al., 1999; Barcelo & Knight, 2002). 
Thus, to learn more about  the factors contributing to developmental 
changes in decision-making, it is necessary to examine how separable 
cognitive functions contribute to the complex process of decision-
making. 
Our understanding of the processes underlying decision-making in 
adults has benefited from investigations of its neural underpinnings. 
Brain imaging techniques are especially valuable when overt behavior 
is difficult  to interpret, because different underlying mechanisms may 
contribute to observed differences in behavior (see Casey, Davidson & 
Rosen, 2002; Van der Molen & Molenaar, 1994). Neuroimaging studies 
in healthy adults and neuropsychological studies in patients with real-
life decision-making problems have shown that two key components of 
decision making – risk estimation and processing performance feedback 
– are subserved by different  regions within the prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
(e.g., Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Anderson, 1994; Rolls, 2000; 
Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale & Shizgal, 2001; Knutson, Adams, 
Fong & Hommer, 2001; Ernst et al., 2005; Cohen, Heller & Ranganath, 
2005). More specifically, these studies show that orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are important for risk 
anticipation, whereas ventrolateral PFC (VLPFC) is engaged when 
participants receive negative performance feedback. 
In several patient  studies, Bechara et  al. (Bechara et  al., 1994; Bechara, 
Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1996; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & 
Damasio, 1997; Bechara, Tranel & Damasio, 2000) have shown that 
patients with OFC damage make disadvantageous choices on the Iowa 
Gambling Task. The Iowa Gambling Task mimics real-life decision-
making, in that it  features immediate and future rewards and 
punishments. These studies showed that healthy control participants 
learned to make advantageous choices over the course of the task, 
favoring larger gains in the future over smaller but more immediate 
gains, whereas OFC patients selected only those options that  result in 
immediate reward. These findings have been taken as evidence that 
OFC subserves risk estimation by generating autonomic responses, but 
that it  does not subserve feedback processing. More recent studies have 
suggested a somewhat  different account  of OFC function, by showing 
that OFC patients make disadvantageous choices on the Iowa Gambling 
Task only when reversal learning is required – i.e., when they must 
learn to adjust their responses after the reinforcement values of stimuli 
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have been reversed (Rolls, 1999; Maia & McClelland, 2004, 2005; 
Fellows & Farah, 2003, 2005). Both accounts, however, suggest  that 
OFC is important  for learning to make decisions by weighing possible 
outcomes (risk estimation).
  
A number of imaging studies have implicated OFC in decision-making 
under conditions of uncertainty (Breiter et  al., 2001; Paulus et al., 2001; 
Ernst et al., 2004; Cohen et  al., 2005; Ursu & Carter, 2005). Some 
studies suggest that OFC is important for risk estimation (Cohen et al., 
2005; Ursu & Carter, 2005). Additionally, some studies suggest that 
OFC is responsible for processing negative performance outcomes 
(Breiter et  al., 2001; Elliott, Friston & Dolan, 2000; Kahn et al., 2002; 
Rogers et al., 1999). However, the anterior, ventral portion of VLPFC 
(BA 47), which is sometimes considered to be part of lateral OFC, is 
more consistently reported as being related to receiving punishment 
feedback (O'Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak & Andrews, 2001; 
O'Doherty, Critchley, Deichmann & Dolan, 2003; Rogers et al., 2004). 
In addition to OFC, several other regions, including anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) and midbrain regions (in particular, the nucleus 
accumbens and ventral striatum), are reported as being important for 
uncertain decision-making (Galvan et  al., 2005; Rodriguez, Aron & 
Poldrach, 2005; Cohen et  al., 2005; Critchley et al., 2003; Paulus, 
Hozack, Frank & Braun, 2002; Rogers et  al., 2004; Volz Schubotz & 
Von Cramon, 2003). ACC is associated with the detection of response 
conflict  and the monitoring of performance (Carter et al., 1998; Ernst  et 
al., 2004; Gehring & Knight, 2000; Holroyd, Nieuwenhuis, Mars & 
Coles, 2004; O'Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak & Andrews, 2001; 
Van Veen & Carter, 2002). Midbrain regions are thought to be 
associated with the prediction of errors (Rodriguez et  al., 2005) or 
responsive to the magnitude of reward (Galvan et al., 2005). 
 
Adaptive decision-making requires not  only emotional evaluation, but 
also the weighing of positive and negative consequences of several 
potential actions. Therefore, it is not  surprising that dorsolateral PFC 
(DLPFC), a region associated with response selection (e.g. Bunge, 
Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen & Gabrieli, 2002b; Critchley et  al., 2001; 
McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein & Cohen, 2004; Rowe, Toni, Josephs, 
Frackowiack & Passingham, 2000), and working memory requirements 
of decision-making tasks (Bechara, Tranel & Damasio, 1998; Manes et 
al., 2002; Fellows & Farah, 2005), is active when subjects make rational 
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decisions, such as when they decide to wait  for future rewards (Fellows 
& Farah, 2005; McClure et  al., 2004). The framework provided by these 
studies in adults allows us to investigate specific hypotheses regarding 
developmental changes in decision-making.
  
Recent advances in developmental neuroimaging have made it  possible 
to relate changes in prefrontal activity to the development of cognitive 
functions. fMRI studies of cognitive control have reported activation in 
similar brain regions for middle-aged children and adults (eg. Bunge, 
Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya & Gabrieli, 2002a; Casey et al., 1995; 
Casey et  al., 2000; Klingberg, Forssberg & Wessterberg, 2002; Casey et 
al., 2002). Interestingly, even though children show activity in similar 
regions, the pattern of activation often differs between children and 
adults, suggesting that  the development of cognitive functions is related 
to a refinement in the organization or efficiency in the recruitment  of 
the prefrontal cortex (Casey et al., 2002). Relative to cognitive control, 
decision-making has received considerably less attention in the 
developmental neuroimaging literature (see Happeney, Zelazo & Stuss, 
2004). To date, only three studies have examined decision-making in 
adolescents and adults (Bjork et  al., 2004; May et  al., 2004; Ernst et al., 
2005), and no fMRI studies have yet  examined decision-making in 
children under the age of 12.
The present study compares the neural substrates of decision-making in 
9-12 year-olds and young adults, using a children's gambling task 
designed to tap two important  aspects of decision making: risk 
estimation and feedback processing. Because the current fMRI study is 
the first  to investigate decision-making in children, we have chosen to 
adapt  for children a paradigm designed by Critchley et al. (2001) for use 
in adults. The cake task allows us to examine developmental differences 
in subcomponents of decision-making, including risk estimation and 
feedback processing. The stimuli in this task resemble “wheels of 
fortune” that  have been used in the adult  neuroimaging literature (e.g., 
see Breiter et al., 2001; Ernst et al., 2004). 
In our child-friendly task, the stimuli represent cakes that  are part 
chocolate-flavored and part strawberry-flavored. Participants are asked 
to look at  a given cake stimulus, and decide whether a piece of 
chocolate or strawberry cake is most likely to be randomly selected by a 
computer. The proportion of chocolate/strawberry pieces differs 
between cakes, resulting in low-risk decisions (for example, one 
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chocolate piece and eight  strawberry pieces) and high-risk decisions 
(for example, four chocolate pieces and five strawberry pieces). 
Performance feedback, indicating gain or loss, follows each decision. 
This study focused on the contributions of OFC, ACC, DLPFC, and the 
midbrain to risk estimation in children and adults, as well as the 
contributions of VLPFC and medial PFC to feedback processing. Such 
a region-of-interest (ROI) approach allowed us to examine changes 
across development in the relative contribution of these regions to 
decision-making. Additionally, we examined the extent  to which 
children and adults rely on the same or different  brain regions during 
risk estimation and feedback processing. We focused primarily on 
negative feedback, because of its importance in updating behavior, but 
examined the neural correlates of positive > negative feedback as well.
We had two predictions about  the development of decision-making. The 
first  prediction was that  children have difficulty anticipating risks 
because the network relying on prefrontal cortex (DLPFC and OFC) 
and its connections with ACC is not  fully developed yet. Such a finding 
would be consistent  with the literature showing that children do not 
experience warning signals in gambling tasks in a similar way as adults 
do (e.g., Hooper et al., 2004; Steinberg, 2005). We expected that adults 
would engage OFC and ACC (e.g., Cohen et al., 2005) as well as 
DLPFC (McClure et al., 2004) more for high-risk than low-risk 
decisions. If children exhibit  immature risk estimation, we would expect 
them to exhibit  less activation of OFC (associated with affective 
judgements) and more ACC activation (associated with detection of 
response conflict), compared to adults. However, if children differ from 
adults in the way they make rational judgements, we would expect to 
see less DLPFC (control) and more ACC (conflict) activation. 
The second prediction was that children would differ from adults with 
respect to the impact of negative and positive feedback on their 
behavior. We expected that if children were to differ from adults in 
feedback processing, negative feedback would result in a different 
pattern of neural activity for children than for adults. This finding would 
be consistent  with the literature showing that children fail to process 
negative feedback (e.g. Kirkham & Diamond, 2003) or process this 
feedback less efficiently (Crone & Van der Molen, 2004). We expected 
that adults would engage OFC (Breiter et al., 2001), VLPFC (in 
particular BA 47), and medial PFC when processing negative vs. 
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positive feedback (e.g., O’Doherty et al., 2003; Holroyd et al., 2004. If 
children experience the negative outcomes of their decisions differently 
from adults, we would expect  to find a different  pattern of OFC, 
VLPFC, and medial PFC activation related to loss or punishment 
feedback in children compared to adults. 
2.2 Method
2.2.1 Participants
Twenty-six paid volunteers participated in the study. These participants 
consisted of fourteen right-handed, healthy young adults (nine females; 
ages 18-26; mean age = 21.5, SD = 2.2) from the University of Davis 
and twelve right-handed, healthy children (seven females; ages 9-12; 
mean age = 11. 3, SD = 0.9). The primary caregiver of each child gave 
informed consent. Participants’ consent  was obtained according to the 
declaration of Helsinki (BMJ 1991; 302: 1194), and the study was 
approved by the Internal Review Board at the University of California 
at Davis. 
2.2.2 Task
Participants learned to perform the cake task prior to scanning. Each 
trial started with a 500 ms fixation cross, followed by a stimulus that 
was presented for 3500 ms, followed by a feedback stimulus that  was 
presented for 2000 ms (see Figure 2.1). The stimulus consisted of a 
round cake presented at the center of the screen, made up of 9 wedges, 
each of which were either said to be chocolate-flavored (brown wedges) 
or strawberry-flavored (pink wedges), followed after 2000 ms by the 
presentation of a question mark and a piece of strawberry and chocolate 
cake at the foot of the cake (Figure 2.1). At  this point, participants were 
instructed to indicate by a left or right  button press which flavor – 
strawberry or chocolate – the computer would be most  likely to select, 
given the fact that its choice was random. To ensure that the youngest 
participants would understand this instruction, all participants were told 
to think of the computer as someone who picks a piece of cake with 
their eyes closed. The proportion of strawberry/chocolate wedges varied 
across stimuli, resulting in low-risk decisions (cakes composed of 9 
pieces, of which 1 or 2 pieces had contrasting flavor) and high-risk 
decisions (cakes composed of 9 pieces, of which 3 or 4 pieces had a 
contrasting flavor) (see Critchley et  al., 2001). Participants used the 
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middle and index fingers of their left  hand to respond. The valence of 
the feedback participants received always was the consequence of the 
combination of the computer’s random choice for either strawberry or 
chocolate and the subject’s decision. If these two matched, subjects 
received positive feedback (gained one point), if they didn’t match, 
subjects received negative feedback (lost one point).
Figure 2.1 Task example of a low-risk trial.  Participants viewed the cake for 
2000 ms, followed by the cue and target. Participants had 1500 milliseconds to 
give a response, after which gain or loss feedback was presented for 2000 ms, 
along with the choice of the computer. Gain was indicated by +1 and loss was 
indicated by -1.
2.2.3 Data acquisition
Over the course of three event-related scans, participants performed a 
total of 162 experimental trials, in which high-risk and low-risk trials 
were intermixed. The visual stimuli were projected onto a screen that 
participants could see via a mirror attached to the head coil. During 
each scan, subjects performed 27 trials for each risk condition (54 trials 
total). Across the two scans, there were equal numbers of trials of each 
type requiring left-button and right-button responses. The order of trial 
types within each scan was determined with an algorithm designed to 
maximize the efficiency of recovery of the BOLD response (Dale, 
1999). For each condition, the order in which the stimuli were presented 
was pre-randomized and was the same for all participants. Periods of 
fixation lasting between 2 and 8 s, jittered in increments of 2 s, were 
interleaved with the experimental trials, as determined by the 
optimization program. 
 
Scanning was performed with a standard whole-head coil on a 1.5 Tesla 
GE scanner at the UCD Imaging Research Center. Functional data were 
acquired using a gradient-echo echo-planar pulse sequence (TR = 2 sec, 
TE = 40 ms, 24 oblique slices, 3.44 x 3.44 x 5 mm, 0-mm inter-slice 
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gap, 240 volumes per run). The first  four volumes of each scan were 
discarded to allow for T1-equilibration effects. High-resolution T1 
weighed anatomical images were collected. Head motion was restricted 
using a pillow and foam inserts that  surrounded the head. All children 
were trained in a mock scanner at  the UCD Imaging Research Center 
prior to the actual scan. 
2.2.4 fMRI data analysis
Data were pre-processed using SPM2 (Wellcome Department  of 
Cognitive Neurology, London). Images were corrected for differences 
in timing of slice acquisition, followed by rigid body motion correction. 
Structural and functional volumes were spatially normalized to T1 and 
EPI templates, respectively. The normalization algorithm used a 12-
parameter affine transformation together with a nonlinear 
transformation involving cosine basis functions, and resampled the 
volumes to 3-mm cubic voxels. Templates were based on the MNI305 
stereotaxic space (Cosoco, Kollokian, Kwan & Evans, 1997), an 
approximation of Talairach space (Talairach & Tourneaux, 1988). 
Functional volumes were spatially smoothed with an 8-mm FWHM 
isotropic Gaussian kernel.
Statistical analyses were performed on individual subjects’ data using 
the general linear model in SPM2. The fMRI time series data were 
modeled by a series of events convolved with a canonical hemodynamic 
response function. The cue and feedback portions of each trial were 
modeled as single events in two separate models: one event-related 
design time-locked with the cue presentation, and one event-related 
model time-locked with feedback presentation. Both designs included 
four conditions: high-risk positive feedback, high-risk negative 
feedback, low-risk positive feedback, and low-risk negative feedback 
trials. Error trials, defined as those trials where the participant did not 
make the choice that was most likely to result  in gain, were modeled 
separately and were excluded from the fMRI analyses. The correct  trial 
functions were used as covariates in a general linear model, along with 
a set of cosine functions that high-pass filtered the data, and a covariate 
for session effects. The least-squared parameter estimates of height  of 
the best-fitting canonical HRF for each condition were used in pair-wise 
contrasts. The resulting contrast  images, computed on a subject-by-
subject basis, were submitted to group analyses. At  the group level, 
contrasts between conditions were computed by performing one-tailed 
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t-tests on these images, treating subjects as a random effect. Task-
related responses were considered significant if they consisted of at 
least five contiguous voxels that exceeded an uncorrected threshold of p 
< .001, unless reported otherwise.
We employed a fast event-related design in the interest  of keeping the 
study as short  as possible for the children. As such, it  is likely that risk 
estimation effects were confounded by feedback effects and vice versa. 
Additionally, a consequence of the way participants tend to perform the 
task is that negative feedback occurs more often following high risk 
than following low risk choices, and vice versa for positive feedback. 
Consequently, any effect of negative feedback could be influenced by 
the uncertainty associated with high risk trials. For these reasons, our 
analyses were performed on a selection of trials, to eliminate the effect 
that the stimuli may have. The comparison of high- versus low-risk 
decisions was based only on trials followed by positive feedback, 
thereby holding feedback constant. Similarly, the comparison of 
positive and negative feedback was based on high-risk trials only, 
thereby holding risk anticipation constant.
ROI analyses were performed to characterize rule sensitivity of five a 
priori predicted regions – OFC, VLPFC (BA 47), DLPFC medial PFC/
ACC, and midbrain – based on contrasts for risk taking and feedback-
processing separately. Averaging the signal across voxels, as is done in 
ROI analyses, captures the central tendency and tends to reduce 
uncorrelated variance. Thus, ROI analyses have greater power than 
whole-brain statistical contrasts to detect  effects that  are present  across 
a set of voxels. ROI analyses were performed with the Marsbar toolbox 
in SPM2 (Brett, Anton, Valabregue & Poline, 2002; http://
marsbar.sourceforce.net/). ROIs that spanned several functional brain 
regions were subdivided by sequentially masking the functional ROI 
with each of several anatomical Marsbar ROIs. Two contrasts were used 
to generate functional ROIs: high-risk vs. low-risk trials (risk analysis), 
and negative vs. positive feedback trials (feedback analysis). These 
contrasts were generated from all participants with an F-threshold of p 
< .001. An ROI of ACC was identified from the risk analysis, and 
VLPFC and medial PFC ROIs were identified from the feedback 
analysis. Additionally, if an a priori ROI was active for a contrast in 
only one of the two age groups, this region was selected to test for 
significant differences between groups (DLPFC and OFC for the risk 
analysis, and OFC for the feedback analysis). In the case of the 
28  | Chapter 2 
midbrain, it  was not possible to create an ROI based on either a general 
or a specific contrast. As such, we created a 15 mm spherical ROI 
centered on MNI coordinates 0, -15, -9 [x, y, z], on the basis of a study 
by Aron et al. (2004). 
For ROI analyses, effects were considered significant at an alpha of .05. 
Following correction for multiple comparisons across ROIs (5 in total), 
all critical effects – i.e., Age Group x Condition interactions, survived 
when the p-value was lowered to p <.01 (p = .05/5 ROIs).
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Performance
Accuracy was defined as the percentage of choices favoring the option 
with the greatest likelihood of reward. On average, children and adults 
performed accurately on ± 91 % and ± 98 % of trials, respectively. A 2 
(Age Group) x 2 (high-risk vs. low-risk Condition) ANOVA resulted in 
a main effect of Age Group (F (1, 24) = 14.63, p < .001), showing that 
children made more errors than adults. There was also a main effect of 
Condition (F (1, 24) = 26.19, p < .001), indicating that  participants 
made more errors on high-risk than low-risk trials. There was a 
marginally significant  Age Group x Condition interaction (F (1, 24) = 
3.63, p = .07, see Figure 2.2), indicating that children were more prone 
than adults to make a greater number of errors on high-risk compared to 
low-risk trials.
Figure 2.2 Accuracy for adults and children, for high-risk and low-risk 
choices. Accurate responses were those trials that were most likely to result in 
a reward. 
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2.3.2 ROI analyses
Risk Estimation
We examined the effects of risk estimation in OFC and DLPFC ROIs 
derived from the contrast of high-risk versus low-risk in adults. Because 
these ROIs were defined on the basis of the fact that  they were 
modulated by risk estimation in adults, our analyses focused on whether 
a similar modulation was also observed in children (Figure 2.3). Both 
ROI analyses revealed a main effect  of Condition, showing that 
activation was higher in DLPFC (F (1, 24) = 7.80, p < .01), and OFC (F 
(1, 24) = 5.81, p < .05) for high-risk compared to low-risk trials, but 
there were no interactions with Age Group (both F’s < 1). The absence 
of interactions with Age Group suggests that children did not  differ 
from adults in terms of DLPFC or OFC activation on high-risk 
compared to low-risk trials.
Figure 2.3 Activation profiles for ROIs derived from high-risk vs. low-risk 
contrast. The contrast for OFC (22, 50, -14 [x, y, z]) and DLPFC (42, 30, 18 
[x, y, z]) was based on a high-risk > low-risk contrast in adults, and the 
contrast for ACC (0, 6, 20 [x, y, z]) was based on an F-contrast based on all 
participants.
We additionally examined the effects of risk estimation in an unbiased 
ROI of medial PFC/ACC, derived from the F-test of high-risk versus 
low-risk based on all participants (Figure 2.3). The 2 (Age Group) x 2 
(Condition) ANOVA for medial PFC/ACC resulted in a main effect  of 
Condition (F (1, 24) = 14.31, p < .001), demonstrating greater 
activation for high-risk than low-risk trials. This analysis also revealed 
an Age Group x Condition interaction (F (1, 24) = 5.23, p < .001). Post 
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hoc comparisons for separate age groups showed that children activated 
medial PFC/ACC more for high-risk than for low-risk trials (F (1, 11) = 
10.51, p  < .001), whereas this difference was absent in adults (F (1, 13) 
= 2.58, p = .13). Thus, children showed greater modulation with respect 
to risk estimation in medial PFC/ACC than adults, but no age 
differences were observed in OFC or DLPFC. Finally, an analysis for 
midbrain was performed for the spherical ROI based on Aron et al. 
(2004). This region was not  influenced by the task manipulations, all p’s 
> .10.
Feedback
We performed ROI analyses on medial PFC and right VLPFC (BA 47) 
regions identified from an F-contrast of negative vs. positive feedback 
based on all participants. The 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Condition) ANOVA 
for medial PFC revealed more activity in this region for negative 
feedback compared to positive feedback (F (1, 24) = 20.16, p < .001), 
but there was no interaction with Age Group (F < 1). The same 
ANOVA for right  VLPFC also showed more activity in this region for 
negative feedback compared to positive feedback (F (1, 24) = 38.06, p 
< .001), but again, there was no interaction with Age Group (F < 1). 
Thus, both children and adults recruited medial PFC and VLPFC more 
strongly for negative than positive feedback. 
An additional ROI analysis focused on the lateral OFC ROI that  was 
derived from the contrast of negative versus positive feedback in 
children only, and the analysis tested whether this region was also active 
in adults. The 2 (Age Group) x 2 (Condition) ANOVA resulted in main 
effects of Age Group, F (1, 24) = 4.87, p < .05) and Condition (F (1, 24) 
= 26.00, p < .001), and an Age Group x Condition interaction (F (1, 24) 
= 10.15, p  < .005). Post  hoc comparisons revealed that  both adults (F 
(1, 13) = 5.95, p < .05) and children (F (1, 11) = 17.82, p  < .001) 
engaged lateral OFC more strongly for negative compared to positive 
feedback, but that  children showed more activation than adults for 
negative feedback (F (1, 25) = 5.14, p < .05), such that children showed 
a greater difference between negative and positive feedback than adults 
did (F (1, 25) = 3.39, p = .09).
As noted above, the feedback analysis focused on the comparison 
between negative and positive feedback in response to high-risk trials 
only. In the high-risk condition – and even more so in the low-risk 
condition – positive feedback was more likely to occur than negative 
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feedback; therefore it  is possible that activation for negative > positive 
feedback is actually related to the feedback being unexpected rather 
than negative. To examine this issue, we also analyzed positive and 
negative feedback trials following low-risk trials. If activation 
associated with negative feedback is related to the feedback being 
unexpected, then this activation should be larger following low-risk 
trials, because the probability of negative feedback is lowest in this 
condition. However, we found no differences in activation for positive 
and negative feedback trials followed by high-risk trials compared to 
positive and negative feedback trials followed by low-risk trials (all F’s 
< 1; see Figure 2.4). This result  suggests that the negative feedback-
related activation is in fact related to the type of feedback provided, 
rather than to the low frequency of this type of feedback.
Figure 2.4 Activation profiles for ROIs derived from gain vs. loss contrast. The 
contrasts for VLPFC (-20, 12, -20 [x, y, z]) and medial PFC (-22, 18,  50 [x, y, 
z]) were based on an F-contrast based on all participants. The contrast for 
OFC (40, 46, -12 [x, y, z]) was based on loss > gain in children.
2.3.3 Whole-brain analysis
In addition to the ROI analyses, an exploratory whole-brain analysis 
was performed. These analyses indicate that children and adults showed 
largely overlapping patterns of activation in the expected brain regions. 
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Figure 2.5 shows the glass brain images for both comparisons, and 
Figure 2.6 shows an overlap of the two main comparisons: high-risk > 
low-risk, and negative feedback > positive feedback. 
Figure 2.5 Glass Brain activation profiles for the High-risk >Low-risk contrast 
and negative > positive feedback contrast in children and adults.
For the high-risk > low-risk comparison, adults recruited right DLPFC 
(BA 9), bilateral ACC (BA 24/33), and right VLPFC (BA 47), and 
children recruited ACC and right VLPFC. When the statistical threshold 
was lowered to p < .005 uncorrected, adults additionally recruited right 
OFC (BA 11). Additional regions that were active for this contrast  are 
reported in Table 2.1. The results of the reverse comparison (low-risk > 
high-risk), while not  a focus of the current study, are also reported in 
Table 2.1. For the negative feedback > positive feedback comparison 
(see Table 2.2), regions activated by adults and children included 
bilateral VLPFC (BA 47), and medial PFC/ACC (BA 6) at  a threshold 
of p  < .001 (uncorrected). When the threshold was lowered to p < .005 
(uncorrected), children additionally recruited a region in right  lateral 
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OFC (BA 11). The reverse contrast (positive > negative feedback, Table 
2.1) resulted in a network of regions, including the expected regions for 
reward processing: bilateral ventromedial PFC (VMPFC) and left 
caudate nucleus (Knutson et  al., 2001; Rogers et al., 2004; O’Doherty et 
al., 2003). Additional activations are reported in Table 2.2.
Figure 2.6 Neural correlates of risk estimation (high-risk followed by positive 
feedback > low-risk followed by positive feedback), and negative feedback 
processing (high-risk followed by loss > high-risk followed by gain) in children 
and adults (p < .005). Activation for children is displayed in red, and 
activation for adults is displayed in blue. High-risk trials were associated with 
increased medial PFC/ACC activation in both children and adults. Negative 
feedback trials were associated with increased activation in bilateral VLPFC 
(BA 47), and children additionally activated right lateral OFC for negative 
feedback trials.
2.4 Discussion
In this study, we used fMRI to test  whether risk estimation and feedback 
processing are sensitive to developmental change. We performed ROI 
analyses to focus on several subregions of PFC that  have been 
associated with these functions in previous studies. Specifically, we 
examined how OFC, ACC, DLPFC, and midbrain contributed to risk 
estimation, and how VLPFC and medial PFC contributed to negative 
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feedback processing. ROI analyses revealed differences in the patterns 
of brain activation of children and adults in these regions of a priori 
interest, while the whole-brain data indicate overlapping patterns of 
brain activation associated with risk estimation and feedback-processing 
for children and adults, suggesting that both age groups performed the 
task in a similar way. The differences are important, as they provide us 
with insight into the relative contributions of different brain regions to 
the development of decision-making abilities. For both risk anticipation 
and negative feedback processing, we observed greater engagement in 
both ACC and lateral OFC among children than in adults. These 
findings suggest that children use these regions less efficiently.
2.4.1 Performance 
Children and adults were highly comparable in terms of performance. 
Importantly, the groups did not differ in performance on low-risk trials, 
excluding the possibility that  children did not  understand the task 
instructions. Participants from both groups tended to
choose the option that had the highest  likelihood of resulting in reward; 
thus, few choices resulted in loss (see also Critchley et  al., 2001). Both 
groups, however, made slightly more choices that were likely to result 
in loss on the high-risk trials, and there was a trend towards a 
disproportionately larger number of disadvantageous choices on high-
risk trials for children compared to adults. These data suggest that, 
consistent with the literature, children were more prone than adults to 
take risks on high-risk trials (e.g. Ernst et  al.,2005; Overman, 2004). 
Additionally, response selection demands may have been larger for 
children on high-risk than low-risk trials, because the perceptual 
conflict  was larger (see Ridderinkhof & Van der Molen, 1995; Bunge et 
al., 2002a). 
2.4.2 Risk estimation
Consistent with our expectations, right OFC (BA 11), bilateral ACC 
(BA 24/33) and right  DLPFC (BA 9) were engaged more strongly when 
participants made high-risk relative to low-risk decisions. These 
findings are consistent with previous neuroimaging studies that have 
shown increased OFC activation when healthy adults make risky 
decisions (Rogers et al., 2004; Breiter et  al., 2001; Ernst et al., 2005; 
2005; Ursu & Carter, 2005; Cohen et al., 2005), as well as with non-
human primate studies showing that  OFC is important  for reversal 
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learning (Schoenbaum, Chiba & Gallagher, 2000; Rolls, 1999; see also 
Maia & McClelland, 2004, 2005; Fellows & Farah, 2003, 2005), and 
reward expectation (Tremblay & Schultz, 1999). Contrary to 
expectations, an ROI analysis targeting the midbrain showed that  this 
region was not affected by the risk manipulation. Parts of the midbrain 
have been associated with error prediction (Rodriguez et  al., 2005), and 
therefore it was expected to be active in the high-risk condition. 
However, the results showing that  midbrain was not active in this task is 
consistent with previous studies in which this region has been shown to 
be sensitive to differences in reward amount (e.g., Galvan et al., 2005), 
whereas in this study the reward or punishment were always associated 
with winning or losing one credit. 
In summary, children and adults exhibited similar patterns of activation 
in OFC and DLPFC in relation to risk estimation, but  children recruited 
ACC more strongly for high-risk choices relative to low-risk choices 
than adults did. The similarities of OFC and DLPFC activation between 
the groups may reflect  the marginal performance differences between 
children and adults on this simple decision-making task. It  would be 
helpful to manipulate risk level more extensively in future studies – for 
example, to include trials where the chances of obtaining reward are 
low but the reward itself is large (e.g., Ernst et al., 2005; Rogers et al., 
2004). We predict  that excessive risk-taking in children relative to 
adults would be associated with under-recruitment  of DLPFC, a region 
implicated in the weighing of response options (McClure et  al., 2004), 
and/or under-recruitment of OFC, a region implicated in the anticipation 
of choice outcomes (Rogers et al., 2004). It should, however, be noted 
that this was the first fMRI study examining decision-making in 
children younger than 12 years of age. We have shown that children 
aged 9-12 recruit many of the same regions that  have been linked to risk 
estimation in adults, albeit  with some differences in sensitivity to 
uncertainty and risk. The sensitivity of these regions to different  levels 
of uncertainty and risk in children should be validated in future 
research.
Within the current  theoretical framework (Ernst  et  al., 2004; Carter et 
al., 1998), the finding that children showed greater modulation of ACC 
for high-risk relative to low-risk choices than adults suggests that 
children experience greater conflict  associated with high-risk trials. 
ACC is thought to be important  for detecting response conflict, 
monitoring performance, and/or anticipating uncertain outcomes (Bush 
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et  al. 2002; Carter et  al., 1998; Critchley, Corfield, Chandler, Mathias & 
Dolan, 2000; O'Doherty et  al, 2001; Van Veen & Carter, 2002). The 
ACC activation in the present  study suggests that performance 
monitoring for high-risk decisions is more effortful for children 
compared to adults. This enhanced ACC activation is likely to reflect 
the fact  that children have greater difficulty making the right decision 
under uncertainty, even if, as in the case of this simple task, they choose 
advantageously most  of the time. Instead or additionally, greater ACC 
response in children may reflect  less efficient  performance monitoring 
in children, even though the high-risk vs. low-risk contrast was 
estimated purely on the basis of correctly performed trials. Arguing 
against this interpretation, it  has been found that  the Error-Related 
Negativity (a brain potential observed in the encephalogram in response 
to errors) becomes larger over the course of adolescence (e.g. a flanker 
task in Davies et al., 2004). This latter finding supports the view that 
children over-recruit ACC on this task because they have greater 
difficulty than adults in choosing the less risky option.
2.4.3 Feedback processing
Both adults and children recruited bilateral VLPFC (BA 47) for 
negative vs. positive feedback processing. This result  is consistent with 
previous studies on adults showing that this region is active following 
punishment (e.g., O’Doherty et  al., 2003), and following negative 
feedback indicating a rule reversal (Cools, Clark, Owen & Robbins, 
2002; Cools, Clark & Robbins, 2004). In our study, adults also 
exhibited activation in medial PFC/ACC (BA 6/ BA 32 (dorsal) and 24 
(ventral)). This finding is consistent  with previous results by Holroyd et 
al. (2004), who have suggested that the medial PFC/ACC is active when 
individuals receive negative feedback as well as when they make an 
error. However, it should be noted that  this interpretation is not 
universally accepted, and follow-up research by this group has failed to 
replicate this effect  (Nieuwenhuis, Slagter, Alting von Geusau, 
Heslenfeld, & Holroyd, 2001). Also, the medial PFC region reported 
here is more anterior than the medial PFC/ACC region reported by 
Holroyd et al. (2004). 
Children additionally recruited a region in right lateral OFC (BA 11) in 
response to negative versus positive feedback. In adults, this region was 
only slightly more active following negative than positive feedback, 
broadly consistent  with the view that this region is important  for 
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processing magnitude of both positive and negative outcomes (Breiter 
et  al., 2001). There was no difference between age groups for positive 
feedback in this region, indicating that  right  lateral OFC was more 
strongly attuned to negative feedback for children than adults. 
Lateral OFC and VLPFC (BA 11/47) are thought to process negative 
feedback for the purpose of adjusting behavior to optimize performance 
(Cools et al. 2002; Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004). In a prior 
developmental study in which participants had to use performance 
feedback to improve their performance, we examined how children 
adjust their behavior based on positive and negative feedback in a 
stimulus-response mapping task (Crone et  al., 2004). On a proportion of 
the trials, participants received standard response-dependent  feedback 
(i.e., negative feedback after an incorrect response, and positive 
feedback after a correct response). In a second condition, intermixed 
with the response-dependent condition and unknown to the participants, 
participants received positive and negative feedback that  was unrelated 
to their actual performance. Heart  rate was measured as an index of 
feedback processing. In this prior study, we found that heart rate slowed 
following negative performance feedback, and that the amount of 
slowing was the same for all age groups for informative feedback. 
However, participants older than 12 did not  show this slowing to 
uninformative negative feedback, whereas children younger than 12 did. 
These findings suggest  that  children under the age of 12 have difficulty 
distinguishing between relevant  and irrelevant feedback for the purpose 
of performance adjustment. Behavioral studies have consistently shown 
that children perform worse than adults on complex decision-making 
tasks (Kerr & Zelazo, 2004; Crone et  al., 2003; Overman, 2004). This 
might  be in part  because they fail to distinguish between informative 
and uninformative feedback, or because they are less able than adults to 
adjust their behavior on the basis of negative feedback (Kirkham & 
Diamond, 2003). The enhanced activation in lateral OFC observed in 
children in the present study in response to negative feedback suggests 
that children may be generally more sensitive to negative feedback than 
adults, regardless of whether or not  the feedback is meaningful. This 
finding could be further investigated in future research by manipulating 
the magnitude of positive and negative feedback. 
2.4.4 Conclusion
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These data indicate that the neural correlates of risk estimation and 
feedback-processing are dissociable in children as well as in adults. 
First, it  is important to note that the children recruited partially 
overlapping brain regions relative to adults, showing that children aged 
9-12 performed the task in a similar way to adults. The differences in 
the pattern of brain activity (i.e., the relative contribution of the brain 
regions involved) that  were found between 9-12 year olds and young 
adults, for lateral OFC and ACC in particular, contribute to our 
understanding of the role that these different processes play in the 
development of decision-making over childhood. 
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Table 2.1 Risk estimation-elicited activation for High-Risk and Low–Risk trials 
for both age groups 
Contrast Region Talairach Coordinates






HR_pos > LR_pos Adults
Medial PFC R OFC 22 50 -14 11 2.98 <.005
R superior frontal 
gyrus 8 14 56 6 4,37 57
<.001
Lateral PFC R inferior frontal gyrus 34 28 0 47 3,83 42 <.001
R DLPFC 42 30 18 46 3.06 160 <.005
L medial frontal 
gyrus -30 -2 38 6 3,61 110
<.001
L DLPFC -42 4 32 9 3,49 <.001
Cingulate L/R ACC 0 6 20 33 3,76 27 <.001
Parietal cortex R Parietal, precuneus 28 -74 34 19 4,61 2415 <.001
R superior Parietal 26 -64 46 7 4,53 <.001
L superior Parietal -22 -68 44 7 4,67 586 <.001
L Parietal, 
precuneus -20 -74 34 19 3,72
<.001
R inferior Parietal 48 -40 52 40 3,33 8 <.001
Occipital 
cortex L Cuneus -14 -104 6 18 4,69 1339
<.001
L Occipital -24 -86 8 19 4,32 <.001
L Occipital -26 -84 -10 18 4,25 <.001
R Cuneus 22 -98 2 18 4,68 2415 <.001
HR_pos > LR_pos Children
 Medial PFC
R medial frontal 
gyrus 2 14 44 6 3,44 65
<.001
L superior frontal 
gyrus -8 62 36 9 4,28 24
<.001
Basal Ganglia R Caudate 28 -34 12 3,69 12 <.001
Cingulate R Cingulate gyrus 6 -14 34 24 4,06 47 <.001
R Cingulate gyrus 8 14 36 32 3,25 65 <.001
L Cingulate gyrus -2 8 24 24 3,67 22 <.001
Occipital 
cortex R Occipital 18 -94 32 19 4,22 1389
<.001
L Occipital -2 -90 34 19 4,08 <.001
LR_pos > HR_pos Adults
Medial PFC R anterior PFC 16 58 20 10 3,47 16 <.001
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Lateral PFC L Insula -36 -28 16 13 3,38 10 <.001
Parietal cortex L inferior Parietal -66 -32 28 40 4,68 91 <.001




Temporal Gyrus 58 -64 8 37 4,05 143 <.001
L Middle 
Temporal Gyrus -58 -68 8 37 3,68 21 <.001
L Angular -52 -72 32 39  3,5 71 <.001
Cingulate R ACC 12 46 -10 29 3,2 5 <.001
Somato-




Occipital -46 -80 34 19 3,43 71 <.001
LR_pos > HR_pos Children
Parietal cortex L Parietal, Angular -44 -68 34 39 3,16 5 <.001
HR = high-risk, LR = low-risk, pos = positive feedback, 
* Volume of activation in mm3
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Table 2.2 Feedback -elicited activation (positive > negative and negative > 
positive) for both age groups
Contrast Region Talairach Coordinates






Negative >  positive FB Adults
Lateral PFC L IFG -34 20 -6 47 3,78 78 <.001
R IFG 36 24 -10 47 4,63 213 <.001
R DLPFC 48 24 36 9 4,37 447 <.001
L DLPFC -46 18 30 9 3,32 14 <.001
R medial frontal 
gyrus 36 12 58 6 3,77 22 <.001
R inferior frontal 
gyrus 44 6 40 6 3,66 45 <.001
Medial PFC R superior frontal gyrus 12 26 60 6 3,75 161 <.001
Temporal R inferior temporal gyrus 64 -46 -12 20 3,53 54 <.001
Parietal R inferior Parietal 46 -56 48 40 4,86 900 <.001
L inferior Parietal -50 -46 48 40 3,59 103 <.001
L superior Parietal -44 -58 50 7 3,44 <.001
Negative >  positive FB Children
Lateral PFC R IFG 40 22 -12 47 3,59 13 <.001
Medial PFC L medial frontal gyrus -2 46 42 8 3,53 12 <.001
R superior frontal 
gyrus 8 46 44 8 3,12 <.001
R lateral OFC 40 46 -12 11 2,88 30 <.005
Positive > negative FB Adults
Medial PFC R VMPFC 4 50 -10 10  4,9 1598 <.001
L VMPFC -4 50 -16 11 4,67 <.001
Lateral PFC R DLPFC 20 38 18 9 3,62 8 <.001
L IFG -20 12 -20 47 4,42 1097 <.001
L Insula -34 -42 22 13 3,72 62 <.001
L Superior frontal 
gyrus -22 6 68 6 3,57 28 <.001
L Medial frontal 
gyrus -22 18 50 6 4,18 1079 <.001
R Medial frontal 
gyrus 22 28 36 8 3,72 10 <.001
Basal Ganglia L Caudate -12 22 4 3,83 1598 <.001
Somato-
sensorycortex R Postcentral gyrus 48 -18 44 3 4,94 3817 <.001
R Precentral gyrus 66 -4 26 6 4,88 <.001
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gyral -26 -46 56 7  3,4 16 <.001
Temporal 
cortex
R Middle temporal 
gyrus 62 0 -8 21 4,47 325 <.001
R Superior 
temporal gyrus 68 -18 0 22 3,83 <.001
Parahippocampal 
gyrus 20 -8 -24 35 4,88 3214 <.001
L Posterior 
cingulate -12 -60 14 30 5,04 8525 <.001
L Middle Temporal 
gyrus -48 -76 10 39 4,03 101 <.001
L Superior 
Temporal gyrus -60 -30 14 42 4,22 260 <.001
L Parahippocampal 
gyrus -22 0 -12 34 4,55 1097 <.001




Occipital -40 -84 36 19 3,98 91 <.001
L Occipital -20 -90 40 19 3,74 <.001
Positive > negative FB Children
Lateral PFC L Medial frontal gyrus -20 -2 38 6 3,26 6 <.001
Basal Ganglia L Caudate -6 20 8 3,66 5 <.001
Cingulate 
cortex R Cingulate gyrus 12 -40 44 31 3,33 10 <.001
Parietal 
cortex L inferior Parietal -66 -26 32 40 3,54 26 <.001
Occipital 
cortex L Occipital -10 -82 20 18 3,23 6 <.001
* Volume of activation in mm3
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3.
What motivates the adolescent? 
Brain regions mediating reward 
sensitivity across adolescence 
The relation between brain development across adolescence and adolescent 
risky behavior has attracted increasing interest in recent years. It has been 
proposed that adolescents are hypersensitive to reward because of an 
imbalance in the developmental pattern followed by the striatum and prefrontal 
cortex. To date it is unclear if adolescents engage in risky behavior because 
they overestimate potential rewards or because they respond more to received 
rewards and whether these effects occur in the absence of decisions. In this 
study,  we used an fMRI paradigm that allowed us to dissociate effects of the 
anticipation, receipt and omission of reward in 10-12, 14-15,  and 18-23 year-
old participants.  We show that in anticipation of uncertain outcomes the 
anterior insula is more active in adolescents compared to young adults,  and 
that the ventral striatum shows a reward related peak in middle adolescence, 
whereas young adults show orbitofrontal cortex activation to omitted reward. 
These regions show distinct developmental trajectories. This study supports the 
hypothesis that adolescents are hypersensitive to reward, and adds to the 
current literature in demonstrating that neural activation differs in adolescents 
even for small rewards in the absence of choice. These findings may have 
important implications for understanding adolescent risk-taking behavior. 
What motivates the adolescent? | 45 
3.1 Introduction
Often decisions are made in uncertain situations, in which not  all the 
information needed to make a rational decision is known. When choices 
in uncertain situations are associated with possible negative outcomes, 
they are considered risky. An increase in risky behavior is one of the 
most salient characteristics of adolescence (Arnett  1999; Boyer 2006; 
Steinberg 2004). This change in behavior suggests a difference in the 
decision making processes of adolescents compared to adults. That  is, 
adolescents may choose differently between competing courses of 
action in an uncertain situation, because they weigh the possible 
outcomes and the probabilities with which these occur differently 
compared to adults. Prior studies have suggested that  adolescents are 
biased towards taking risks because of differences in the way they 
experience rewards (Bjork et  al. 2004; Ernst et al. 2005; Galvan et al. 
2006; May et al. 2004; Van Leijenhorst et al. 2006). 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have identified 
brain regions related to outcome anticipation and processing. Many 
studies have shown that  the ventral striatum responds to anticipation of 
potential rewards (Breiter et  al. 2001; Dagher 2007; Knutson et  al. 
2001; Tom et al. 2007), which was confirmed by a recent  meta analysis 
(Knutson and Greer, 2008). In addition, the anterior insula have been 
implicated in the anticipation of outcomes, activation in this region is 
also often associated with the uncertainty associated with anticipation 
(Critchley et al. 2001; Volz et al. 2003). Finally, several studies in adults 
have shown that  medial prefrontal, orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate 
cortex are involved in processing rewards (Bechara 2001; Knutson et al. 
2001; O'Doherty et al. 2001; O'Doherty et al. 2002; Rolls 2000). 
The functional development of these regions is not  well understood. 
The few developmental studies to date show a seemingly inconsistent 
pattern of results. Adolescent risk-taking has on the one hand been 
associated with a decreased sensitivity of the ventral striatum to reward 
in adolescents compared to adults. This neural response has been 
suggested to lead adolescents to seek more stimulating experiences in 
order to compensate for low levels of activation in the ventral striatum 
(Bjork et al. 2004; Spear 2000). On the other hand, adolescent risk-
taking has been associated with an increased responsiveness of the 
ventral striatum to reward (Galvan et  al. 2006). In these studies, it was 
suggested that this increase in the response to potential rewards in 
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combination with immature cognitive control abilities (resulting from 
the protracted development of the prefrontal cortex (PFC)) biases 
adolescents towards taking risks (Casey et  al. 2008b; Ernst  et al. 2006; 
Galvan et al. 2006).                                             
  
The interpretation of these developmental findings is complicated for 
two reasons. First, there is a large variance in the ages of participants 
that have been included in these studies on adolescent reward 
processing. This is problematic because adolescents form a very 
heterogeneous group, for instance, in early adolescence developmental 
changes could be influenced by pubertal changes. In prior studies 
adolescents from a broad age range have been included. For example, in 
the study by (Bjork  et al. 2004), the adolescent group consisted of 
participants aged 12-17-years, which may hinder our interpretation of 
the pattern of developmental change.  Structural brain imaging studies 
have demonstrated that development of brain structure in terms of grey 
and white matter proportion continues throughout adolescence (Giedd et 
al. 1999; Gogtay et  al. 2004), and a recent study has shown that  these 
developmental changes follow a nonlinear pattern in many brain regions 
(Shaw et  al. 2008). A second difficulty is that different  experimental 
paradigms have been used in prior reports, making it difficult  to 
compare results. For example, in prior studies rewards were dependent 
upon participants’ task performance, and the requirements for obtaining 
rewards varied. Rewards could depend on reaction times (e.g. (Bjork et 
al. 2004), or on response accuracy/ probability matching (e.g. (Ernst et 
al. 2005; Eshel et  al. 2007; Galvan et  al. 2006; Van Leijenhorst et al. 
2006). In addition, reward magnitude (Bjork et al. 2004; Galvan et al. 
2006) reward probability (May  et al. 2004; Van Leijenhorst  et al. 2006) 
or both magnitude and probability (Ernst et al. 2005; Eshel et  al. 2007) 
were manipulated. It  is therefore difficult to relate developmental 
differences in ventral striatum activation to risk taking, or reward 
processing more generally. Recently, studies on adult  decision-making 
have attempted to predict behavior based on preceding changes in 
activation of the ventral striatum (Knutson et  al. 2008a). These studies 
showed that  increased ventral striatum activation is associated with an 
increased willingness to take risks in adults. In a prior study including 
adults, Knutson et  al. (2008b) used a decision-making task, and 
presented rewarding pictures that  were unrelated to the task. 
Presentation of these pictures was related to increased activation of the 
ventral striatum and to increased willingness to take risks (Knutson et 
al. 2008b). Thus, if a peak in activation of the ventral striatum in 
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adolescents drives them to take risks, it is important to understand the 
extent  to which this region is independent of behavioral requirements. 
In addition, it  is important to understand at what phase, during the 
anticipation or processing of rewards, differences between adolescents 
and adults are observed. A better understanding of the causes of 
adolescent reward processing can help interpret the potentially harmful 
risky behavior that  many adolescents engage in. It  is important to 
understand whether adolescents are more likely to engage in risky 
behavior compared to adults because they overestimate potential 
rewards (in an early phase of the decision-making process), or because 
their response to received rewards differs from that  of adults (in a later 
phase). Insight into these possible differences in reward sensitivity in 
adolescence informs us about  the processes that  underlie adolescent 
real-world risky behavior. In addition this knowledge could aid attempts 
to intervene and protect adolescents against  the problems they face. 
Basic differences in reward related brain regions between participants 
form different ages may complicate the interpretation of developmental 
changes in behavior. One way to work around this difficulty is to study 
reward processing using an experimental task in which reward and risk 
are unrelated to participants’ behavior (see Tobler et  al. 2008) for a 
similar approach). Therefore, the goal of this study was to examine 
developmental differences in neural activation related to different 
phases of reward processing in the absence of behavior. 
We compared the neural substrates of outcome anticipation and 
outcome processing in early and middle adolescence and young 
adulthood using fMRI. In order to identify the pattern of development 
of brain regions implicated in the processing of reward we included 
three homogenous age groups (10-12 year olds, 14-15 year olds and 
18-23 year olds). These participants performed a Slot Machine Task 
(Donkers et al. 2005), a simple paradigm in which small monetary 
rewards are unpredictable and unrelated to behavior. In this task, 
participants view three slot machines in which pictures of fruit  are 
presented consecutively. Only when these three pictures are the same, 
participants win money. The task involves the presentation of three 
different  conditions: 1) all three pictures are different  (referred to as the 
XYZ conditions), 2) the first  two pictures are the same but the third is 
different  (referred to as the XXY conditions) and 3) all three pictures 
are the same (referred to as XXX conditions). In this way, the paradigm 
allowed us to dissociate brain activation associated with outcome 
anticipation (when the first two out of three pictures are the same versus 
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all three pictures are different; XXY vs XYZ), processing of reward 
(when all three pictures are the same versus the first  two out  of three 
pictures are the same; XXX vs XXY), and omission of reward (XXY vs 
XXX). 
Our analyses focused on identifying brain regions implicated in reward 
processing and uncertainty, including the striatum, the insula and the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Our first hypothesis was that these regions 
show functional development  which is reflected in a different pattern of 
activation in the different age groups. We tested for linear and nonlinear 
developmental patterns. Our second hypothesis was that if adolescent 
risk taking is associated with increased sensitivity to reward this should 
be reflected in a peak in activation in the ventral striatum in this age 
group. We examined at which stage, during anticipation or processing 
of outcomes, the ventral striatum would show different  responses in the 
absence of behavioral requirements, and whether the response to 
rewards in this region would be increased or decreased in adolescents 
compared to adults. The results are expected to provide insight  in the 
development  of reward related brain regions during adolescence, and 
contribute to the interpretation of differences in neural responses 




Fifty-three healthy, right-handed volunteers participated in the study, 
fifteen 18-23 year olds (7 females; mean age = 20.2, SD = 1.6), eighteen 
14-15 year olds (10 females; mean age = 15.0, SD = 0.7), and seventeen 
10-12 year olds (8 females; mean age 11.6, SD = 0.8). Informed consent 
was obtained from all participants and from a primary caregiver in case 
participants were younger than 18 years of age. The study was approved 
by the Medical Ethical Committee at  the Leiden University Medical 
Centre. Data from three additional adult  participants were excluded 
because of technical difficulties. Data for participants who had moved 
more than 3 mm in any direction were excluded from the analyses. For 
this reason, the data of three participants (a 14, 15 and 10 year old) were 
excluded. Average movement was .52 mm for the 18-23 year olds, .68 
mm for the 14-15 year olds, and .62 mm for the 10-12 year olds. The 
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difference in average movement between the age groups was not 
significant (p >.1 ).
3.2.2 Behavioral assessment
Prior to scanning, all participants were prepared for the scan session in a 
quiet  laboratory in which a mock scanner was present. This mock 
scanner, which simulated the environment and sounds of an actual MRI 
scanner, gave minors the opportunity to become accustomed to the 
scanner environment, and was used to explain the scanning procedure to 
all participants. In order tot  obtain an estimate of IQ, age appropriate 
versions of two subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(Wechsler 1981) or the Wechsler Intelligence Scales for Children 
(Wechsler 1991) - Similarities and Block Design - were administered to 
all participants. For 10-12 year olds, 14-15 year olds and 18-23 year 
olds estimate IQs were 119.7 (SD = 9.7), 106.0 (SD = 9.0) and 108.7 
(SD = 9.4) respectively. 10-12 year olds’ average IQ was significantly 
higher relative to the other two age groups (F(2, 49) = 11.62, p =.001) 
but overall participants’ IQs fell in the average range. The analyses 
reported below were all corrected for differences in IQ by adding IQ as 
a covariate factor to the analyses. However, none of the effects were 
influenced by IQ differences. Therefore, IQ differences are not 
described further. 
All participants were screened for psychiatric conditions, drug use, head 
injuries and contraindications for MRI using a checklist. No participants 
reported any problems. In addition, participants in the two youngest  age 
groups were screened for behavioral problems using parent-ratings on 
the Child Behavior Checklist  (Achenbach 1991). Scores for all 
participants fell within the non clinical range. 
3.2.3 Experimental Design
Participants performed the Slot Machine Task, a child-friendly version 
of a paradigm used previously by (Donkers et al. 2005). Each trial 
started with the presentation of three empty slot machines. After 500 
ms, a coin was presented at  the bottom of the screen for 1000 ms, which 
served as a cue. In order to keep participants engaged in the (otherwise 
passive) task, they were instructed to start  the machines by pressing a 
pre-specified button with their right index finger on presentation of the 
cue. The response had to be given within a 1000 ms time window. 
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Following the 1000 ms response window, three pictures, each one of 
three possible fruit types – a kiwi, a pear or a pair of cherries - were 
presented consecutively, from left to right in the slot  machines, every 
1500 ms (See Figure 3.1). 
Pictures were presented in three possible orders: 1) three different 
pictures (e.g., kiwi-pear-cherries, referred to as XYZ trials), 2) two 
identical and one different picture (e.g., kiwi-kiwi-cherries, referred to 
as XXY trials) or 3) three identical pictures (e.g., kiwi-kiwi-kiwi, 
referred to as XXX conditions). These three trial types represent three 
experimental conditions. The order in which trials were presented was 
randomized and participants were presented with a new combination of 
the three pictures on each trial. Participants were instructed in advance 
that they would gain € 0.05 on each XXX trial, and that they would not 
gain money on the other types of trials. When participants failed to 
respond during the 1000 ms. cue presentation, the trial ended and they 
received a € 0.10 penalty. This occurred on less than 5% of the trials. At 
the end of the experiment the total winnings (€  1.50) were added to the 
amount that participants received as reimbursement for participating in 
the study.                                                                                                      
Figure 3.1 Example of a.) a trial, b.) a possible outcome displays for the Slot 
Machine Task. Following a 1000 ms. time window in which participants could 
respond to the cue, three pictures appeared consecutively every 1500 ms. 
resulting in three trial types: XXX, XXY or XYZ. Participants won € 0.05 on 
each XXX trial, and did not win in the other conditions.
3.2.4 MRI Data Acquisition 
Trials were presented over the course of two event-related scans that 
each lasted approximately 7 minutes. The visual stimuli were projected 
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onto a screen that  participants could see via a mirror attached to the 
head coil. During scanning participants were presented with a total of 
120 trials, in which XXX, XXY and XYZ trials were intermixed, such 
that 60 XYZ trials, 30 XXY and 30 XXX trials were presented in total, 
with 60 trials in each run. Age related differences in response to rewards 
could be influenced by slow maturation of the ability to learn 
probabilities and predict risk. We controlled for this possibility by 
presenting the three consecutive stimuli in pseudo-random order to 
maximize uncertainty. On all trials after presentation of the first picture 
the probability that the next  picture in the series of three was the same 
was always 50%. In the same way, after two identical pictures had been 
presented the probability that the third picture was the same was 50%. 
(50% XYZ, 25% XXY, 25% XXX trials, following (Donkers et  al. 
2005). Periods of fixation lasting between 1 and 3 s, jittered in 
increments of 500 ms, were added in between the experimental trials. 
Scanning was performed using a standard whole-head coil on a 3 Tesla 
Philips scanner at the Leiden University Medical Center (LUMC). 
Functional data were acquired using a T2*-weighted gradient-echo 
echo-planar pulse sequence (38 contiguous 2.75 mm oblique axial 
slices, using interleaved acquisition, TR = 2.211 s, TE = 30 ms, 2.75 x 
2.75 mm inplane resolution, 230 volumes per run). The first two 
volumes of each scan were discarded to allow for T1-equilibration 
effects. High-resolution T2* weighed images and high resolution T1 
anatomical images were collected at the end of the scan session. Head 
motion was restricted using a pillow and foam inserts that surrounded 
the head. 
3.2.5 fMRI preprocessing and Statistical analysis
Data pre-processing and analysis was conducted using SPM2 
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology). Images were 
corrected for differences in timing of slice acquisition, followed by rigid 
body motion correction. Structural and functional volumes were 
spatially normalized to T1 and echo planar imaging templates, 
respectively. The normalization algorithm used a 12-parameter affine 
transformation together with a nonlinear transformation involving 
cosine basis functions. During normalization the data was resampled to 
3-mm cubic voxels. Templates were based on the MNI305 stereotaxic 
space (Cocosco et al. 1997). Functional volumes were smoothed with an 
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8-mm full-with at  half maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel. Statistical 
analyses were performed on individual subjects’ data using the GLM in 
SPM2. The fMRI time series were modeled as a series of events 
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) in 
two separate models. We modeled each trial in the three different 
conditions (XXX, XXY, and XYZ) as a zero duration event around the 
onset times of the second stimulus in a first model, and around the onset 
times of the third stimulus in a second model. Error trials, defined as 
those trials where the participant  did not respond within the 1000 ms 
cue window, were modeled separately and were excluded from the 
fMRI analyses. 
For each participant  the parameter estimates of height  of the best-fitting 
canonical HRF for each condition were used in pair wise contrasts. For 
the first model we computed contrast images for the comparison of 
XXY and XYZ (i.e. comparing the situation where participants had first 
seen two pictures that  were the same (XX) versus two pictures that  were 
different  (XY)); which revealed brain activation patterns related to the 
anticipation  of the outcome of trials, based on the hypothesis that 
adolescents are more sensitive to potential rewards than adults. For the 
second model we computed contrast images for the comparison of XXX 
and XXY conditions; comparing brain activation patterns related to the 
processing of the outcome of trials. The resulting contrast  images 
computed for each participant were submitted to second level group 
analyses. At the group level, whole brain contrasts between conditions 
were computed by performing one-tailed t-tests on these images, 
treating participants as random effect. Whole brain statistical maps were 
thresholded at p < .001, with an extent  threshold of 5 contiguous 
voxels. 
3.2.6 Statistical Analyses: Age related differences
Since we were especially interested in the pattern of activation related 
to outcome anticipation and outcome processing in the three different 
age groups, we performed voxelwise ANOVAs to identify regions that 
showed age-related differences in activation. We tested for linear (-1 0 
1), quadratic (-0,5 1 -0,5) and curvilinear (1 -0,5 -0,5), (-0,5 -0,5 1) 
effects in the in the contrasts of XXY - XYZ for the first  model 
(outcome anticipation), and XXX - XXY for the second model 
(outcome processing). ANOVAs were considered significant  at a 
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statistical threshold of .001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons, with 
an extent threshold of 5 contiguous voxels. 
3.2.7 Imaging Results: Region of Interest Analysis
  
We used the MARSBAR toolbox for use with SPM2 (Brett  et al. 2002) 
to perform region of Interest (ROI) analyses to further characterize 
patterns of activation. We created 6 mm spherical ROIs centered at the 
peak activity voxel in the regions that were identified in the ANOVAs 
testing for age related differences. In addition we used MARSBAR to 
extract  BOLD activity time series in these ROIs by averaging the time 
courses for the different experimental conditions starting at  the onset  of 
each trial. These time courses are displayed for illustrative purposes in 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3. 
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Outcome Anticipation 
We conducted a GLM analysis on the functional data modeled at the 
onset of the second stimulus, and computed the voxelwise contrast  of 
XXY > XYZ for 10-12-year-olds, 14-15-year-olds and 18-23-year-olds 
separately. These analyses resulted in largely overlapping areas of 
activation for the three age groups. In all age groups, outcome 
anticipation was consistently associated with activation in the right 
anterior insula (see Figure 3.2 top panel). For 10-12 year olds and 14-15 
year olds anterior insula activation was found in both hemispheres. In 
addition, the adolescent age groups showed activation clusters in the 
ventral striatum and dorsal cingulate cortex. Significant clusters and 
corresponding MNI coordinates are reported in Supplemental Table 3.1.
The voxelwise ANOVAs testing for age related changes for the XXY - 
XYZ contrast did not  result in any significant clusters at a threshold of p 
< .001. At  a more liberal threshold (p < .005) the ANOVA testing for 
the -1 0 1 contrast  revealed a linear change in activation with age in the 
right  anterior insula (peak at: 42, 12, -3, z = 2.95), F (1, 47) = 11.24, p 
= .002. We created a 6 mm spherical ROI centered at  this voxel and 
performed an Age group (3) x Condition (2) ANOVA on the data 
extracted from this ROI to further characterize activation patterns in this 
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region. Average time series for this ROI are plotted in the bottom panel 
of Figure 3.2. The ANOVA for this ROI resulted in an Age group x 
Condition interaction, F (2, 47) = 7.00, p =.002. Follow up comparisons 
confirmed that  this region was more active in the XXY compared to the 
XYZ condition in the 10-12-year-olds F (1, 16) = 11.26, p  = .004, and 
14-15-year-olds F (1, 17) = 3.62, p = .005. For the 18-23 year olds the 
difference between conditions was not significant (p = .19). 
Figure 3.2 Whole brain results for the 10-12 –year-old, 14-15-year-old and 
18-23-year-old participants related to the anticipation of possible reward for 
the contrast of XXY > XYZ at a p < .001 uncorrected threshold (top panel). 
And 6 mm spherical ROIs and average time courses for the three age groups 
for the anterior insula, and striatum (lower panel). 
No age related changes for the XXY - XYZ contrast were found in the 
striatum. An ANOVA did reveal that this region was active in all age 
groups (peak at: -9, 9, 0, z = 4.57) in anticipation of outcomes, F (3, 47) 
= 13.11, p < .001. As anticipated, ANOVAs on the data extracted from 
the 6 mm spherical ROI for this region resulted in a main effect  of 
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Condition, F (1, 47) = 23.73, p < .001, and no significant  interaction 
with Age Group (p = .1). These results demonstrate that  the striatum 
was more active in anticipation of potential reward to the same extent  in 
all age groups. Nevertheless, comparisons for the age groups separately 
suggest  a larger ventral striatum response in the adolescent groups. That 
is, in the 10-12 and 14-15 year-olds the XXY condition resulted in 
significantly more activation compared to the XYZ  condition (p’s for 
the main effect  of Condition = .001), whereas in adults this difference 
only showed a trend towards significance (p = .09).
3.3.2 Outcome Processing
To examine brain activation patterns related to the processing of 
outcomes, a similar GLM analysis was performed on the functional data 
modeled at  the onset of the third stimulus. Again, we computed the 
contrasts of interest for 10-12-year-olds, 14-15-year-olds and 18-23-
year-olds separately. For the contrast  of XXX > XXY (reward 
processing) we found activation in the striatum and dorsal cingulate 
cortex for 10-12-year-olds and 14-15-year-olds (see Figure 3.3 top 
panel). No significant  clusters were found for the 18-23-year-olds, not 
even at  a more liberal uncorrected threshold of p < .005. 14-15-year-
olds also showed activation in left lateral prefrontal cortex. 
A GLM for the reverse contrast  of XXY > XXX (processing of omitted 
reward) did not  reveal any significant  clusters for both the 10-12-year-
olds and 14-15-year-olds. In contrast, a region in the left OFC was 
found to be more responsive to omitted rewards in 18-23-year-olds at  an 
uncorrected threshold of p < .001. An overview of significant clusters 
and corresponding MNI coordinates are reported in Supplemental Table 
3.2.
The voxelwise ANOVAs testing for age related changes for the XXX - 
XXY contrast  confirmed the whole brain findings for the XXX > XXY 
contrast  by showing that activation in the striatum differed between 
adolescents and young adults. At  an uncorrected threshold of p < .001 
the ANOVA testing for the -0.5 1 -0.5 contrast revealed a cluster in the 
ventral striatum (peak at  12, 9, -15, z = 3.68) that  showed a quadratic 
developmental pattern, F (1, 47) = 17.64, p < .001. The Age group (3) x 
Condition (2) ANOVA on the data extracted from the 6 mm spherical 
ROI centered at  this voxel revealed that  his region was more active in 
the XXX compared to the XXY condition in 14-15-year-olds F (1, 17) = 
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22.84, p < .001, but did not differ between conditions in the 10-12-year-
olds (p = .41) and 18-23-year-olds (p = .12) (see Figure 3.3 bottom 
panel). The whole brain contrasts for the separate age groups revealed a 
region in the lateral OFC which was responsive to omitted rewards in 
the adult group. This finding was confirmed with an ANOVA testing for 
a curvilinear developmental trend with the -0.5 -0.5 1 contrast that 
resulted in a region in lateral OFC (peak at: -27, 48, -3, z = 3.05), F (1, 
47) = 11.99 p = .001 (see Figure 3.3 bottom panel). ANOVAs on the 6 
mm spherical ROI for this region resulted in a Condition x Age group 
interaction F (2, 47) = 8.67, p = .001. Follow up comparisons confirmed 
that this region only showed an increased response to the omission of 
rewards compared to received rewards in the 18-23-year-olds F (1, 14) 
= 7.38, p = .02. 
Figure 3.3 Whole brain results for the 10-12 –year-old, 14-15-year-old and 
18-23-year-old participants related to the anticipation of possible reward for 
the contrast of XXX > XXY at a p < .001 uncorrected threshold (top panel) and 
XXY > XXX (in blue).  And 6 mm spherical ROIs and average time courses for 
the three age groups for the striatum and OFC (lower panel). 
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3.4 Discussion
This study was motivated by the question how adolescents differ from 
adults in their sensitivity to uncertain reward. We examined the 
developmental trajectory of brain activation related to the processing of 
uncertain reward during the anticipation and outcome phases. Prior 
studies have reported inconsistent  findings on adolescent  reward 
processing, showing both overactive (Galvan et al. 2006) and 
underactive (Bjork et  al. 2004) incentive-related neurocircuitry in 
adolescence. The present study differed from these previous studies in 
that we used a paradigm which resulted in probabilistic reward that  was 
not dependent  on behavior. This approach allowed us to examine basic 
differences in reward sensitivity under uncertainty. In addition, we 
examined neural differences in three distinct age groups; 10-12-year-
olds, 14-15-year-olds, and 18-23-year-olds, which enabled us to test  for 
different patterns of age related change. 
The study yielded two main results: 1) when anticipating uncertain 
rewards, all age groups showed increased activation in the striatum, but 
a cluster in the anterior insula showed a linear decrease in activation 
form early adolescence to adulthood. 2) When processing the outcome 
of trials, middle adolescents were more responsive to received rewards 
as indicated by increased activation in the ventral striatum, whereas 
young adults responded most to the omission of rewards as indicated by 
increased activation in the OFC. In general, our findings support  the 
hypothesis that middle adolescence is characterized by overactive 
incentive-related neurocircuitry, but we show that  this effect is most 
pronounced during the phase of reward receipt. In light  of the results of 
prior studies these results favor the hypothesis that  overactive reward 
related circuitry and immature PFC circuitry potentially bias 
adolescents towards taking risks (see also (Casey et  al. 2008a; Ernst et 
al. 2005; Galvan et al. 2006). 
 
3.4.1 Developmental changes in outcome anticipation
Anticipation of outcomes was associated with activation in the striatum 
and anterior insula when the first  two stimuli were identical, and 
indicated the possibility of winning. Activation in the insula showed a 
linear decrease with age; this region was most  active in 10-12 year olds, 
less active in 14-15 year olds, and least  active in 18-23 year olds when 
anticipating reward.  In the paradigm that  we used, the anticipation of 
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potential reward was associated with maximum uncertainty. After 
presentation of two of the same pictures, the probability of the third 
picture being the same or different was equal. In contrast, when the 
second picture was different from the first, a reward was no longer 
possible, and as a consequence there was no uncertainty associated with 
the anticipation of the outcome.  The age related change in anterior 
insula activation could therefore reflect differences in at least two 
processes: 1) positive arousal associated with the anticipation of 
receiving a reward, or 2) the uncertainty when anticipating an unknown 
outcome.  
Our results are consistent with the results of recent  studies which have 
implicated the anterior insula in situations where decisions are 
associated with uncertainty (Huettel 2006; Huettel et  al. 2005; Paulus et 
al. 2003; Volz et  al. 2003; Volz and von Cramon 2006). The anterior 
insula have often been implicated in the experience of 
psychophysiological arousal. It has been suggested that  the insula aid 
decision making by reflecting the autonomic nervous system responses 
to risk associated with a decision (Bechara 2001; Critchley et al. 2001; 
Paulus et al. 2003). Large autonomic signals preceding a 
disadvantageous decision have been suggested to serve as a warning 
signal that  protect  against  risk-taking (Bechara et al. 1997). In light of 
this hypothesis the increased insula response in younger adolescents 
seems contradictory. However, other studies have suggested that this 
autonomic signal reflects the salience of the decision that has to be 
made (Tomb et al. 2002), and prior developmental studies showed that 
children experience autonomic signals when anticipating risky 
decisions, but  fail to use these signals to optimize their decisions (Crone 
et  al. 2005; Crone & Van der Molen 2004, 2007). In the current study, 
the increased insula activation in young adolescents could reflect 
immaturity of this region. The youngest  participants could have 
experienced increased psychophysiological arousal related to the 
uncertainty associated with anticipation of a possible reward. Even 
though we did not collect subjective ratings of affect, previous studies 
have attempted to correlate experienced affect and patterns of brain 
activation. A recent study found that while activation in the ventral 
striatum correlated with reported positive affect, activation in the 
anterior insula correlated with both positive and negative reported affect 
(Samanez-Larkin et al. 2007). The results from this study suggest  that 
the anterior insula might contribute to decision-making by reflecting 
general arousal in uncertain situations.
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Huettel (2006) dissociated uncertainty related to the amount of potential 
reward that could be gained  (reward risk), and uncertainty with regard 
to the optimal response (behavioral risk). He showed that  activation in 
the anterior insula was selectively influenced by uncertainty related to 
response selection. Our results add to this finding by showing that  the 
anterior insula is involved in uncertain situations in the absence of 
response selection, suggesting that this region may have a more general 
role in representing uncertainty of outcomes. A recent study (Preuschoff 
et  al. 2008), showed that  the anterior insula reflect  the degree of 
uncertainty in a way similar to that  in which the striatum is sensitive to 
the magnitude of reward. The authors suggest  that  the anterior insula 
could support  processes similar to the reward prediction errors in the 
striatum. The linear decrease in activation in this region shows that 
anterior insula function is immature in adolescence, and could be taken 
to suggest a greater difficulty in adolescents to estimate the risk 
involved in an uncertain situation. Possibly, adolescents expected 
reward more often compared to adults in the present study because they 
did not learn that  the occurrence of rewards was unpredictable. Taken 
together, the increased response in the anterior insula in anticipating an 
uncertain reward may bias adolescents towards increased risk-taking 
behavior. 
One explanation that  has to be considered is that the increased 
activation in the anterior insula reflects negative affect. Not winning 
might  be associated with more experienced negative arousal when it 
occurs at the end of the trial (XXY) compared to when it occurs at  the 
presentation of the second picture (XYZ). Even though we estimated 
the HRF at  the onset of the second stimulus, the third stimulus followed 
1.5 sec later. Therefore, it is possible that  the observed neural response 
is influenced by the third stimulus. In future studies it will be important 
to further examine the effect of both the degree of risk/uncertainty and 
the amount  of reward on adolescent decision-making. Given the 
possible focus of the adolescent group on reward, it  would be 
interesting to test  if the neural systems that are responsive to uncertainty 
respond similarly when the valence of the outcome is negative, i.e. 
when the XXX condition would reflect a loss rather than gain. 
3.4.2 Developmental changes in outcome processing
As expected, winning money resulted in increased activation in the 
ventral striatum. This finding replicates previous studies that  have 
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shown that  this region is responsive to rewards (Huettel 2006; Knutson 
et  al. 2001; McClure et  al. 2003). Interestingly, striatal activation 
following a win peaked in 14-15-year-olds, and was less pronounced in 
10-12-year olds, and 18-23-year-olds, consistent with the hypothesis 
that this region is more responsive in adolescents (Casey et al. 2008a; 
Ernst et al. 2006a; Galvan et al. 2006). 
In the present  study, we found the peak in responsiveness of the ventral 
striatum in middle adolescence only for reward processing, not for 
reward anticipation. This finding is inconsistent with previous studies, 
which reported an increase in activation in this region before the actual 
delivery of rewards. These prior results were taken to suggest  a role for 
the ventral striatum in the prediction and anticipation of outcomes 
(Bjork et al. 2004; Galvan et al. 2006; Huettel 2006; Knutson et al. 
2001). Our findings, however, suggest  that  the peak in ventral striatum 
response in adolescents is only found for the receipt  of rewards. In 
previous experiments, the cues signaled potential rewards and allowed 
for reward prediction, therefore activation in the ventral striatum in 
these studies could reflect an early response to knowing that the reward 
will follow, rather than anticipating the possibility of a reward. These 
data could also be taken to suggest  that adolescents overestimate their 
chances of obtaining a reward, or ability to obtain a reward. We suggest 
that in the present  study a peak in activation in the ventral striatum was 
not observed until the actual delivery of reward because the task design 
maximized uncertainty and did not  allow for reward prediction. Even 
though the anticipation results did not  show a statistically significant 
peak in activation and no Age x Condition interaction in the ventral 
striatum, follow up analyses hinted that  the anticipation striatum 
response was larger for young and middle adolescents relative to adults. 
Future studies should study the anticipation versus outcome results in 
more detail. 
Finally, young adults, but not early and middle adolescents, showed 
increased activation in left lateral OFC following the omission of 
rewards. Lateral OFC has previously been implicated in processing of 
punishment (O'Doherty et  al. 2001). The OFC is highly connected to 
both appetitive circuitry and other regions within the PFC, and recently 
it has been suggested that OFC  has an integrative function by guiding 
the brains’ response to affective information, and guiding affective 
decision making by maintaining and updating a representation of 
incentive related expectations online (for reviews, see (O'Doherty 2007; 
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Wallis 2007). The response of lateral OFC in young adults may 
therefore signal the need for increased attention and adjustment of 
behavior following negative outcomes. It should be noted that the OFC 
is a heterogeneous region and many questions regarding its role in goal 
directed behavior and decision making and associated changes with 
development  need to be tested in future studies. The finding that  this 
region is involved in the processing of unfavorable outcomes in adults, 
but not  in early and middle adolescents, is consistent  with the 
hypothesis that  networks in the brain related to higher order processing 
and cognitive control functions do not mature until late adolescence 
(Ernst et al. 2006a; Galvan et al. 2006).
3.4.3 Conclusions
The current findings could be interpreted in light of recent accounts that 
seek a neuropsychological explanation for adolescent behavior. Both the 
Social Information Processing Network model (SIPN) (Nelson et al. 
2005) and the Triadic Model (Ernst et al. 2006) contain an appetitive 
component  and a cognitive/regulatory component. In these models, 
adolescent behavior is characterized by a strong appetitive system and a 
relatively weak control system. The SIPN Model (Nelson et al. 2005) 
suggests that  the brain structures that  underlie the appetitive component 
are responsive to gonadal hormones, and are triggered at  the beginning 
of puberty, in contrast  to cognitive structures that follow a slower 
development. 
The passive paradigm used in the present  study did not allow us to 
resolve questions about  the way in which differences in the neural 
substrate of reward processing and risk perception between adolescents 
and adults contribute to motivated behavior in adolescents and adults. It 
is important to elucidate this relation and its developmental trajectory, 
because adolescent risky behavior can have serious consequences 
(Fareri et  al. 2008; Steinberg 2004). The finding that  reward related 
brain regions are more responsive in adolescence, even when rewards 
are unrelated to behavior and small, suggests fundamental differences in 
the way in which uncertain rewards are processed at different  ages. In 
order to judge the ecological validity of these findings, future studies 
should take individual differences in for example sensation-seeking, 
temperament and gender into account and will have to examine these 
regions using more complex tasks. A second limitation of this study is 
that we did not obtain direct  measures of pubertal status, which limits 
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our ability to interpret  the contribution of pubertal changes to the 
differences between the 10-12 and 14-15-year-olds. Future studies 
should attempt  to more closely relate age related changes to changes 
associated with pubertal development. 
In summary, our findings demonstrate that brain activation patterns 
related to outcome anticipation in the absence of behavior are 
distinguishable from those related to the processing of outcomes. 
Anticipation of uncertain reward is associated with activation in the 
anterior insula and striatum. In particular, activation in the anterior 
Insula shows a linear developmental trend, and decreases from early 
adolescence to young adulthood. In contrast, processing of reward is 
associated with a peak in activation in the ventral striatum in 14-15-
year-olds, and 10-12-year-olds to a lesser extent. Interestingly, 18-23-
year-olds are most  responsive to omitted reward, showing activation in 
lateral OFC regions. These findings support the hypothesis that 
adolescence is characterized by an imbalance in the maturation of 
affective and regulatory brain circuitry (Ernst  et al. 2005; Galvan et  al. 
2006; May  et  al. 2004). The present data show that  at a basic level of 
processing adolescents are more responsive to anticipated and received 
reward and risk associated with uncertainty compared to adults. 
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Supplemental Table 3.1 MNI coordinates of peak activation voxels for 
significant clusters related to the anticipation of reward (XXY > XYZ 
contrast) for 10-12, 14-15 and 18-23-year-olds, significant at p < .001 
uncorrected. 








R anterior insula 36 24 -9 4.67 167
L anterior insula -33 18 9 4.23 10
L anterior insula -33 15 -15 4.19 90
L caudate -6 6 0 3.85 11
R caudate 12 15 0 3.67 9
L frontal lobe - Suppl. motor cortex -3 6 57 3.48 32
R parietal lobe - Sup. parietal 30 -45 42 3.84 47
R parietal lobe - Supramarginal 
gyrus  51 -33 45 3.86 38
L parietal lobe - Lateral occipital 
cortex -27 -60 30 3.30 6
14-15-year-olds
R anterior insula 30 27 0 5.18 238
L anterior insula -33 15 6 3.74 71
L ventral striatum - Accumbens -9 9 -3 4.16 34
R thalamus 9 0 0 4.52 98
L thalamus -6 -9 -3 4.00 27
R frontal lobe – Paracingulate gyrus 9 15 48 3.44 7
R frontal lobe – Precentral gyrus 54 9 27 4.01 41
L frontal lobe – Precentral gyrus -54 0 45 3.78 13
R frontal lobe – Suppl. motor cortex 3 3 63 3.93 59
R parietal lobe – Lateral occipital 
cortex 24 -66 36 4.33 137
R occipital lobe – Lat. occipital 
cortex 30 -78 18 3.84 21
18-23-year-olds
R Anterior insula 33 27 0 5.16 35
L Anterior insula -33 21 6 3.91 11
R parietal lobe – Lateral occipital 
cortex 33 -69 54 3.55 7
64 | Chapter 3 
Supplemental Table 3.2 MNI coordinates of peak activation voxels for 
significant clusters related to the processing of reward (XXX > XXY 
contrast), and to the processing of omitted rewards (XXY > XXX 










L frontal lobe – Inferior frontal 
gyrus -36 12 27 3.91 10
L caudate -12 9 0 3.79 33
L frontal lobe – Precentral gyrus -54 -12 42 3.77 79
R frontal lobe – Precentral gyrus 60 0 24 3.67 62
L frontal lobe – Precentral gyrus -54 3 24 3.52 22
L frontal lobe - Paracingulate 
gyrus -3 18 45 3.50 28
L frontal lobe – Superior frontal 
gyrus -18 12 48 3.37 5
L parietal lobe – Supramarginal 
gyrus -63 -45 24 3.35 6
L putamen -18 18 -12 3.28 6
L frontal lobe – Middle frontal 
gyrus -42 36 24 3.26 5
14-15-year-olds
L caudate -15 3 21 4.40 283
L parietal lobe – Supramarginal 
gyrus -51 -39 45 4.30 179
R anterior insula 30 15 -15 4.29 18
L parietal lobe - 
Parahippocampal gyrus -12 -33 -9 4.28 497
L frontal lobe - Paracingulate 
gyrus -6 18 42 4.21 122
R temporal lobe – Fusiform 
cortex 39 -21 -15 4.04 5
L parietal lobe - Posterior 
cingulate gyrus -3 -39 27 4.01 130
L anterior insula -39 3 -3 3.98 110
L frontal lobe – Frontal pole -24 60 -3 3.95 9
L frontal lobe – Subcallosal 
cortex -12 21 -18 3.92 7
R occipital lobe – fusiform gyrus 15 -87 -15 3.86 41
L Thalamus -15 -36 9 3.83 8
L frontal lobe – Middle frontal 
gyrus -42 33 27 3.82 32
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R temporal lobe – Inf. temporal 
gyrus 57 -30 -18 3.73 24
L frontal lobe – Paracingulate 
gyrus -15 36 24 3.67 24
R temporal lobe – Inf. temporal 
gyrus 57 -54 -18 3.63 5
L occipital lobe – Precuneus 
cortex -3 -78 36 3.62 32
R parietal lobe – Postcentral 
gyrus 21 -42 54 3.55 6
L frontal lobe – Precentral gyrus -51 -9 39 3.53 20
L parietal lobe – Supramarginal 
gyrus -57 -48 15 3.49 6
R frontal lobe – Anterior 
cingulate gyrus 3 30 15 3.48 40
M frontal lobe – Frontal pole 0 57 3 3.45 17
Cerebellum 0 -63 -15 3.43 7
M parietal lobe – Post. cingulate 
gyrus 0 -24 24 3.32 5
18-23-year-olds
R occipital lobe – Intracalcarine 
cortex 15 -81 6 3.67 6
L occipital lobe – Occipital pole -15 -102 -3 3.55 32
L occipital lobe – Occipital pole -30 -93 -12 3.44 13
XXY > XXX
10-12-year-olds
R temporal lobe – Fusiform 
cortex -24 -48 -15 3.64 12
R parietal lobe – Precuneus 
cortex 24 -54 6 3.31 5
L temporal lobe – Fusiform 
gyrus -39 -66 -18 3.26 7
14-15-year-olds  
                                    No significant clusters………………     
18-23-year-olds
L frontal lobe – Frontal orbital 
cortex -27 36 -12 4.20 7
L frontal lobe – Frontal pole -9 54 -18 3.79 9




A developmental study of risky 
decisions on the Cake Gambling 
Task; Age and gender analyses of 
probability estimation and 
reward evaluation
Decision-making, or the process of choosing between competing courses of 
actions, is highly sensitive to age related change, showing development 
throughout adolescence. In this study, we tested whether the development of 
decision-making under risk is related to changes in risk-estimation abilities. 
Participants (N = 93) between ages 8-30 performed a child friendly gambling 
task, the Cake Gambling task,  which was inspired by the Cambridge Gambling 
Task (Rogers et al.,  1999), which has previously been shown to be sensitive to 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) damage. The task allowed comparisons of the 
contributions to risk perception of 1) the ability to estimate probabilities, and 
2) evaluate rewards. Adult performance patterns were highly similar to those 
found in previous reports, showing increased risk-taking with increases in the 
probability of winning and the magnitude of potential reward. Behavioral 
patterns in children and adolescents did not differ from adult patterns,  showing 
a similar ability for probability estimation and reward evaluation. These data 
suggest that participants 8 years and older perform like adults in a gambling 
task, previously shown to depend on the OFC in which all the information 
needed to make an advantageous decision is given on each trial and no 
information needs to be inferred from previous behavior. Interestingly, at all 
ages, females were more risk-averse than males. These results suggest that the 
increase in real-life risky behavior that is seen in adolescence is not a 
consequence of changes in risk perception abilities. The findings are discussed 
in relation to theories about the protracted development of the prefrontal 
cortex.    
Risky decisions on the Cake Gambling Task | 69 
4.1 Introduction
Decision-making can be defined as the process of choosing between 
competing courses of actions. Often, the outcomes of decisions we 
make are uncertain and associated with the possibility of leading to 
undesirable results, therefore they involve taking risks. Successful 
decision-making in everyday life situations requires the ability to find a 
balance between possible benefits and costs that  are associated with 
taking these risks, as well as incorporating the likelihood of achieving 
what we desire. Decision-making is an important  and complex ability 
that slowly develops during childhood and into adolescence (see Boyer, 
2006 for a review). Adolescence in particular has been characterized as 
a period of increased risk taking (Steinberg, 2004). Self-report and 
observation studies have shown an increase in, for example, the number 
of traffic accidents and in the use of illegal drugs, tobacco and alcohol 
during adolescence (eg. Steinberg, 2004; Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992). 
These results suggest that  adolescents are not capable of adult decision-
making. From a cognitive perspective, many aspects of developmental 
changes in decision-making abilities are not  well understood, even 
though the possible serious consequences of inadequate decision-
making skills in real life make a better understanding important. 
In the present  study we examined the development  of two important 
abilities that are required for successful decision-making; 1) probability 
estimation (deciding which choice has the largest chance of resulting in 
reward) and 2) evaluation of the reward associated with the least likely 
outcome (does the reward that can be gained make it  worth taking the 
risk). More specifically we developed a child friendly gambling 
paradigm inspired by the Cambridge Gambling Task (Rogers et al., 
1999), the Cake Gambling Task, which specifically taps these two 
processes.
Recent advances in neuropsychological and neuroimaging research 
have contributed to the understanding of decision-making abilities in 
adults. Studies on patients with damage or lesions to the orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC) have given insight into the importance of this region for 
successful decision-making. The OFC is the region of the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) which lies at  the base of the brain, directly behind our 
forehead and comprises Brodmann area’s 10, 11, 13, 14, and 47/12. 
Interestingly, damage to the OFC is related to impaired decision-making 
in real life, while other cognitive abilities remain intact  (Bechara et al., 
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1994; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1996; Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel & Damasio, 1997; Bechara, Tranel & Damasio, 2000, Rolls, 
Hornak, Wade, & McGrath, 1994). A distinctive  characteristic of OFC 
patients is that they fail to perform on reversal learning tasks. In these 
tasks participants learn to differentiate between a stimulus that is 
associated with a reward and a stimulus that  is not associated with a 
reward. During the task, the contingencies change, in such a way that 
the previously unrewarded stimulus becomes associated with a reward 
and the previously rewarded stimulus is no longer associated with a 
reward. The previously learned association between a stimulus and a 
reward has to be unlearned; OFC patients are unable to reverse 
stimulus-reward associations. As a consequence they fail to modify their 
behavior when changes in the environment  require them to do so (Rolls 
et al., 1994). 
A neuropsychological task which was specifically designed to mimic 
real-life decision making, the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), (Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio & Anderson, 1994), also demonstrates OFC 
patients’ decision-making deficit. The IGT  is an experimentally 
controlled card game in which participants are instructed to win money 
by selecting cards from four decks. Two of the four decks result in 
frequent  large gains, but selecting from these two decks is 
disadvantageous in the long run because of occasional large losses. 
Selecting cards from the two other decks is advantageous in the long 
run because even though this choice results in smaller gains, occasional 
losses are also small. Participants have to learn from the consequences 
of their choices during the task which decks are advantageous and 
which they should avoid in order to maximize their winnings. While 
healthy participants learn to do this over the course of the task, 
participants with damage to the OFC continue to select from the 
disadvantageous decks. Neuroimaging studies in healthy adults have 
confirmed the role of OFC in decision-making and risk-taking (Cohen, 
Heller, & Ranganath, 2005; Ernst  et al., 2002; Krain, Wilson, Arbuckle, 
Castellanos, & Milham, 2006; Rogers et al., 1999).
To our knowledge, most  of the behavioral studies on the development of 
decision-making have used the IGT  or child-friendly versions of this 
task. These studies have shown an increase in performance with age in 
childhood and adolescence (Crone & Van der Molen, 2004; Hooper, 
Luciana, Conklin & Yarger, 2004; Kerr & Zelazo, 2004; Overman, 
2004). In particular, these studies demonstrate that children aged 6-12-
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years select  cards mainly from disadvantageous decks, whereas 13-17-
year-old adolescents learn to select  cards from advantageous decks over 
task blocks. However, comparison across studies indicates that 
adolescents do not  yet perform at  an adult  level. These findings indicate 
that  the ability to distinguish between advantageous and 
disadvantageous decks is still developing in late adolescence (Hooper et 
al., 2004; Overman, 2004). Children’s inability to learn which decks are 
advantageous resembles that of patients with OFC damage, and has led 
to the hypothesis that  children’s behavior on the IGT is related to 
immaturity of the OFC. This hypothesis is consistent with recent  studies 
on brain development that  have shown that  the PFC is one of the last 
areas of the brain to mature structurally, as indicated by age related 
changes in gray and white matter volumes into early adulthood (Giedd 
et  al., 1999; Gogtay et al, 2004) and functionally, as indicated by 
functional neuroimaging studies that  show different  patterns of 
activation on tasks that  recruit  PFC in children and adults (eg.Casey et 
al., 2005; Ernst  et al., 2005; Galvan et al., 2006). Behavioral differences 
between children, adolescents and adults can provide us with a window 
on the developing brain.
The IGT  has been successful in that it closely resembles real-life 
decision making, and the results of developmental studies that  used this 
task have given us many insights into age related changes in decision-
making. Nevertheless, we believe our gambling paradigm can help 
broaden the insight into the development  of different abilities that form 
the basic building blocks of decision-making. The IGT is a complex 
task, changes with development  have been observed in, for example, the 
ability to keep, and work with information in working memory, the 
ability to estimate risks, and the ability to predict, and process the 
outcome of decisions (Hooper et  al., 2004; Kirkham & Diamond, 2003). 
The developmental trajectories of these abilities and their respective 
contributions to decision-making are largely unknown. Neuroimaging 
studies have shown that  a network of PFC regions is active when 
performing the IGT (Ernst  et  al., 2002), and IGT performance of 
patients with damage to PFC regions outside of the OFC has also been 
shown to be impaired (Clark, Manes, Antoun, Sahakian & Robbins, 
2003; Bechara et al., 1998). 
To address this problem in interpreting the results from developmental 
studies that  used the IGT  task or similar tasks, we chose to focus on risk 
perception in the absence of other processes that  contribute to decision-
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making. The Cambridge Gambling Task that was developed by Rogers 
and colleagues (1999) differs from the IGT in that on each trial it gives 
participants all the information concerning the relative attractiveness of 
the risky and safe decisions. In the CGT participants are shown six 
boxes and are told that the computer has randomly selected one of these 
boxes to hide a token in. Participants are instructed to win as much 
money as possible by guessing in which box the token is hidden. A 
proportion of the boxes is red and a proportion is blue, and participants 
bet on one of these two possible outcome colors. Crucially, a large 
reward is always associated with the minority color. Importantly, 
because performance on the task is not dependent  on the outcome of 
previous trials, demands on working memory are low and outcome 
processing is less important. Therefore this task specifically taps two 
abilities that comprise risk-perception; the ability to 1) estimate 
probabilities, and 2) evaluate rewards. 
To gain more insight  in the developmental pattern of these two abilities, 
participants ranging in age from 8 to 30, in 5 age groups: 8-9, 11-12, 
14-15, 17-18, and 25-30 year olds were included in the present study. 
The Cake Gambling Task was developed to make the gambling 
paradigm understandable for young children and to stir their 
involvement. A simpler version of the Cake Gambling paradigm has 
previously been shown to be appropriate for use with children in a 
neuroimaging study that  examined probability estimation in children 
and adults (Van Leijenhorst, Crone & Bunge, 2006). In the current 
version of the Cake Gambling Task participants are instructed to win as 
many credits as possible by gambling with two flavors of cake. Two 
specific manipulations were introduced to dissociate between separable 
aspects of risk perception. First, three types of cakes which differed in 
the probability of winning associated with gambling were presented, in 
order to tap the ability to estimate probabilities. Second, a number of 
credits that  could be won or lost was associated with the choices that 
could be made. Similar to the Cambridge Gambling Task (Rogers et al., 
1999) a large number of credits was always associated with the smallest 
likelihood of winning, in order to tap the sensitivity to the magnitude of 
the reward associated with gambling. 
The proportion of pink/brown wedges, and the number of credits 
associated with the colors were varied systematically across trials. On 
each trial one of the wedges was selected randomly by the computer, 
according to the different  proportions. This selection resulted in a 17%, 
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33% or 50% chance that  the least likely of the two outcome possibilities 
was selected. For the 17% condition in which both colors were 
associated with 1 credit, we expected participants to choose the safe 
decision. This ability was expected to be present already for the 
youngest  participants, because prior research has indicated that  the 
ability to estimate probabilities is already present by age 5 
(Schlottmann, 2001). When the number of points associated with the 
risky decision increased we expected participants to choose this option 
more often. We expected that the youngest children would be the least 
risk-averse, and we expected that  with age participants became more 
risk-averse (Boyer, 2006). In addition, we expected that participants 
would gamble more often when the probability of winning increased, so 
for the 17%, 33% and 50% chance of winning conditions we expected 
similar patterns of results, but  an increase in gambling (see Rahman et 
al., 2001). 
An additional complication in measuring age differences in decision-
making is the variance explained by individual differences. Differences 
in the tendency towards sensation seeking behavior are likely to 
contribute to differences in risk-taking (Crone, Vendel & Van der 
Molen, 2003). Sensation seeking can be defined as “the need for varied, 
novel, and complex sensations and experiences and the willingness to 
t a k e p h y s i c a l a n d s o c i a l r i s k s f o r t h e s a k e o f s u c h 
experience” (Zuckerman, 1979, p.10). Participants completed a 
sensation seeking scale to examine correlations between self-report 
measures of risk-taking and risk-taking as measured with the Cake 
Gambling task. We expected higher levels of sensation-seeking to be 
associated with more risk-taking (Lejeuz et  al., 2002; 2003). Also, 
general cognitive abilities might be related to participants’ task 
performance. For this reason, all participants completed the Raven SPM 
as an index of IQ. 
One further variable was taken into account. In prior decision-making 
studies, gender differences have also been consistently reported 
(Overman et  al., 2004). Interestingly, on the IGT  men outperform 
women, a pattern which is observed in children (Kerr & Zelazo, 2004; 
Garon & Moore, 2004), adolescents (Crone, 2005; Overman, 2004), and 
adults (Reavis & Overman, 2001). This finding seems to contradict  self-
report indices of risk-taking which show that boys and men are less 
risk-averse than women (for a review see: Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 
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1999).  In the present  study gender differences were examined to clarify 
these contradictory findings. By selecting an equal number of men and 
women in each age group, we could examine whether gender 
differences may be specifically present in a certain age range.  
4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants
93 volunteers, distributed among five age groups participated in the 
study: 19 8-9 year olds (M = 9.4, SD = .78, 10 female), 18 11-12 year 
olds (M = 10.9, SD = .68, 12 female), 20 14-15 year olds (M = 14.6, SD 
= .51, 10 female), 17 17-18 year olds (M = 17.18, SD = .70, 8 female), 
and 19 25-30 year olds (M = 27.6, SD = 1.26, 8 female). Chi-square 
analyses indicated that gender distributions did not  differ significantly 
between age groups χ2 (4) = 2.49, p > .05. Children and adolescents 
were recruited by contacting local schools. All participants were 
selected with the help of their teachers; informed consent was obtained 
from a primary caregiver. Adults were recruited through flyers. In all 
age groups the participant with the highest score received a small 
reward. 
4.2.2 Cake Gambling Task
Participants completed a computerized child friendly gambling task, the 
Cake Gambling Task, which was inspired by the Cambridge Gambling 
Task (Rogers et  al, 1999). In this gambling task all information that  is 
relevant for making a decision is presented to participants on each trial 
and no information has to be learned or retrieved over consecutive 
trials. On each trial, participants gamble with a round cake presented at 
the center of the screen. Cakes consisted of 6 wedges that could be 
brown or pink, and participants were told that  these wedges were 
chocolate-flavored (brown wedges) or strawberry-flavored (pink 
wedges). A brown and pink square containing a number of coins, 
indicating the number of credits that was associated with each flavor, 
were presented at  the foot of each cake. The proportion of pink/brown 
wedges ( 5:1, 4:2, or 3:3), and the number of credits (1, 3, 5, 7 or 9), 
associated with the wedges were varied systematically across trials. 
Importantly, 1 credit  was always associated with the most likely of the 
two outcome possibilities, a safe choice, and 1, 3, 5, 7 or 9 credits were 
always associated with the least  likely of the two outcome possibilities, 
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a risky choice. Each trial started with a 500 ms fixation cross, followed 
by a stimulus that  was presented for 5000 ms, followed by a feedback 
stimulus that was presented for 1000 ms. 3000 ms after the stimulus 
appeared on the screen, a question mark was presented in between the 
squares at  the bottom of the screen. At  this point, participants were 
instructed to indicate by a left or right button press which color – pink 
or brown – the computer was most likely to select, given the fact that  its 
choice was random, and to decide which of two possible gambles they 
wanted to accept (see Figure 4.1 for an example of a trial and trial 
timing)1. Participants had to decide between taking the risk of choosing 
the least  likely outcome, putting a high number of credits at stake, or 
choosing the most likely outcome with only 1 credit  at  stake. To ensure 
that the youngest participants would understand this instruction, all 
participants were told to think of the computer as someone who picks a   
 
Figure 4.1 Task example of a low-risk trial. Participants viewed the cue for 
2000 ms, followed by the cue and target. Participants had 1500 milliseconds to 
give a response, after which gain or loss feedback was presented for 2000 ms, 
along with the choice of the computer. Gain was indicated by +1 and loss was 
indicated by -1.
piece of cake with their eyes closed. The valence of the feedback 
participants received always was the consequence of the combination of 
the computer’s random choice (according to the different proportions of 
the two colors) for either pink or brown and the participant’s decision. If 
these two matched, the stake associated with the participants choice was 
added to the total points score, if they did not match, the stake was 
subtracted from the total points score. Participants were instructed to try 
to win as many credits as possible on every trial. To prevent  participants 
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1 Figure 4.1 was not included in the published manuscript, but is shown here to 
facilitate comparisons between the different versions of the Cake Gambling 
paradigm described in this thesis.
from losing motivation due to disappointment following losses, we 
explained that  the computer’s choice was random, like it would be if 
someone who is blindfolded chooses, and winning was associated with 
some luck in addition to trying your best. For this reason we also didn’t 
stress the total points score (participants were not shown their 
cumulative earnings on every trial), but we told participants to try and 
win on as many trials as possible. However, to keep participants 
engaged in the task we showed the cumulative score during breaks and 
at  the end of the task and we included a small prize in each age group 
for the participant with the highest  number of credits in total at  the end 
of the experiment. 
4.2.3 Sensation Seeking Scale 
All participants over 11 years of age completed the Zuckerman’s 
Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS) (Zuckerman, Eysenck,& Eysenck,1978). 
This scale has previously been adapted for Dutch adults (Feij & Van 
Zuilen, 1984) and adolescents (Feij & Kuiper, 1984). Participants 
completed the SSS appropriate for their age. Adolescents completed the 
adolescent version of the SSS that  consists of five sub-scales measuring 
Extraversion, Emotionality, Impulsivity, Thrill and Adventure Seeking 
aspects of Sensation Seeking (TAS), and Disinhibition and Experience 
Seeking aspects of Sensation Seeking (Dis/Es). Some of the Dis/Es sub-
scale items concerning, for example, experience with illegal drugs or 
sex were considered inappropriate for the youngest  participants. 
Therefore 11-12 year olds completed a version of the SSS that did not 
include this sub-scale. The TAS, and Dis/Es sub-scales were examined 
as a measure of sensation seeking, because these sub-scales are 
distinguishable in both the adult  and adolescent SSS version. The TAS 
sub-scale consists of 11 ‘true/false’ items, such as ‘I prefer to be in a 
place where there is a lot  going on’, the Dis/Es sub-scale consists of  8 
‘true/false’ items, such as ‘I would like to experience what  it is like to 
use illegal drugs’. The Tas and Dis/Es sub-scales have an internal 
consistency of .79 and .69 respectively. Adults completed the adult SSS 
containing TAS (12 items, internal consistency .80), Disinhibition (12 
items, internal consistency .78), and Experience Seeking (14 items, 
internal consistency .74) sub-scales. The adult  SSS consists of questions 
such as ‘I like wild, uninhibited parties’ that have to be answered using 
a 5-point scale (1= never, 2= rarely, 3= sometimes, 4= usually and 5= 
always). 
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4.2.4 Raven Standard Progressive Matrices 
Participants filled out  the Raven Standard Progressive Matrices task 
(Raven SPM) in order to obtain an estimate of their ability to form 
perceptual relations and reason by analogy. The Raven Standard 
Progressive Matrices (SPM) is a non-verbal test designed to measure 
general intellectual ability (Raven, Raven & Court, 1998). The SPM 
consists of 60 items, five sets (A, B, C, D, & E) of 12 items each. Each 
item consists of a figure from which one piece is missing. Below the 
figure either six (sets A & B) or eight (sets C through E) pieces are 
displayed that can be used to complete the figure. Only one of these is 
correct. The different  sets and items within the sets are increasingly 
difficult.  
4.2.5 Procedure
All participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory or 
classroom. All participants completed all tasks. Stimuli were presented 
in color against  a black background on a 15-inch computer screen 
placed at  a distance of approximately 70 centimeters from the 
participant. Preceding the task participants were given verbal 
instructions and were shown examples of trials and feedback displays. 
Following this instruction, all participants performed 15 practice trials 
on the laptop computer. Care was taken that  all participants understood 
the instructions after practice. The Gambling task consisted of 270 trials 
and took approximately 30 minutes to complete, including instructions 
and 3 short breaks. The total points score was shown during the three 
breaks and at  the end of the task. The colors pink and brown 
corresponded to the left and right index finger, this mapping was 
counterbalanced between subjects to control for key preference. Color 
credit  associations were counterbalanced within subjects to control for a 
possible color preference. The Raven SPM (approx. 25 minutes to 
complete) and the SSS (approx. 10 minutes to complete) were 
administered after completion of the gambling task. All participants 
were given the opportunity to take a short  break following the gambling 
task, and were offered a drink and cookie. The total duration of the 
experiment was approximately 80 minutes, after completion of the 
experiment participants were thanked for participation, the participant 
with the most credits within each age group received a small reward. 
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 Cake Gambling Task Performance 
Participants’ performance was examined by computing the percentage 
of risky choices for every combination of the probability of winning and 
the number of credits to gamble with. Risky choices were defined as 
those choices for which the participants chose to gamble with the 
highest  number of credits, even though these were associated with a 
small (5:1, 4:2) or equal (3:3) probability of winning. The data were 
submitted to repeated measures ANOVAs with Age Group (5) and 
Gender (2) as between-subjects factors and Probability (5:1, 4:2, 3:3) 
and Credits (1, 3, 5, 7, 9) as within-subjects factors. The percentages of 
risky choices, for all age groups separate, are presented in Figure 4.2A.  
As can be seen in Figure 4.2A, when the number of  credits that could 
be gambled with was the same for both colors (credits = 1), participants 
had no preference for either pink or brown in the 3:3 condition (the 
number of choices for each color was at  chance level). In contrast, they 
avoided the color associated with the lowest probability of winning in 
the 4:2 and 5:1 conditions (main effect  Probability, F (2, 166) = 363.16, 
p < .001). This effect  of probability did not  differ between age groups (p 
= .65) or genders (p = .24), showing that  all participants were able to 
judge probabilities. 
When the number of credits to gamble with increased, the percentage of 
risky decisions also increased (main effect  Credits, F (4, 332) = 54.78, p 
< .001). Importantly, this effect was more pronounced for the conditions 
with the highest  probability of winning, (Probability x Credit 
interaction: F (8, 664) = 8.09, p < .001). Separate ANOVAs for each of 
the Probability conditions confirmed that  this effect was observed for all 
probability conditions. That is, in the 3:3 condition the 1 Credit 
condition resulted in chance level performance. In contrast, the 3, 5, 7 
and 9 Credit conditions were associated with more risky choices, and 
did not differ from each other (p’s > .05). Similar post-hoc ANOVAs for 
the 4:2 and 5:1 conditions showed an increase in risky choices 
associated with each increase in credits (all p’s < .05). Contrary to 
expectations, and demonstrated in Figure 4.2A, there were no 
differences in the pattern of risky decision-making between the age 
groups (all p’s > .37). 
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Our analyses focused on the comparison of age groups, not age as a 
continuous variable to facilitate the interpretation of developmental 
changes in behavior. In addition we submitted participants’ raw ages as 
a covariate factor to a mixed model ANCOVA on the Cake Gambling 
Task data with Gender (2) as a between-subjects factor and Probability 
(3) and Credits (5) as within-subjects factors. Importantly, none of the 
effects that resulted from our initial analyses were altered by including 
Age as covariate; again no changes in performance with age were 
found.
 
4.3.2 Gender differences 
In contrast  to the absence of an age difference in risky decision-making, 
there were pronounced differences in the decision-making patterns of 
males and females. That is, the percentage of risky choices was higher 
for male participants compared to female participants (main effect 
Gender, F (1, 83) = 9.22, p < .01).  Moreover, this difference in the 
percentage of risky decisions between male and female participants 
increased with the number of Credits at  stake (Gender x Credits 
interaction, F (4, 332) = 3.06, p = .05). This interaction is displayed for 
the five age groups in Figure 4.2B. Male participants made 4.56%, 
7.77%, 9.18%, 12.62%, and 11.45% more risky choices than females 
when gambling with 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 credits respectively (all p’s < .05). 
This pattern was found to be consistent from late childhood through 
early adulthood. No significant interactions with Age Group were 
found.
4.3.3 Performance during the task
Even though the Cake Gambling paradigm was designed to minimize 
the importance of learning for task performance, it is possible that 
participants tried to optimize their behavior by learning from the 
outcomes of their choices over the course of the task. To examine task 
performance over time, we divided the task in three blocks of 90 trials. 
The results from this repeated measures ANOVA with Task block (3), 
Probability (3), and Credits (5) as within subjects factors and Age group 
(5) as between subjects factor mimicked the results from the previous 
analyses, showing an increase in the percentage of risky decisions with 
an increase in the probability of winning, and the number of credits that 
could be gambled with for all age groups (Probability x Credits F (8, 
536) = 5.79, p <.001). This pattern did not differ between task blocks 
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Figure 4.2 Average percentage of risky choices plotted for all age groups as a 
function of the number of credits gambled with (1, 3, 5,  7 or 9) for a.) the 
different probabilities of winning (3:3, 4:2, 5:1), and b.) male and female 
participants. In all age groups gambling increases with the probability of 
winning and with the number of credits, and male participants made more risky 
decisions than female participants. 
(Probability x Credits x Task block, p >.05). A main effect of Task 
Block (F (2, 146) = 11.70, p <.001), indicated that  participants took 
more risks during the first trial block than during the last two trial 
blocks. This main effect  was qualified by a Probability x Task Block 
interaction (F (4, 292) = 4.61, p = .001). Separate ANOVAs for each of 
the probability conditions showed that the decrease in the percentage of 
risky decisions from the first to the later blocks of the task was most 
pronounced in the 4:2 condition, that  is, the percentage of risky choices 
decreased from the first (M = 32.76, SD = 21.99) to the second block 
(M = 24,62, SD = 22.63) as well as from the second to the third block 
(M = 20.78, SD = 23,36) (p <.001). No differences in risk taking 
behavior over time were observed in the 3:3 condition (p > .05) (M = 
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66.31, SD = 18.95, M = 63.13, SD = 22.61, and M = 62.48, SD = 23.84 
respectively), in the 5:1 condition the percentage of risky choices 
decreased from the first block (M = 18.40, SD = 17.88) to the second 
block (M = 15.00, SD = 21.70) (p < .05), but did not differ between the 
second block and the third block (M = 13.46, SD = 21.78) (p > .05) 
Again, there were no interactions with age group. 
4.3.4 Sensation Seeking 
Participants’ raw scores were z-transformed and a median split, creating 
groups of high sensation seekers and low sensation seekers was 
performed for each age group, gender and Sensation Seeking sub scale 
separately. This technique has been shown to be unlikely to change the 
conclusions drawn from the results while it facilitates the interpretation 
of the results (Farrington & Loeber, 2000). The 11-12 year olds, 14- 15 
year olds, 17-18 year olds and 25-30 year olds raw scores on the Thrill 
and Adventure Seeking sub scale of the Sensation Seeking 
questionnaire were  M = 5.89, SD = 2.45; M = 6.85, SD = 2.48; M = 
8.06, SD = 2.59; and M = 6.11, SD = 3.02 respectively, and 14- 15 year 
olds, 17-18 year olds and 25-30 year olds respective raw scores on the 
Disinhibition/Experience Seeking sub-scale of the sensation seeking 
questionnaire were; M = 2.05, SD = 1.36; M = 2.88, SD = 1.90; and M 
= 10.63, SD = 4.39. Interactions with the task manipulations were only 
significant for the Disinhibition/Experience Seeking Scale (DIS/ES). 
Participants labeled as high sensation seekers on the Dis/Es scale 
showed more risky decision-making with an increase in the probability 
of winning compared to participants labeled as low sensation seekers on 
this scale (Probability x Dis/Es interaction, F (2, 88) = 4.12, p < .05). 
This interaction was qualified by a Probability x Credits x Dis/Es 
interaction, F (8, 35) = 2.24, p< .05) showing that participants labeled 
as high sensation seeking took more risks when the amount of credits 
that could be gambled with increased compared to participants labeled 
as low sensation seeking.
4.3.5 Raven SPM 
As expected, the number of correct  solutions on the Raven SPM task 
increased with age (F (4, 76) 20.84, p < .001). Post hoc Tukey tests 
revealed that  the 8-9 year olds were the least accurate (M = 37.67, SD = 
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8.94), followed by 11-12 year olds (M = 43.89, SD = 5.06) and 14-15 
year olds (M = 44.87, SD = 4.00), who did not differ from each other. 
Finally, the highest scores were achieved by the 17-18 year olds (M = 
51.73, SD = 3.04), and 25-30 year olds (M = 53.37., SD = 4.66), who 
also did not differ from each other. Raven scores were z-transformed in 
order to enable comparisons between the different age groups. 
Correlations were run to determine whether or not  inductive reasoning 
ability may influence the findings. However, there was no correlation 
between z- transformed Raven SPM scores and the average percentage 
of risky decisions (r = -.06, p = .572). The SPM scores were then 
entered as a covariate in a repeated measures ANOVA with Gender (2) 
and Group (5) as between-subjects factor and Probability (5:1, 4:2, 3:3) 
and Credits (1, 3, 5, 7, 9) as within-subjects factors. This analysis 
showed that Raven SPM scores were no significant  covariate (F (1, 70) 
= .112, p = .74), and including Raven SPM scores as a covariate did not 
change the pattern of results. 
4.4 Discussion
This study examined the development  of risk perception, an important 
aspect of decision-making, in participants aged 8-30 using the Cake 
Gambling Task, a child friendly gambling paradigm inspired by the 
Cambridge Gambling Task (Rogers et al., 1999). In particular, the focus 
of the study was on two aspects of risk perception: probability 
estimation and evaluation of reward. In concurrence with previous 
findings by Rogers and colleagues with a similar paradigm in adults 
(1999), we found that  in participants from all age groups an increase in 
the probability of winning, and an increase in the number of credits 
associated with gambling, resulted in an increase in the number of risky 
decisions. Contrary to our expectations, we did not find differences in 
task performance between the age groups. Therefore, both the 
likelihood of winning and the magnitude of the reward associated with 
winning contribute to decision-making from middle childhood on, 
suggesting that increases in risky behavior that  are observed in 
adolescence are not likely to be the consequence of immature risk 
perception abilities. 
The results are in sharp contrast with the results of previous 
developmental studies that have used the IGT or similar tasks which 
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have shown age related changes in risky decision making throughout 
adolescence (Overman, 2004; Crone & Van der Molen, 2004). These 
age related changes are therefore likely to be related to task demands 
that are specific to the IGT.  As mention in the introduction, The IGT 
(Bechara et al., 1994) and reversal learning tasks (Rolls et  al., 1994) 
differ from the Cambridge Gambling Task (Rogers, 1999) and the Cake 
Gambling Task in that they place great  demands on working memory 
and outcome processing in addition to risk perception abilities. In these 
tasks participants have to infer the task contingencies based on feedback 
they receive about their decisions over trials, whereas in the Cambridge 
Gambling Task (Rogers et al., 1999) and Cake Gambling Task all the 
information is presented to participants on any given trial. The current 
results suggest  that developmental differences in decision making as 
measured with the IGT are associated with the demands that this task 
places on the ability to infer task contingencies over trials. 
More support  for the hypothesis that the IGT and the Cake Gambling 
Task tap into different processes and underlying brain circuitry comes 
from the comparison of gender differences. Interestingly, on the Cake 
Gambling Task, male participants in all age groups take more risks than 
female participants, mirroring the results of self-report  studies that 
report males to be more risk taking in real life (Byrnes, Miller & 
Schafer, 1999), but contradicting prior findings using the IGT  that  show 
male participants to outperform female participants (e.g., Overman, 
2004). Advantageous performance on the IGT requires participants to 
learn which decks are profitable, and in order to do this, outcome 
processing as well as updating information kept  in working memory are 
important. The higher number of advantageous choices for men relative 
to woman on the IGT could be associated with aspects of contingency 
learning, rather than risk perception. Support  for the idea that the neural 
correlates of IGT  performance differ between men and women comes 
from a study by Bolla, Eldreth, Matochik & Cadet (2004). The authors 
report that the brain mechanisms engaged by men and women when 
performing the IGT  differ. In men activation is lateralized to the right 
hemisphere, and men showed more activation in right lateral OFC than 
women did. In contrast, in women activation was found in both 
hemispheres, and women showed more activation in left  DLPFC than 
men. These findings suggest  that  women differ from men in the 
cognitive strategies they use when performing the IGT  (Bolla et  al., 
2004). These findings suggest  that  male strategies result in better 
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learning abilities in this specific task, together with increased risk taking 
compared to women.  
In this study, behavior did not differ between children, adolescents and 
young adults, suggesting that the basic mechanisms of probability 
estimation and reward evaluation are already in place at  age 8. What 
then causes adolescents to engage in more risk-taking behavior than 
children and adults in real life? Adolescents may be highly sensitive to 
environmental influences. For example, Choudhury, Blakemore & 
Charman (2006) recently suggested that  adolescence is a period which 
is characterized by increased social awareness. Thus, it is possible that 
age related differences in risk-taking are present under the influence of 
social pressure. Initial evidence for this hypothesis comes from a study 
by Gardner & Steinberg (2005), in which risk-taking on a laboratory 
task greatly increased in adolescents, not  children and adults, when 
peers were physically present. Another explanation comes from 
epidemiological studies which have suggested that adolescents engage 
in risky behaviors, despite the increase in cognitive awareness of the 
risks involved, because they believe the risks to be acceptable (Fromme, 
Katz, & Rivet, 1997; Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992; Gerrard, Gibbons, 
Benthin, & Hessling, 1996; Moore & Gullone, 1996). Also, adolescent 
risk participation correlates positively with the number of benefits the 
adolescent perceives associated with making a risky decision and 
correlates negatively with the number of potential negative 
consequences that are perceived (Cohn, Macfarlane, Yanez, & Imai, 
1995; Goldberg, Halpern-Felsher, & Millstein, 2002; Lavery, Siegel, 
Cousins, & Rubovits, 1993). Therefore, adolescents may accept some 
probability of negative consequences because they desire the potential 
positive outcomes the risks might bring about (cf. Boyer, 2006, p. 302). 
Along this line, recently it has been suggested that  adolescents might 
experience risks different compared to children and adults as a 
consequence of the rates at  which motivational and cognitive control 
systems in the brain mature. Relatively mature motivational circuitry 
biases adolescents towards risky “exciting” behavior, while relatively 
immature cognitive control circuitry makes it difficult for adolescents to 
control these impulses, which makes adolescence a period of increased 
vulnerability to risky behavior. For example, a recent study by Galvan 
et  al. (2006) indicates that  reward anticipation in adolescence is 
characterized by a hypersensitive emotion-inducing system and an 
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under active emotion-regulation system, even when differences in 
performance are absent.  
Decision-making is a multi-faceted concept, the perception of risk is 
just  one of many abilities that contribute to it. The relationship between 
activation in the PFC and decision making behavior is complex in a 
similar way. Different  regions of the PFC are likely to contribute to 
decision making behavior, and in addition to gaining insight into the 
development  of these different regions and the component  processes of 
decision-making the interaction between different regions will have to 
be taken into account in future studies.     
Future research might  also address some limitations in the current study. 
We did not include direct measures of brain activity; functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies could provide more 
insight  into changes with development  in the relative contribution of 
different  PFC regions, such as the OFC. In a previous fMRI study using 
a simplified Cake Gambling task (Van Leijenhorst, Crone, & Bunge, 
2006) we found that  children used different brain circuitry to reach adult 
decisions, in the absence of differences in behavior. The present study 
looked at  the perception of risks in a gambling task under 
experimentally controlled circumstances. We assume that behavior in 
this situation is similar to behavior in real-life, but  we have to 
acknowledge that there could be differences between the processes 
involved in performing the experimental task and real-life decision 
making. It should also be taken into account that limited task 
engagement could account in part  for the lack in performance 
differences between the age group. The overall higher level of risky 
decisions in male participants could reflect  differences in the way they 
experienced the task, possibly they were more engaged because of 
gender related differences in the way participants interpreted the 
competition element. The relation between Cake Gambling Task 
behavior and individual differences in sensation seeking tendency, 
suggests that  risk perception as assessed with the Cake Gambling task 
does relate to real-life risky behavior, and the consistent  performance in 
all age groups over the duration of the task suggest  that  participants 
involvement in the game did not differ throughout  the experiment. Also, 
in the Cake Gambling Task the differences between the conditions were 
relatively clear. More subtle differences might be required to measure 
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age related differences in risk estimation abilities. For example, a study 
by Budhani & Blair (2005) found evidence for a relation between task 
performance in a response reversal task and the salience of changes in 
task contingencies. Children with mild OFC impairments performed 
worse as the changes in task contingencies were more subtle. 
In conclusion, the present results indicate that  risk perception is already 
in place at  the age of 8 and does not change between ages 8-30. These 
results suggest  that  increases in real-life risky behavior in adolescence 
are not likely to result  from a protracted development  of risk perception 
abilities which results in immature decision-making. Gender differences 
are consistent across this age period, with male participants taking more 
risks than female participants. This study adds to current  knowledge 
about the development  of decision-making abilities in that it  offers 
insight  into the relative contribution of risk perception to decision-
making from childhood until young adulthood. Insight into the 
development  of abilities that contribute to adult  decision-making is 
important  in order to better understand potential problems adolescents 
face. 
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5.
A heart rate analysis of risky 
decision-making, reward sensitivity, 
and outcome monitoring in 
adolescence
The ability to evaluate risks, and monitor choices and their outcomes are 
important components of mature decision-making. Immature decision-making 
and heightened sensitivity to rewards are thought to underlie adolescent risky 
behavior. We tested for the development of decision-making abilities in 
adolescence, and measured heart rate (HR) changes to gain insight in the 
temporal dynamics of decision-making. Participants from three age groups 
(11-12-year-olds, 14-15-year-olds,  and 17-18-year-olds) chose between high-
risk and low-risk probabilistic gambles with varying magnitudes of reward. 
Risk-taking decreased with age, and HR data showed that 11-12-year-olds 
showed a heightened sensitivity to rewards. Age related changes in HR 
responses were related to the anticipation of the outcome of risky decisions, not 
to the evaluation of outcomes. These findings support the hypothesis that a 
heightened sensitivity to rewards contributes to adolescent risk-taking, and 
suggest that developmental changes are related to the perception of risks, not 
their consequences.
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5.1 Introduction
The slow development of decision-making has been well documented. 
One of the key aspects of mature decision-making is the ability to 
identify and avoid immediate and long-term undesirable consequences 
of actions, or in other words, avoid excessive risk (Beyth-Marom, 1993; 
Garon & Moore, 2004). Many studies have shown that children’s 
decisions are more likely to be risky and oriented towards short-term 
rewards compared to adults’ decisions (Blakemore & Choudhury, 2006; 
Boyer, 2006; Crone, Bullens, Van der Plas, Kijkuit  & Zelazo, 2008; 
Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky & Pedulla, 2003; Reyna & Ellis, 1994), and 
that the ability to take the long term consequences of choices into 
account improves until late adolescence (Hooper, Luciana, Conklin & 
Yarger, 2004; Overman et al., 2004). Adolescence is a developmental 
phase in which many problems are related to risky behavior, for 
example involvement  in accidents, experimentation with illicit  drugs or 
alcohol, and problems in school. Immature decision-making abilities are 
thought  to underlie these problems (Arnett, 1992; Rivers, Reyna & 
Mills, 2008; Steinberg, 2004). 
The study of decision-making development  and its contribution to risk-
taking is complicated because age differences in risk-taking have been 
difficult to measure using laboratory tasks (see Boyer 2006 for a 
review). The results of previous studies using laboratory tasks of risk-
taking seem inconsistent  with the idea that decision-making abilities are 
immature in adolescence. For example, when the demands on learning 
and working memory are minimized by making outcome values and 
associated probabilities explicit, no age differences in decision-making 
behavior are found from age 8 to 30 (van Leijenhorst, Westenberg & 
Crone, 2008). Other developmental studies have shown that 5-6 year 
old children show an understanding of probabilities (Acredolo, 
O'Connor, Banks & Horobin, 1989; Schlottmann, 2001). However, in 
real life situations, decisions and their outcomes have to be monitored 
and this information has to be used to optimize behavior. The Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT) was designed to mimic these real life 
requirements (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio & Anderson, 1994), in this 
task participants have to learn form the outcomes of their decisions 
which choice options are risky. Developmental studies using this 
paradigm have shown an increased ability to learn to avoid the risky 
options throughout adolescence (Crone & Van der Molen, 2004; Hooper 
et  al., 2004). Importantly, these behavioral studies have limited ability 
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to inform us whether developmental changes in performance monitoring 
occur around the moment decisions are made, when the outcomes of 
decisions are processed, or during both these moments. Therefore, it 
remains unclear what aspects of child and adolescent  decision-making 
contribute to risky behavior. 
Psychophysiological measures can give further insight into the 
development of performance monitoring. Event-related potentials 
(ERPs) have been used to examine the temporal dynamics of central 
nervous system processes related to evaluating the outcomes of risky 
decisions. Gehring & Willoughby (2002) showed that  negative 
outcomes of 2-choice gambles result  in a frontally located negative 
brain potential, which peaks approximately 265 ms after the 
presentation of the negative outcome. They concluded that this ERP 
response, referred to as the Medial Frontal Negativity (MFN), was 
specific for negative outcomes, because it  was not  affected by 
information which signaled that  participants had chosen the wrong 
gamble (i.e., when the alternative choice would have resulted in even a 
greater loss). This MFN potential has the same temporal dynamics as 
the feedback-related negativity (FRN), a brain potential which is 
elicited by feedback indicating an incorrect responses (Holroyd & 
Coles, 2002). The FRN is also associated with response uncertainty or 
response conflict  and with the detection of errors. Localization studies 
examining the underlying neuroanatomical source of these negative 
brain potentials have reported that  the resolution of negative or 
erroneous outcomes is located in or near the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) (Miltner et  al., 2003; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2004). Studies on the development  of error-related ERP 
responses related to performance monitoring, suggest that error-related 
ERP responses continue to develop well into adolescence (Davies, 
Segalowitz & Gavin, 2004a, 2004b; Ladouceur, Dahl & Carter, 2004). 
Even though these developmental studies focused on response-related 
error monitoring (internal evaluation) and not on feedback-related error 
monitoring (external evaluation), the results lead to the hypothesis that 
performance monitoring is still immature in adolescents. 
Performance monitoring is also reflected in autonomic nervous system 
changes. It  is well documented that beat-to-beat  heart rate changes are 
related to information processing demands. Heart rate decelerates when 
attention has to be directed to detect  information relevant  to the task that 
is performed, and accelerates when that information is processed or 
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used actively in working memory (Lacey & Lacey, 1974; Van der 
Molen, Somsen & Orlebeke, 1985). These cardiac changes are thought 
to result  from a parasympathetic system which affects the heart  very 
quickly resulting in a change in heart rate within tens of milliseconds 
(Somsen, Jennings & Van der Molen, 2004), and which is related to self 
regulatory cognitive functions (Posner & Rothbart, 1998). Heart  rate 
typically slows in anticipation of a stimulus or a behavioral response, 
followed by an acceleratory recovery to baseline (Jennings & Van der 
Molen, 2002). Processing of negative performance feedback typically 
results in a delay of this return to baseline, as reflected in a lengthening 
of the inter beat interval, or heart  rate deceleration (Somsen, Van der 
Molen, Jennings & Van Beek, 2000; Van der Veen, Van der Molen, 
Crone & Jennings, 2004). This lengthening suggests that heart  rate is 
sensitive to the valence (negative/positive) of performance feedback 
(Somsen et al., 2000; Van der Veen et al., 2004). Similarly, the 
anticipation of performance feedback results in cardiac slowing, and 
this slowing is prolonged when outcomes are different  (better or worse) 
than expected (Crone, Bunge, de Klerk & Van der Molen, 2005a; 
Crone, Bunge, Latenstein & Van der Molen, 2005b; Crone, Somsen, 
Van Beek & Van Der Molen, 2004b). This study suggests that heart rate 
changes not only respond to the valence of the feedback, but reflects a 
performance monitoring system that responds differentially to feedback 
that is informative for optimizing task performance (Crone et  al., 2003; 
Somsen et al., 2000). 
In a gambling context, we have shown that the amount of rewards 
associated with decisions affects the pattern of cardiac changes (Crone 
et  al., 2005a). In this study, young adult participants gambled for low or 
high amounts of money and we studied the cardiac changes during the 
anticipation and evaluation of the outcomes of these gambles. As 
expected, we observed heart rate slowing during periods when 
participants were anticipating the outcomes of gambles, and this 
slowing was larger when more money was at stake. Further, heart  rate 
slowed more following feedback for high reward gambles relative to 
low reward gambles, independent of whether the feedback indicated a 
loss or a gain. These results show that  beat to beat heart rate changes are 
a sensitive index of both the anticipation of the outcomes of uncertain 
decisions and of the monitoring of these outcomes (Crone & Van der 
Molen, 2007), and the high temporal resolution enables the 
differentiation of these response related and feedback related cognitive 
processes.  
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In prior work, we have shown that  heart  rate changes can be used in 
children and adolescents (Crone & Van der Molen, 2007; Van 
Leijenhorst, Crone & Van der Molen, 2007). In a study using the IGT 
paradigm, heart  rate responses in children of three age groups (8-10, 
12-14, 16-18 years old) were assessed when they were anticipating and 
evaluating the outcomes of choices (Crone & Van der Molen, 2007). 
Participants were instructed to make choices from four locations on a 
computer screen, and each location was associated with a high or a low 
reward. Over the course of the task, participants had to learn that those 
locations which resulted in high reward also resulted in high 
punishments, leading to long-term loss. In contrast, those locations 
which resulted in low reward also resulted in low punishment, leading 
to long-term gain. The feedback results were the same as previously 
reported in adults (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1996; Crone 
et  al., 2004b). That  is, losses resulted in larger cardiac slowing than 
gain, and the slowing was larger when the loss was greater or when the 
loss was unexpected (Somsen et al., 2000). These results show an age 
related difference in the ability to anticipate negative outcomes. 
Whereas 16-18-year-olds, comparable to adults showed differentiated 
autonomic responses prior to risky outcomes, the younger age groups 
showed autonomic responses prior to all outcomes. These results 
suggest  that  while the processing of outcomes is similar for all age 
groups, the anticipation of these outcomes is immature in adolescence. 
It  should be noted that  the learning requirements of the IGT put 
demands on working memory capacity (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & 
Anderson, 1998), and it is therefore unclear whether the observed 
differences were related to anticipating the outcomes of risky decisions 
and the way in which risks are perceived, or to differences in working 
memory capacity and the ability to learn from the outcomes of choices. 
The goal of the present  study was to gain insight  into adolescent  risk-
taking by examining the development  of decision-making. Specifically, 
we used measures of heart rate changes to differentiate the relative 
contributions of the development of processes related to the anticipation 
and evaluation of gamble outcomes. Three age groups participated in 
the present  study (11-12, 14-15, 17-18-years old), reflecting different 
stages of adolescent development (Steinberg, 2005; Westenberg, Hauser 
& Cohn, 2004). All participants performed a modified version of the 
Cake Gambling Task (van Leijenhorst et  al., 2008) optimized for use in 
combination with autonomic measures. Participants were asked to 
repeatedly choose between a low-risk and a high-risk gamble, and were 
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instructed to try and win as many credits as possible over the course of 
the experiment. Stimuli were cakes composed of six wedges in two 
colors, pink (strawberry flavor) and brown (chocolate flavor) according 
to a 1:5, 2:4 or 3:3 probability distribution. As a consequence, choosing 
the high-risk gamble was associated with a 17%, 33%, or 50% chance 
of winning. We manipulated the number of credits that was associated 
with the different  decisions; in such a way that 3 or 7 credits were 
associated with the high-risk gamble, and 1 credit was always 
associated with the alternative low-risk gamble. We expected the 
behavioral results to resemble those found in our previous study using 
this paradigm (van Leijenhorst  et al., 2008), in that  the percentage of 
choices for the high-risk gamble would increase with the probability 
that this choice results in a win, and with the number of credits that 
were associated with it. 
We focused our analyses of the psychophysiological changes on the 
comparison of low-risk versus high-risk gambles, associated with a low 
or high number of credits, based on research described above that 
suggests that the ability to estimate probabilities matures well before 
adolescence. First, we examined whether cardiac changes related to 
outcome anticipation following high-risk gambles would differ from 
low-risk gambles, and whether high-risk gambles for high reward would 
differ from high-risk gambles for low reward. Based on prior work, we 
expected that  cardiac slowing associated with outcome anticipation 
would be larger for high-risk compared to low-risk gambles, and larger 
for high reward than low reward gambles (Crone et  al., 2005a). Prior 
studies have demonstrated that  the psychophysiological response in 
anticipation of uncertain outcomes becomes more differentiated with 
age during adolescence (Crone & Van der Molen, 2007), in the present 
study we therefore examine differences in anticipatory autonomic 
responses in distinct phases of adolescence, using a task with minimal 
working memory and learning demands. 
Second, we examined cardiac changes in response to the resolution of 
high-risk and low-risk gambles. We expected cardiac slowing in 
response to the outcomes of trials (Crone et al., 2003; Hajcak, 
McDonald & Simons, 2003; Van der Veen et al., 2004), and we 
expected this slowing to be larger when the outcome was unexpected 
(Crone et  al., 2003). The current study allowed us to test  whether heart 
rate responsiveness in adolescence is sensitive to the valence of the 
feedback (van der Veen et  al., 2004) or to the informative value 
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provided by the feedback, for example when the feedback violates 
expectations (Somsen et  al., 2000). Under the hypothesis that  heart rate 
changes reflect the informative value of feedback, cardiac slowing was 
expected to be larger when high-risk gambles resulted in gain, and when 
low-risk gambles resulted in loss. Previous work showed that  cardiac 
changes in response to the outcome of gambles did not show age related 
change (Crone & Van der Molen, 2007). Based on these findings, we 
did not expect age related differences in autonomic nervous system 
responses to loss and gain outcomes in the present study. 
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Participants
Fifty adolescents distributed among three age groups participated in the 
experiment. Data from 7 participants had to be excluded from the 
analyses as a consequence of technical difficulties. Data from sixteen 
11-12-year-olds (Mean = 12.22, SD = .55, 8 girls), sixteen 14-15-year-
olds (Mean = 15.09, SD = .45, 7 girls), and eleven 17-18-year-olds 
(Mean = 18.07, SD = .53, 4 girls) were included in the final sample. All 
participants were recruited by contacting local schools in the Leiden 
area (the Netherlands), and selected with the help of their teachers. 
Written informed consent was obtained from all participants aged 18 
and older. For participants younger than 18, written informed consent 
was obtained from a primary caregiver. In addition all participants gave 
verbal assent prior to inclusion in the study. Participants with learning 
or behavioral disorders or a history of neurological impairments, as 
indicated by their parents or teacher were not selected to take part in the 
study. No detailed information regarding parental income, parental 
education level, or family size of the participants was obtained. 
However, participants were mostly Caucasian, and came from families 
with average or above average SES. All procedures were approved by 
the Leiden University Department of Psychology Internal Review 
Board.
All participants completed the Raven Standard Progressive Matrices 
task (Raven SPM) in order to provide an estimate of participants’ 
general intellectual ability (Raven, Raven & Court, 1998). A one-way 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) performed on the estimated IQ scores 
revealed a significant difference between the three age groups (F (2, 41) 
= 5.03, p = .01). Post hoc Tukey tests showed that  11-12-year-olds’ 
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scores (Mean IQ = 119.19, SD = 6.57) were significantly higher than 
14-15-year-olds’ scores (Mean = 108.73, SD = 11.87). Both age groups 
did not differ statistically from 17-18-year-olds’ average scores (Mean 
IQ = 112.00, SD = 8.94). Importantly, estimated IQ scores for all age 
groups fell within the average to high average range. To test  whether IQ 
differences influenced gambling behavior we correlated estimated IQ 
scores and the average percentage of risky decisions, and did not  find a 
significant correlation (r = .007, p = .97), in addition after we excluded 
5 participants (4 middle adolescents, and 1 older adolescent) with 
estimated IQ scores below 100, IQ scores no longer differed between 
age groups (Mean IQ scores were 119.19 (SD = 6.57), 114.00 (SD = 
7.29), and 113.40 (SD = 8.06) for 11-12, 14-15, and 17-18-year-olds 
respectively) (p > .05). None of the results were affected by exclusion 
of these participants. Together these findings convince us that IQ as 
measured with the Raven SPM is not a factor in the reported effects.
5.2.2 Cake Gambling Task
In the Cake Gambling Task participants repeatedly choose between two 
gambles which are presented visually in order to make the choice 
options understandable to children. On every trial a stimulus depicting a 
cake composed of six wedges was presented at the center of the screen. 
The wedges could be brown or pink, and participants were told that 
these colors represented chocolate (brown) or strawberry (pink) 
flavored pieces of cake. The proportion of pink:brown wedges was 
varied systematically across trials to be 1:5, 2:4, or 3:3. In addition to 
varying this proportion, both colors were associated with a number of 
credits that formed the stake in the gambles. For each cake, one of the 
colors was associated with 1 credit, and the other color was associated 
with 3 or 7 credits. For the 1:5 and 2:4 cakes, 3 or 7 credits were always 
associated with the minority color, for the 3:3 cakes the 3 or 7 credits 
could be associated with both colors. A brown and pink square 
containing a number of coins, indicating the number of credits that  was 
associated with each flavor, and a question mark were presented below 
each cake. On each trial the computer randomly selected one of the 
wedges, which resulted in a 17% (for 1:5 cakes), 33% (for 2:4 cakes) 
and 50% (for 3:3 cakes) chance of the color associated with the higher 
number of credits to be chosen by the computer. To ensure that  the 
youngest  participants would understand this instruction, all participants 
were told to think of the computer as someone who picks a piece of 
cake with their eyes closed.
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Each trial started with a 500 ms fixation cross, followed by the 
presentation of a cake stimulus (see Figure 5.1). At  this point, 
participants were instructed to decide and indicate with a button press 
which of the two possible gambles they wanted to accept. A low-risk 
gamble was a gamble in which one credit was at  stake (which could be 
won or lost dependent on the outcome) whereas a high-risk gamble was 
Figure 5.1 Example of a trial in the Cake Gambling Task showing the 1:5 
probability condition. Choosing the high-risk gamble (the least probable option 
- darker color) results in a 3 credit stake, whereas choosing the low-risk 
gamble (the most probable option – lighter color) results in a 1 credit stake. In 
this example the most likely option was chosen and 1 credit was won. 
Participants were given 2 Euro to play with at the beginning of the experiment. 
Trial timing and associated Inter beat intervals are shown. See text for further 
details.  For the response locked analysis the average IBI length of IBI -2 was 
772.01 ms (SE = 16.13); for the feedback locked analysis this was 763.94 ms 
(SE = 15.53).
a gamble in which 3 or 7 credits were at stake (which could be won or 
lost). In the 1:5 and 2:4 conditions, low-risk gambles had a higher 
chance of resulting in a win, whereas high-risk gambles had a lower 
chance of resulting in a win. In the 3:3 conditions, the probabilities for 
high-risk and low-risk gambles were the same, and only the amount of 
credits at  stake differed. The stimulus remained on the screen for 2500 
ms and participants had to make their response within this time period 
with the index and middle finger of their dominant  hand. The stimulus 
and response were followed by a 4000 ms period during which a 
fixation cross was presented and participants anticipated the outcome of 
the gamble that they had chosen. This time allowed for analysis of heart 
rate and skin conductance changes related to the decision and outcome 
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anticipation phase of the trial. Following this fixation period a feedback 
stimulus was presented for 3000 ms. The valence of the feedback 
participants received was the result of the combination of the 
computer’s random choice for either pink or brown and the participant’s 
decision for the gamble associated with either pink or brown. If these 
two matched, participants received feedback indicating that they won 
the credits associated with the gamble they had chosen, and these 
credits were added to the total points score. If they did not match, 
participants received feedback indicating that they lost the credits 
associated with the gamble they had chosen and these credits were 
subtracted from the total points score. Participants were instructed to try 
to win as many credits as possible on every trial. 
5.2.3 Psychophysiological Measures. 
During performance of the Cake Gambling Task, participants’ 
electrocardiogram (ECG), skin conductance levels (SCL) and 
respiration were continuously recorded using a Biopac MP150 system. 
The ECG was recorded from three electrodes, attached via the modified 
lead-2 placement. SCL was recorded using a constant voltage (0.5 V) 
with two electrodes attached to the middle and index fingers of 
participants’ non dominant hand. Respiration was recorded using a 
temperature sensor placed under the nose. ECG signals, SCL and 
respiration signals were sampled and recorded at  a rate of 400 Hz. Inter 
Beat Intervals (IBIs) were computed based on the ECG signals and 
were visually screened for physiologically impossible readings and 
artifacts, IBI scores which were more than 2 SD removed from the 
mean were taken out  of the analysis using an algorithm developed in 
our laboratory. It  should be noted that a lengthening of the IBI, or a 
larger IBI value indicates a slowing of heart rate. The results of the skin 
conductance and respiration measures are not presented in this report. 
5.2.4 Procedure
All participants were tested individually in a quiet  room. Stimuli were 
presented in color against a black background on a 17-inch laptop 
computer screen placed at  a distance of approximately 70 centimeters 
from the participant. Preceding the task participants were given verbal 
instructions and were shown examples of trials and feedback displays. 
Following this instruction, all participants performed 21 practice trials 
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on the laptop computer. Care was taken that  all participants understood 
the instructions after practice.
At the start of the task all participants were given 2 Euro to gamble 
with; they were told that  dependent on the number of credits they would 
win over the course of the task, they could lose, win or double the 2 
Euro. The Cake Gambling Task consisted of 168 trials presented in four 
blocks of 42 trials and took approximately 40 minutes to complete, 
including instructions and 3 short breaks. The total points score was 
shown during the three breaks and at  the end of the task. The colors 
pink and brown corresponded to the index and middle fingers of 
participants’ dominant hand. This mapping was counterbalanced 
between participants to control for possible key preference, and color-
credit  associations were counterbalanced within subjects to control for a 
possible color preference. The Raven SPM (approx. 25 minutes to 
complete) was administered in the classroom within two weeks 
following the experimental task. After completion of the experiment 
participants were thanked for participation, and all were paid 4 Euro. 
5.3 Results 
The results are described in 2 sections; the first section describes the 
behavioral results, the second section describes the heart  rate results. To 
correct for non-equal variances in the analyses with heart  rate as within-
subject factors, degrees of freedom were adjusted using the Huynh–
Feldt correction.
5.3.1 Cake Gambling Task performance: Risk-taking
Participants’ performance was examined by computing the percentage 
of choices for high-risk gambles for every combination of the 
probability of winning and the amount  of credits. In addition, mean 
reaction times were recorded. Choices for high-risk gambles were 
defined as those trials for which participants chose the 3 or 7 credits 
gamble over the 1 credit alternative, even though this choice was 
associated with a smaller (1:5, 2:4) or equal (3:3) probability of 
resulting in a win. Choice data were submitted to repeated measures 
ANOVAs with Age Group (11-12-year-olds vs. 14-15-year-olds vs. 
17-18-year-olds) as between-subjects factors and Probability (1:5 vs. 
2:4 vs. 3:3) and Credits (3 or 7) as within-subjects factors. This analysis 
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resulted in main effects of Credits (F(1, 40) = 26.11, p < .001), 
Probability (F(2, 80) = 20.65, p < .001), and a Probability x Credits 
interaction (F(2, 80) = 9.47, p < .001); participants were willing to 
choose the high-risk gamble more often when 7 credits could be won 
(Mean = 52.75 %, SE = 2.71) compared to when 3 credits could be won 
(Mean = 33.67 %, SE = 3.46), and more often when the probability of 
winning was 2:4 (Mean = 46.67 %, SE = 2.29) or 3:3 (Mean = 48.31%, 
SE = 2.60) relative to when it was 1:5 (Mean = 34.66 %, SE = 3.45). 
The latter effect was amplified in the 7 credits condition relative to the 3 
credits condition. No main effect  of Age Group (p = .08) or interaction 
of Age Group with any of the effects reported above was found (all p’s 
> .1), this suggested that risk-taking behavior did not  differ between 
early, middle and late adolescents (see Figure 5.2). However, when age 
as a continuous variable was correlated with average risk-taking, a 
negative correlation was found, suggesting less risk-taking in older 
adolescents. (r = -.36, p = .02). Correlation analyses for each credit 
condition separately showed that this correlation was only significant in 
the 3-credit condition (r = -.33, p < .05), not in the 7-credit  condition. 
Together, these results show that  younger participants were more 
willing to choose the high-risk gamble when 3 credits could be gained 
compared to older participants. 
Figure 5.2 Average percentage of choices for high-risk gambles plotted for 
11-12, 14-15 and 17-18-year-olds as a function of the number of credits at 
stake (3 or 7) for the different probabilities of winning (1:5, 2:4 or 3:3). Error 
bars represent standard errors
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5.3.2 Reaction Times
Reaction time (RT) data for high-risk and low-risk gambles were 
submitted to repeated measures ANOVAs with Age Group (3) as 
between-subjects factors and Probability (1:5, 2:4 or 3:3), Credits (3 or 
7), and Choice type (high-risk or low-risk) as within-subjects factors. 
This analysis resulted in a main effect of Choice type F (1, 40) = 5.80, p 
< .05. Choices for high-risk gambles were made faster (Mean RT = 
1241.50, SE = 33.15) compared to choices for low-risk gambles (Mean 
RT  = 1302.57, SE = 33.31). There were no other main or interaction 
effects. Mean RTs for 11-12 year olds (Mean = 1245.03, SE = 49.58), 
14-15 year olds (Mean = 1306.07, SE = 49.58) and 17-18 year olds 
(Mean = 1265.02, SE = 59.79) did not  differ (p = .68), and the effect  of 
type of choice on RTs did not  differ between the age groups (p = .53) 
(RTs per reward condition are reported in Table 5.1).
Table 5.1 Mean reaction times for 11-12, 14-15, and 17-18 year olds for high-
risk (3 or 7 credits) and associated low-risk (1 credit) choices.
High-Risk gamble Low-Risk gamble 
Mean RT          SE Mean RT          SE         
11-12 yrs. 3 credits 1241.45 64.06 1279.03 52.96
7 credits 1188.67 62.61 1270.96 58.43
14-15 yrs. 3 credits 1247.77 64.06 1317.32 52.96
7 credits 1339.04 62.61 1320.13 58.43
17-18 yrs. 3 credits 1226.24 77.26 1317.13 63.88
7 credits 1310.84 75.52 1310.84 70.47
Taken together, consistent with previous reports, participants chose 
high-risk gambles more often when the probability of winning and the 
number of credits at stake were higher. Choices for high-risk gambles 
were made faster than choices for low-risk gambles, suggesting that 
either the latter required more deliberation time or that the high-risk 
gambles were selected more impulsively. Consistent  with previous 
studies, differences in performance between the adolescent age groups 
were small. There were no age differences in performance when a large 
reward could be won, but when a small reward was associated with the 
high-risk decision, younger participants were more willing to take the 
risk and gamble for this reward. In the next  section we examine in what 
way beat  to beat changes in heart  rate are related to risk-taking behavior 
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and whether there are developmental differences in the sensitivity of 
this measures to specific phases of the task. 
5.3.3 Risk-taking as reflected in Heart rate changes
The results from the analysis of changes in inter-beat-intervals (IBI) are 
organized in two sections, associated with two distinct phases of 
decision-making trials. The first  phase involves the response and the 
anticipation of the outcome of gambles. The second phase involves the 
processing of these outcomes and their evaluation. In the analysis of 
both phases, we focused on whether the participant chose a low-risk or 
high-risk gamble, and whether the high-risk gamble option was 
associated with 3 or 7 credits. The current design and number of 
observations did not  allow us to also distinguish between probability 
conditions and with reward amounts in one analysis. In addition, 
analyses on heart  rate changes for the different probability conditions 
informed us that  including probability in the analyses did not  add to the 
interpretation of the mechanism underlying developmental changes in 
decision-making1. Therefore all analyses presented below are conducted 
on values collapsed across probability conditions. 
5.3.4 Heart rate changes associated with decision-making and outcome 
anticipation.
To examine cardiac responses related to participants’ choices, seven 
inter beat  intervals (IBIs) were selected around the response, IBIs were 
computed for high-risk and low-risk gambles separately for the 
conditions in which 7 or 3 credits were at  stake. The IBI concurrent  to 
the response is referred to as IBI 0, and all IBIs were referenced to IBI 
-2 (which functioned as a baseline) (see Figure 5.1 for a schematic 
example of cardiac timing relative to trial timing). A larger IBI value 
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1 IBIs were computed for high-risk and low-risk gambles for the 1:5,  2:4 and 
3:3 Probability conditions separately.  A Probability (1:5 vs. 2:4 vs.  3:3) x 
Choice type (high-risk vs.  low-risk) x IBI (1, 2, 3) x Age group (11-12-year-
olds, 14-15-year-olds, 17-18-year-olds) repeated measures ANOVA resulted in 
a main effect of IBI F (2, 80) = 28.03 p < .001; heart rate slowed in anticipation 
of the response (from IBI -2 to IBI 0),  followed by an acceleratory recovery to 
baseline (IBI 1, 2, 3 and 4). The Probability x IBI and the Probability x Choice 
type x IBI interactions did not reach significance (p’s > .5).  No differences 
between the age groups were found for any of these effects (all p’s > .2), 
suggesting that the cardiac changes related to decision-making associated with 
the different probabilities did not differ between age groups. 
indicates a slowing of heart rate relative to this baseline. To show the 
temporal characteristics of the cardiac changes associated with the 
response and anticipation of the outcome of gambles, the values of IBI 
-1, 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 relative to the value of IBI -2 are plotted in Figure 
5.3 for each of the Choice and Credit  condition for the different age 
groups. These plots show the cardiac changes that are typically 
observed when participants prepare for a significant  event; heart  rate 
slows (an increase in IBI length) preceding the response, and 
subsequently returns to baseline (acceleratory recovery). A preliminary 
analysis of IBI -2 (Mean length = 772.01 ms, SE = 16.13 ms) revealed 
no significant differences in IBI length between the Age groups (p = .
28), confirming that this IBI can be validly used as a baseline when 
comparing task related heart rate changes between the different age 
groups. Given that there was a 500 ms inter trial interval and the 
average response times were around 1200 ms, the IBI -2 value for the 
response locked analysis does not  overlap with heart  rate changes 
following feedback on the previous trial (see Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.3 Heart rate changes related to high-risk (3 or 7 credits) gambles and 
associated outcome anticipation plotted for 11-12-year-olds, 14-15-year-olds 
and 17-18-year-olds. (* denotes significant effect at p <.05). Error bars 
represent standard errors.
To examine cardiac changes related to participants’ choices and the 
anticipation of outcomes related to those choices, we focus the analysis 
on the first  three IBIs following the response (IBI 1, 2 and 3). IBIs 
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immediately following responses (Somsen, Van der Molen, Jennings & 
Orlebeke, 1985; Somsen et  al., 2000) and feedback presentation (Crone, 
Somsen, Zanolie & Van der Molen, 2006; Crone et al., 2003) have been 
found to be most sensitive to HR changes. In addition, the feedback is 
not presented until after IBI 4, therefore cardiac changes in these IBIs 
cannot reflect  outcome processing. This data selection resulted in a 
Credits (3 vs. 7) x Choice type (high-risk vs. low-risk) x IBI (1, 2, 3) x 
Age group (11-12-year-olds, 14-15-year-olds, 17-18-year-olds) repeated 
measures ANOVA. This ANOVA resulted in a main effect  of IBI F (2, 
80) = 29.53 p < .001, and a Credits x IBI interaction F (2, 80) = 4.25, p 
< .05, which showed that the heart rate responses differed for 3 credit 
and 7 credit  gambles. An interaction with Age group (Age group x 
Credits x IBI, F (4, 80) = 4.19, p < .005), demonstrated that  this heart 
rate pattern was influenced by the Credit  condition to a different  extent 
in the different age groups. ANOVAs for the age groups separately 
showed that for the 14-15-year-olds, and 17-18 year olds heart rate 
changes related to the response and associated outcome anticipation 
phase were not significantly influenced by the amount  of credits at  stake 
(p’s > .05). In contrast, for the 11-12 year olds, the acceleratory 
recovery to baseline following the response was delayed for 7 credit 
gambles compared to 3 credit gambles (Credits x IBI, F (2, 30) = 6.55, 
p = .01). Follow up ANOVAs showed that the difference between 
gambles or 3 and 7 credits for 11-12 year olds was not significant at IBI 
1 (p = .52), but  was significant  at IBI 2 F (1, 15) = 4.93, p < .05, and 
IBI 3 F (1, 15) = 5.90, p < .05. Interestingly, this effect was not 
modulated by whether 11-12-year-olds chose a low-risk or a high-risk 
gamble (Credits x Choice, p  = .16; Credits x Choice x IBI, p = .79); the 
IBI response during outcome anticipation for the 7 credits relative to 3 
credits condition was similarly elevated for both low-risk and high-risk 
gambles. 
In sum, even though in all age groups heart  rate changes did not differ 
for high-risk and low-risk choices, there were age related differences in 
heart rate responses during the outcome anticipation phase. In 
particular, 11-12 year-olds’ heart  rate decelerated in anticipation of the 
outcome of 7 credit gambles compared to 3 credit  gambles, independent 
of whether they had chosen a high-risk or low-risk gamble. In contrast, 
no differences between conditions were found for the 14-15 and 17-18 
year olds. These results suggest  increased performance monitoring 
associated with the anticipation of the outcomes of high reward gambles 
in early adolescence.
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5.3.5 Cardiac changes associated with outcome processing
To examine cardiac responses related to the processing of the outcomes 
of gambles, seven IBIs were selected around the presentation of the 
feedback, IBIs were computed for loss and gain trials, following 7 
credits high-risk gambles, 3 credits high-risk gambles, and 1 credit  low-
risk gambles separately. For this analysis the IBI concurrent  to the 
presentation of the feedback is referred to as IBI 0, and all IBIs were 
referenced to IBI -2 (the second IBI preceding the presentation of the 
feedback) (see Figure 5.1). Again, to show the temporal characteristics 
of cardiac changes , the values of IBI -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 relative to IBI 
-2, are plotted in Figure 5.4 following gain and loss feedback associated 
with 1 credit  low-risk gambles and 3 or 7 credit  high-risk gambles 
separately. Figure 5.4 shows the expected pattern; heart  rate slows in 
anticipation of the presentation of the feedback, and subsequently 
returns to baseline.  A preliminary analysis of IBI -2 (Mean length = 
763.94 ms, SE = 15.53 ms) revealed no significant differences in IBI 
length between the Age groups (p = .32), confirming that this IBI could 
be validly used as a baseline when comparing task related heart  rate 
changes between the different age groups. Similar to the response 
locked analysis, the IBI -2 value for the response feedback locked 
analysis does not overlap with heart rate changes following the 
preceding response (see Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.4 Heart rate responses related to loss and gain feedback for high-risk 
(3 or 7 credits) and low-risk (1 credit) gambles. (* denotes significant effect at 
p < .05). Error bars represent standard errors.
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To examine cardiac changes related to the processing of gain and loss 
outcomes, we focused the analysis on the first  three IBIs following the 
presentation of the feedback (IBI 1, 2 and 3). The feedback remains 
visible for 3000 ms, therefore cardiac changes in these IBIs are unlikely 
to reflect anticipation of the next trial. This data selection resulted in a 
Credits (1, 3, 7) x Feedback (gain vs. loss) x IBI (1, 2, 3) x Age group 
(11-12-year-olds, 14-15-year-olds, 17-18-year-olds) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. 
The ANOVA resulted in a main effect of IBI, F (2, 80) = 27.30, p < .
001, and a Credits x Feedback interaction F (2, 80) = 3.17, p < .05. No 
differences between the Age groups were found (all p’s > .16), showing 
that in contrast  to the decision phase, cardiac changes related to the 
outcome of gambles were similar in early, middle, and late adolescence. 
As can be seen in Figure 5.4, heart  rate slowing following the 
presentation of the feedback was larger for gain relative to loss 
outcomes of high-risk gambles (3 and 7 credits), whereas heart rate 
slowing was larger for loss relative to gain outcomes for low-risk 
gambles (1 credit). These observations were statistically verified with 
ANOVAs for the credit  conditions separately, which showed that  the 
difference in the cardiac response following gain and loss feedback was 
not significant for 3 credit  (p = .21) and 7 credit (p = .28) outcomes, but 
for low-risk 1 credit  outcomes heart rate slowed more following 
feedback indicating loss (M = 29.29, SE = 3.48) relative to feedback 
indicating gain (M = 20.62, SE = 2.87) (main effect  feedback; F(1, 40) 
= 6.22, p = .017) 
In summary, the analysis of autonomic nervous system responses to the 
outcome of gambles indicate that  heart rate slowed following the 
presentation of the feedback, and that this slowing was larger for loss 
than for gain feedback following low-risk gambles, whereas following 
high-risk gambles heart rate changes did not differ significantly for gain 
and loss. These results show that heart  rate is not  simply sensitive to the 
magnitude of gain or loss, but  is responsive to the informative value of 
the feedback. That  is, the heart rate response is more pronounced when 
the outcome is associated with the least predictable outcome (loss 
following a low-risk gamble). Consistent  with prior studies, there were 
no age differences in the effects of feedback on autonomic nervous 
system changes (see also Crone & Van der Molen, 2007).
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5.4 Discussion
The goal of this study was to gain insight  into adolescent risk-taking. 
We examined adolescents' decision-making in a gambling task, and 
measured associated beat to beat changes in heart  rate. This technique 
enabled us to differentiate the developmental trajectories of cognitive 
processes related to the anticipation and evaluation of the outcomes of 
gambles separately. The paradigm also allowed us to gain insight  into 
age related changes in performance monitoring and the sensitivity to 
rewards in adolescence. 
In a previous behavioral experiment in which we used a paradigm 
similar to the paradigm used here, we showed that participants ranging 
in age from 8 to 30 years take both the probability of winning and the 
number of credits associated with a gamble into account when they 
make risky decisions (van Leijenhorst et  al., 2008). Our behavioral 
results are consistent with this finding; the percentage of choices for 
high-risk gambles increased with the associated probability of winning, 
and was higher for high reward gambles than low reward gambles. 
Gambling behavior did not differ between the age groups for high 
reward gambles, however, when a small reward was at  stake younger 
adolescents were more likely to choose a high-risk gamble than older 
adolescents. This finding could suggest that  in early adolescence the 
potential gain associated with low reward gambles is experienced as 
more rewarding, or that the potential loss associated with the low 
reward gamble is experienced as less negative. Heart rate changes can 
help us gain insight into this hypothesis. 
Measures of cardiac changes associated with the decision and 
anticipation of the outcomes of gambles revealed that, consistent with 
prior studies (Crone, Jennings & Van der Molen, 2004a; Crone & Van 
der Molen, 2007; Somsen et al., 2000), decisions were associated with 
anticipatory heart  rate slowing, followed by an acceleratory recovery to 
baseline in all age groups. These cardiac responses have been shown to 
reflect anticipatory cognitive processes related to a performance 
monitoring system (Somsen et al., 1985; Van der Molen et  al., 1985). 
When monitoring increases and allocation of attentional resources is 
required, heart rate typically shows a phasic slowing (Jennings & Van 
der Molen, 2002). Contrary to our expectations, no difference in the 
cardiac response to high-risk or low-risk choices was found in any of 
the age groups. 
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If it is the case that  the youngest  participants chose the high-risk gamble 
for 3 credits more often than the older adolescents because of the way 
they experience the potential reward, performance monitoring should be 
increased, since a focus on the potential reward would make the 
outcome of their decisions more salient. In contrast, when they chose 
the high-risk gamble associated with low reward more often because of 
the way they experience the potential loss, performance monitoring 
should decrease, because the outcome is less salient. Even though high-
risk gambles for low reward were not  associated with age related 
differences in cardiac responses, the recovery to baseline was delayed 
for the 11-12-year-olds for high reward gambles. Heart rate slowed 
more for these participants, regardless of whether they had chosen a 
high-risk or low-risk gamble. This finding suggests that, even though 
participants in all age groups monitor their decisions and anticipate the 
outcome of their choices, in early adolescence participants are most 
likely more sensitive to rewards. In addition, this finding supports the 
hypothesis that younger participants are more willing to gamble because 
they experience potential rewards differently. 
This interpretation is consistent with recent theories on adolescent risk-
taking which suggest that early adolescents show more arousal related 
to potential rewards (Ernst et  al., 2005; Galvan et  al., 2006; Van 
Leijenhorst et al., 2009; Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure & Pine, 2005). In 
addition, self-regulatory, or executive skills develop slowly (Huizinga, 
Dolan & Van der Molen, 2006; Posner & Rothbart, 1998), the larger 
response to high reward gambles could reflect 11-12-year-olds' 
immature ability to regulate the arousal they experience in response to 
the potential reward. An alternative explanation is that  because of the 
slow maturation of executive skills, 11-12-year-olds experience the task 
differently. They could, for example, find it more difficult to understand 
that the outcomes of gambles are randomly chosen and that they can not 
influence the trial sequence. This could result in increased performance 
monitoring.  
Heart rate has also been found to be sensitive to performance feedback, 
showing more slowing when outcomes are more relevant  (Crone et al., 
2005a; Crone et  al., 2005b). The outcome of gambles were associated 
with heart rate slowing as well; this slowing was most  pronounced for 
unexpected feedback (losing following a low-risk gamble). Consistent 
with the findings from our prior studies, heart  rate was sensitive to the 
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informative value of the feedback and not  to the valence of the outcome 
in itself (Crone et al., 2003; Van Leijenhorst  et al., 2007). This data 
pattern again supports our hypothesis that  heart rate responses reflect 
cognitive processes related to an executive control system (Jennings & 
Van der Molen, 2002; Somsen et al., 2000). No age related differences 
were observed during the feedback evaluation phase of the task. In this 
gambling task in which working memory requirements were minimal, 
and participants did not have to learn from the outcomes of their 
decisions, heart  rate changes showed developmental change until mid 
adolescence during the anticipation phase of trials, but  did not differ 
between age groups during the outcome processing phase. This finding 
is consistent  with previous studies (Crone & Van der Molen, 2007; 
Somsen et al., 2000), showing that developmental change in 
performance monitoring is related to the anticipation of outcomes, not 
to the processing of outcomes. Moreover, this finding suggests that it is 
unlikely that adolescents engage in risky behavior because they 
experience the outcome of their choices differently from adults, but 
because they weigh the potential reward differently when they make a 
decision. In early adolescence, participants seem more sensitive to 
potential rewards. This interpretation fits well with recent theories on 
adolescent risk-taking based on new insights from studies on functional 
brain development. These studies show that reward related brain regions 
(e.g. the ventral striatum) show an enhanced response in adolescence 
(Ernst  et al, 2005; Galvan et al., 2006; Van Leijenhorst  et al., 2009), 
whereas brain regions which are important  for cognitive control (e.g. 
the lateral prefrontal cortices) do not mature until well into young 
adulthood (Casey, Giedd, & Thomas, 2000; Giedd, 2004; Gogtay et al., 
2004). These immature cognitive control abilities paired with the 
increased sensitivity to reward, are thought to bias adolescents towards 
risk-taking (Casey, Getz & Galvan, 2008; Ernst, Pine & Hardin, 2006; 
Steinberg, 2004). 
5.4.1 Limitations and future directions
The laboratory context  of this study also resulted in several limitations 
which should be addressed in future studies. First, optimization of the 
task for autonomic recordings resulted in relatively slow presentation of 
the stimuli, which made the task less comparable to real-life risk 
situations. Future studies could further examine the relation between 
decision-making in a task context and real life risky behavior by 
looking for correlations with self report  measures of risky behavior. In 
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addition future work could look at  the role of performance monitoring 
as reflected in autonomic nervous system changes by examining the 
relation between cardiac changes on early trials and decision-making on 
later trials. Nevertheless, we found a decrease in risk-taking with age, 
and different reward related anticipatory cardiac responses in the 
youngest  age group. Second, even though participants played for real 
money, the amount was relatively small (maximum of 4 Euro gain), and 
gambles were associated with a high or low number of abstract  credits. 
This may have influenced the way in which the different  age groups 
approached the task. While the pattern of heart  rate changes suggests 
that all participants were attentive and were motivated throughout the 
experiment, 4 Euro could be a more salient reward for participants in 
the youngest age group. The question how comparable rewards are to 
participants of different ages cannot  be answered with this study, but 
will have to be addressed in the future. Future studies could explore the 
subjective emotional reactions of participants to gain insight  into their 
experience of the task. Finally, the brain-based explanations are not 
based on real brain assessments but  are inferred based on the 
psychophysiological manifestation during separate phases of risk-
taking. This approach reveals developmental changes in autonomic 
nervous system responses to reward in a gambling task, and informs 
neuroimaging studies on the neural mechanisms of adolescent risk-
taking that are currently being conducted in our and other laboratories.  
 
5.4.2 Conclusion
This study contributes to the literature on adolescent decision-making 
by describing its psychophysiological manifestation in terms of heart 
rate changes, and providing insight  into the temporal resolution of 
decisions and associated age related differences. The results from this 
study suggest  that developmental differences in reward sensitivity 
underlie increased risk-taking in adolescence. In particular, the response 
to rewards during the anticipation of the outcome of risky decisions 
changes with development, not the response to actual outcomes. These 
changes could be interpreted as slow maturation of self-regulatory 
functions which inhibit reward related arousal (Posner & Rothbart, 
1998), and are supported by neuroimaging studies which have reported 
an adolescent  specific enlarged response in reward related brain regions 
in anticipation of outcomes (Ernst  et al., 2005; Galvan et  al., 2006). 
Future studies should examine how the development of these systems 
relates to adolescent risky behavior as it is observed in real-life. 
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6.
 Adolescent risky decision-making: 
Neurocognitive development of 
affective and control regions
Recent models hypothesize that adolescents risky behavior is the consequence 
of increased sensitivity to rewards in the ventral medial (VM) prefrontal cortex 
(PFC) and the ventral striatum (VS), paired with immature cognitive control 
abilities due to slow maturation of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
and lateral PFC. We tested this hypothesis with fMRI using a gambling task in 
which participants chose between Low-Risk gambles with a high probability of 
obtaining a small reward (1 Euro) and High-Risk gambles with a smaller 
probability of obtaining a higher reward (2, 4, 6, or 8 Euro). We examined 
neural responses during choice selection and outcome processing in 
participants from 4 age groups (pre-pubertal children, early adolescents,  older 
adolescents and young adults). High-Risk choices increased with rewards for 
all ages, but risk-taking decreased with age for low reward gambles. The fMRI 
results confirmed that High-Risk choices were associated with activation in 
VMPFC, whereas Low-Risk choices were associated with activation in lateral 
PFC. Activation in dorsal ACC showed a linear decrease with age, whereas 
activation in VMPFC and VS showed an inverted-U shaped developmental 
pattern, with a peak in adolescence. In addition,  behavioral differences in risk-
taking propensity modulated brain activation in all age groups. These findings 
support the hypothesis that risky behavior in adolescence is associated with an 
imbalance caused by different developmental trajectories of affective and 
regulatory brain circuitry.   
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6.1 Introduction
From late childhood until young adulthood, teens increasingly need to 
rely on their own judgment in potentially risky situations, and they must 
learn to avoid excessive risks. The ability to make these decisions 
develops slowly, which can have serious consequences in daily life 
(Dahl & Gunnar, 2009; Steinberg et al., 2008). For example, self report 
and observation studies show that the number of traffic accidents peaks 
in adolescence, and that teens are at risk for getting involved in criminal 
behavior, experimentation with tobacco and alcohol, and unsafe sexual 
activity (Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1992; Steinberg, 2004). Even though it 
is difficult  to examine this real-world risk-taking using laboratory tasks, 
these problems underline the importance of understanding the normal 
developmental trajectory of decision-making and its contribution to 
risk-taking behavior. 
Tasks measuring decision-making often show a decreases in risk-taking 
with age (Boyer, 2006), or no age related change in performance after 
late childhood (Van Leijenhorst, Westenberg & Crone, 2008). However, 
adolescents show more risky behavior than adults when the 
experimental task is arousing; for example when peers are present 
(Gardner & Steinberg, 2005), or when it  stresses affective rather than 
deliberative processing (Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009). 
The development  of neuroimaging techniques including fMRI has led to 
neurobiological models that  account  for these findings by suggesting 
that risky behavior in adolescence results from the earlier functional 
maturation of reward-related compared to control-related brain circuitry. 
Affective and control related circuitry are thought to have separable 
contributions to decision-making, and the difference in the pattern of 
their development leads to an imbalance in the adolescent brain (Casey, 
Getz & Galvan, 2008; Ernst, Pine & Hardin, 2006; Galvan et al., 2006). 
In this study, we test  this model by examining the development of 
reward-related and control-related brain regions using fMRI and a 
gambling task. The developmental neuroimaging studies published to 
date have revealed that  reward processing is associated with activation 
in similar brain regions in adolescents and adults, including the ventral 
medial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and the ventral striatum (VS) (Bjork 
et  al., 2004; Ernst et al., 2005; Eshel, Nelson, Blair, Pine & Ernst, 2007; 
Galvan et al., 2006; May et al., 2004). In adults, these regions have been 
implicated in the processing of primary rewards such as a sweet  taste 
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(McClure, Berns & Montague, 2003; O'Doherty, Deichmann, Critchley 
& Dolan, 2002), but  also in the processing of abstract  rewards such as 
monetary gain (Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale & Shizgal, 2001; 
Knutson, Adams, Fong & Hommer, 2001). Developmental studies, have 
reported stronger activation in the VS in response to rewards in 
adolescents than in adults (Ernst et al., 2005). Therefore, prior studies 
have suggested that brain regions associated with reward processing, 
show a heightened response to rewards in mid-adolescence.
The functional development of cognitive control related brain regions, 
associated with for example working memory, response inhibition and 
performance monitoring, typically follows a linear pattern (Casey, 
Galvan & Hare, 2005; Casey, Giedd & Thomas, 2000). In the context  of 
decision-making tasks, these regions, including the dorsal anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) the dorsal lateral (DL) and ventral lateral (VL) 
PFC, show developmental changes throughout adolescence (Eshel et  al., 
2007; Galvan et al., 2006; Van Leijenhorst, Crone & Bunge, 2006). For 
example, Galvan et al. (2006) found a slow developmental trajectory for 
the VLPFC/lateral-OFC in a delayed two-choice task in which reward 
amounts were varied. The extent of activation in this region in response 
to rewards was larger for 7-11 year olds and 13-17 year olds than for 
23-29 year olds. Similarly, Van Leijenhorst et  al. (2006) found an age-
related decrease in activation in the dorsal ACC associated with an 
increase in the ability to identify the choice option with the highest 
probability of resulting in a win between late childhood/ early 
adolescence (9-12) and young adulthood (18-25). These findings were 
interpreted as reflecting an immature activation pattern; children and 
adolescents require more activation in cognitive control related regions 
than adults when making decisions. In contrast, Eshel et al. (2007) 
found a decrease in risk-taking together with an increase in activation of 
the dorsal ACC and VL PFC from adolescence (9-17 years) to 
adulthood, and interpreted these findings in terms of an increase in the 
recruitment  of cognitive control circuitry with increasing age, resulting 
in an increase in the ability to regulate impulsive risky behavior. In sum, 
developmental changes in cognitive control areas during decision-
making have been associated with increased as well as decreased neural 
activation. 
To date, the studies on adolescent  risk-taking have focused on either the 
neural correlates of cognitive control (Eshel et al., 2007; Van 
Leijenhorst et  al., 2006), or the neural correlates of reward processing 
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(Ernst  et  al., 2005; Galvan et al., 2006; Van Leijenhorst  et  al., 2009), but 
have not  attempted to directly compare the relative contribution of the 
brain regions implicated in these processes to adolescent risk-taking 
behavior. In addition, not all studies have included participants from a 
wide age range (i.e., children, adolescents and adults), which limits the 
possibility to test for adolescent-specific patterns of activation and an 
inverted U-shaped developmental pattern. Therefore, the question 
whether brain regions associated with reward processing and cognitive 
control in a risk-taking task follow distinct developmental patterns has 
not yet been tested explicitly. Also, even though an adolescent specific 
peak in risky behavior and associated harmful consequences is well 
documented, not  every adolescent engages in real world risky behavior. 
For example, Galvan, Hare, Voss, Glover & Casey (2007), found a 
positive relation between self reported risk perception and the response 
to rewards in the ventral striatum; participants who associated risky 
behavior with possible negative consequences showed a less 
pronounced neural response to rewards. Further insight into these 
individual differences across development  is important  to identify the 
adolescents who are at greater risk.
The goal of the present  study was twofold: the first  goal was to test, 
using fMRI, whether developmental changes in brain activation related 
to decision-making under risk can be characterized by a linear 
development  pattern of control related brain regions, including dorsal 
ACC and lateral PFC, and a peak in adolescence in responsiveness to 
rewards in reward related regions, including the VMPFC and the VS. 
The second goal was to test the relation between brain activation and 
individual differences in risk-taking propensity during development. To 
test these hypotheses, participants from four age groups (8-10, 12-14, 
16-17, 19-22-years old) participated in an fMRI study in which we used 
a child friendly two-choice decision-making task in which participants 
repeatedly chose between a low-risk gamble and a high-risk gamble, 
and in which the amount of reward associated with the high-risk gamble 
was varied (Van Leijenhorst, Westenberg & Crone, 2008). We tested for 
different  developmental trajectories, by performing high-risk > low-risk 
gamble comparisons and gain > no-gain outcome comparisons, and by 
modeling age as a gradually increasing or decreasing predictor or as a 
non-linear rise-and-fall predictor. 
Based on prior empirical studies, and based on the recently postulated 
models of adolescent risk-taking which suggest  an imbalance between 
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the maturation of control and reward brain circuitry (Casey et al., 2008; 
Ernst et al., 2006; Steinberg et  al., 2008), we predicted that participants 
would choose the high-risk gamble more often as the reward associated 
with it  increased (Van Leijenhorst  et  al., 2008). In addition we predicted 
that rewards would elicit increased activation in VMPFC and the VS, 
and that activation in these regions would be associated with choices for 
high-risk gambles (Eshel et al., 2007; Knutson, Wimmer, Kuhnen & 
Winkielman, 2008). In contrast  choices for low-risk gambles were 
expected to be associated with increased activation in lateral PFC 
regions (Eshel et  al., 2007). We further predicted that  the neural 
response in reward related regions and control related regions would co-
vary with individual differences in risk-taking propensity. With regard 
to development, we expected that  1) when both choice options are 
similar, decision-making in younger participants would be associated 
with increased activation in dorsal ACC (Van Leijenhorst et  al., 2006), 
2) that  high potential reward would be associated with a peak in 
activation of reward related regions in the VS and VMPFC in mid-
adolescence, during both the decision and outcome phase (Ernst et  al., 
2005; Galvan et al., 2006; Van Leijenhorst  et  al., 2009), and 3) that 
activation in control related regions in lateral PFC would show a linear 
change in activation with age (Eshel et al., 2007; Galvan et al., 2006). 
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Participants 
Fifty-eight healthy, right-handed volunteers were included in the study. 
To dissociate developmental changes related to puberty and 
adolescence, we recruited participants from four age groups; thirteen 
pre-pubertal children (aged 8-10 years; 8 female; mean age 9.7, SD = 
0.9), fifteen pubertal adolescents (aged 12-14 years; 8 female; mean age 
13.4, SD = 0.8), fifteen post-pubertal adolescents (aged 16-17 years; 7 
female; mean age = 17.1, SD = 0.7), and fifteen young adults (aged 
19-26 years; 7 female; mean age = 21.6, SD = 2.08). All procedures 
were approved by the Leiden University Department  of Psychology and 
the Medical Ethical Committee at  the Leiden University Medical 
Center. All participants, or a primary caregiver in the case of minors, 
gave informed consent. Data for two additional participants (an 8-year-
old and a 21-year-old) was excluded from the analyses because of 
excessive head movement. Mean head movement was .14 mm for the 
8-10 year olds, .08 mm for the 12-14 year olds, .07 mm for the 16-17 
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year olds, and .06 mm for the 19-26 year olds. Even though mean head 
movement during scanning was slightly higher in the youngest age 
group than in the older the age groups (F (3, 57) = 12.10, p < .001), for 
none of the participants head movement during scanning exceeded 1 
voxel in any direction. Participants in the three youngest age groups 
were screened for behavioral problems using parent-ratings on the Child 
Behavior Checklist (Achenbach, 1991). Scores for all participants fell 
within the non-clinical range. 
6.2.2 The Cake Gambling Task 
The present study used an adapted version of a child friendly gambling 
task (Van Leijenhorst et  al., 2008) in which participants were asked to 
choose between a low-risk gamble and a high-risk gamble associated 
with a probabilistic monetary reward. In this gambling task, all 
information that  was relevant  for making a decision was presented to 
participants on every trial and no information had to be learned or 
retrieved over consecutive trials. The probability associated with both 
gambles and the associated potential rewards were presented visually. 
Participants saw a cake composed of six brown and pink wedges in a 
4:2 ratio (see Figure 6.1A) and a pink and brown square presented at  the 
bottom of the screen in which the reward associated with that color was 
presented as stacks of 50 cent coins. On each trial, one of the wedges 
was randomly selected by the computer. If the color of this wedge 
matched the color that the participant chose, the reward associated with 
that gamble was won; if they did not match, the gamble did not result in 
a reward. Participants chose between a low-risk gamble (betting on the 
majority color with a 66 % chance of winning) and a high-risk gamble 
(betting on the minority color with a 33 % chance of winning). The 
probabilities associated with the two choice options were kept  constant 
but the amount  of reward associated with the high-risk gamble was 
varied. The potential reward associated with the low-risk gamble was 
always 1 Euro, whereas the potential reward associated with the high-
risk gamble was 2, 4, 6, or 8 Euro. The condition in which a choice had 
to be made between a 1 Euro low-risk gamble and a 2 Euro high-risk 
gamble was ambiguous, since the expected value (the probability x 
reward magnitude) of both choice options was equal. In the conditions 
in which the high-risk gamble was associated with 4 to 8 Euro, the 
expected value of the high-risk gamble was always higher than that of 
the low-risk gamble. Trials had the following structure: a fixation cross 
was presented for 500 ms, followed by the presentation of the cake 
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stimulus which remained visible for 2000 ms. During this time, 
participants had to make their choice via a button press with the index 
or middle finger of their right hand. Following the cake stimulus, a 
fixation cross was presented for 4000 ms after which participants were 
shown the outcome of the gamble for 2000 ms. 
Figure 6.1 A) The Cake Gambling Task. The left panel shows the different trial 
types as a function of the amount of reward associated with the High-Risk 
gamble. The right panel depicts trial timing for an example of a low-risk choice 
followed by a gain outcome. B) Behavioral Results, the percentage of choices 
for the High-Risk gamble shown for each Reward condition (2, 4, 6 and 8 
Euro), and Age group (8-10-year-olds, 12-14-year-olds, 16-17-year-olds, and 
19-26-year-olds).  Error bars depict standard error. Age differences were only 
present for the 2-Euro condition.
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The outcome screen indicated the result  of the gamble (gain or no-gain) 
as well as the size of the associated reward. For gain outcomes, 
participants saw the stack of coins they had gambled with. For no-gain 
outcomes, participants saw this stack of coins with a cross through it. 
Jittered fixation varying between 300 ms and 5250 ms in increments of 
550 ms was added to the inter trial intervals using an optimization 
program (optseq2; see http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq/, 
developed by Dale, (1999)).
6.2.3 Raven Standard Progressive Matrices 
All participants completed Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices 
(Raven, Raven & Court, 1998) outside of the scanner in order to obtain 
an estimate of their ability to form perceptual relations and reason by 
analogy. The Raven Standard Progressive Matrices (RSPM) is a non-
verbal test  designed to measure general intellectual ability (Raven et  al., 
1998). Based on the final scores on this test, we obtained estimated IQ 
scores using Dutch norms. Estimated mean IQ scores all fell within the 
average to high-average range; 123.31 (SD = 7.86) for the 8-10 year 
olds, 120.60 (SD = 10.87) for 12-14 year olds, 115.20 (SD = 10.36) for 
16-17 year olds, and 125.33 (SD = 7.28) for 19-26 year olds. Estimated 
IQ scores for 16-17 year olds were the lowest. However, only the 
difference between 16-17 year olds’ estimated IQ scores and 19-26 year 
olds’ estimated IQ scores reached significance (F(1, 28) = 9.61, p < .
01). Because all participants’ scores fell within the average to high-
average range, IQ differences are not described further. 
6.2.4 Procedure
Participants were prepared for the scan in a quiet  laboratory. A mock 
scanner was used to simulate the environment and sounds of an actual 
MRI scanner. All participants received extensive instructions and 
performed 11 practice trials immediately before the scan. They were 
told that  their goal was to win as often as possible and that at the end of 
the experiment they would get to keep the sum of two randomly 
selected outcomes (one trial per task block). We explained that there 
was no need to remember performance on previous trials because trials 
were not  related, and that each trial could be chosen in the end. 
Therefore, all trials were equally important. We explained that  gambling 
requires some luck, and that their winnings could be anywhere between 
0 and 16 Euro. In reality, all participants were paid 5 Euro. Following 
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the scan, participants filled out  the RSPM, and additional questionnaires 
which are not reported here. 
6.2.5 MRI Data Acquisition 
In total, 84 trials, with 21 trials per condition, were presented over the 
course of two event-related scans that  lasted approximately 7 minutes 
each. Scanning was performed using a standard whole-head coil on a 3 
Tesla Philips scanner at  the Leiden University Medical Center (LUMC). 
Stimuli were projected onto a screen that participants could see via a 
mirror attached to the head coil. Functional data were acquired using a 
T2*-weighted gradient-echo echo-planar pulse sequence (38 contiguous 
2.75 mm oblique axial slices, using sequential acquisition, TR = 2.2 s, 
TE = 30 ms, 2.75 x 2.75 mm inplane resolution, 200 volumes per run). 
High-resolution T2* weighed images and high resolution T1 anatomical 
images were collected at the end of the scan session. Head motion was 
restricted using a pillow and foam inserts that surrounded the head. 
Participants watched cartoons while structural scans were collected. 
6.2.6 fMRI preprocessing and Statistical analysis 
Data pre-processing and analysis was conducted using SPM5 
(Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology). Images were 
corrected for differences in timing of slice acquisition, followed by rigid 
body motion correction. Functional volumes were spatially normalized 
to echo planar imaging templates. Templates were based on the MNI305 
stereotaxic space (Cocosco, Kollokian, Kwan & Evans, 1997). The 
normalization algorithm used a 12-parameter affine transformation 
together with a nonlinear transformation involving cosine basis 
functions. During normalization the data was resampled to 3 mm cubic 
voxels. Functional volumes were smoothed with a 6 mm full-width at 
half maximum isotropic Gaussian kernel. 
Statistical analyses were performed on individual subjects’ data using 
the general linear model implemented in SPM5. For each participant, 
the fMRI time series were modeled as a series of zero duration events 
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). We 
modeled the onset of the stimulus and the onset  of the outcome of each 
trial as zero duration events. Trials for which no response was given 
within the 2000 ms cue window were modeled separately and were 
excluded from subsequent  analyses. Decision-analyses related to the 
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stimulus distinguished high-risk and low-risk gambles for the four 
different  reward conditions (2, 4, 6, and 8 Euro gambles). Outcome-
analyses distinguished gain and no-gain outcomes for the four reward 
conditions (2, 4, 6, and 8 Euro) following high-risk gambles; gain and 
no-gain outcomes following a low-risk gamble were modeled 
separately. The modeled events were used as covariates in a general 
linear model, along with a basic set of cosine functions that  high-pass 
filtered the data. The least-squares parameter estimates of height of the 
best-fitting canonical HRF for each condition were used in pair-wise 
contrasts. The resulting contrast  images, computed on a subject-by-
subject basis, were submitted to group analyses. At  the group level, 
whole-brain contrasts between conditions were computed by 
performing one-tailed t-tests, treating participants as a random effect. 
Task-related responses were considered significant if they exceeded an 
uncorrected threshold of p < .001, with an extent threshold of 10 voxels. 
To test  the hypothesis that  control related regions followed a linear 
increase or decrease with development, whereas reward related regions 
followed a nonlinear trend and showed a peak in adolescence, we 
performed separate voxelwise ANOVAs. These analyses aimed at 
identifying regions that  showed age-related change in activation related 
to decision-making and during outcome processing. We tested for both 
linear (-3 -1 1 3 / 3 1 -1 -3 contrast) and quadratic (-1 1 1 -1 contrast) 
age-related patterns of change. ANOVAs were also considered 
significant if they exceeded an uncorrected threshold of p < .001, and an 
extent threshold of 10 contiguous voxels.
6.2.7 fMRI Results: Region of Interest Analysis 
We used the MarsBaR toolbox for use with SPM5 (MarsBaR; see http://
marsbar.sourceforge.net/ developed by: Brett, Anton, Valabregue & 
Poline (2002)) to perform region of interest (ROI) analyses to further 
illustrate patterns of activation in the clusters that  we identified in the 
voxelwise analyses. We created 6 mm spherical ROIs centered at the 
peak active voxel for these clusters. 
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Risk-taking behavior and Reaction Times (RTs) 
  
We submitted the percentage of High-Risk gambles to a repeated 
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measures ANOVA with Age group as between subjects factor and 
Reward (2, 4, 6, 8 Euro) as within subjects factor. Risk-taking increased 
when the reward at  stake was higher (main effect Reward, F (3, 162) = 
39.13, p < .001). On average, risk-taking did not  differ between age 
groups (p = .51), but there was a significant  Age group x Reward 
interaction (F (9, 162) = 2.57, p < .005) (see Figure 6.1B.). Follow-up 
ANOVAs for the age groups separately showed that participants in all 
age groups made more High-risk decisions as rewards increased (all p’s 
< .005). However, comparing the age groups in each reward condition 
separately showed no age-related differences in the percentage of High-
Risk decisions for the 4, 6, and 8 Euro gambles (p’s > .1). In contrast, 
for 2 Euro gambles this analysis revealed a decrease in risk-taking with 
age (p <.05), suggesting that  in the most  ambiguous condition older 
participants were more risk averse. Post  hoc ANOVAs confirmed that 
the percentage of risk-taking in the 2-Euro condition was higher for 
8-10-year-olds and 12-14-year-olds relative to 19-26-year-olds, whereas 
the 16-17-year-olds did not differ from the younger and older age 
groups. 
To test for age-related differences in response times, we submitted 
participants’ average RTs to a repeated measures ANOVA with Reward 
(2, 4, 6, or 8) and Choice (High-Risk, Low-Risk) as within subjects 
factors and Age group as between subjects factor. Ten participants were 
excluded from this analysis due to missing observations in one or more 
of the conditions (2 pre-pubertal children, 1 pubertal adolescent, 4 post-
pubertal adolescents, and 3 young adults). The analysis showed that 
average RTs did not  differ between Age groups (p = .21), or between 
High-Risk and Low-Risk decisions (p = .33). RTs varied as a function 
of the amount of reward at  stake as revealed by a main effect  of Reward 
(F (3, 132) = 4.68, p  = .004). RTs for 2 Euro gambles were slower 
compared to 6 Euro (p < .05) or 8 Euro (p < .001) gambles. This pattern 
of results did not differ as a function of Age (Reward x Age Group, p = .
36) (see Supplemental Figure 6.1).   
Taken together, there were no age differences in risk-taking when the 
reward at stake was high, however, for the more ambiguous 2 Euro 
gambles participants were more risk averse as they were older. There 
were no age differences in response times, suggesting that  age 
differences in neural responses cannot  be explained by differences in 
reaction times or impulsive responding. 
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6.3.2 fMRI results
The fMRI results are described in two sections; first  we describe the 
results of the analyses during the decision phase, then we describe the 
analyses related to the outcome processing.
6.3.3 Brain regions involved in High-Risk versus Low-Risk decisions 
We first  identified brain regions underlying risk-taking behavior across 
age groups. We performed a general linear model analysis on the 
functional data modeled at the onset  of the stimulus, and computed a 
voxelwise contrast  of High-Risk > Low-Risk decisions across reward 
conditions. This analysis revealed three significant clusters in the 
medial PFC; one cluster in the dorsal medial PFC (peak at  -12, 51, 18, z 
= 3.62) , t(1, 57) = 3.85, p < .001, one in the ventral medial PFC (peak 
at  -6, 60, -6, z = 3.96) , t(1, 57) = 4.26, p < .001, and one cluster in the 
subgenual ACC (peak at -3, 21, -6, z = 4.34) , t(1, 57) = 4.75, p < .001. 
The reverse contrast  of Low-Risk > High-Risk decisions resulted in a 
cluster of activation in right DLPFC (peak at 39, 24, 36, z = 4.49), t (1, 
57) = 4.94, p < .001 (see Figure 6.2A). These results are consistent with 
the dual process hypothesis which suggests that activation in reward 
related areas in the medial PFC is associated with risky decisions, 
whereas activation in control areas in the lateral PFC is associated with 
cautious decisions. All significant clusters and corresponding MNI 
coordinates are reported in Supplemental Table 6.1.
6.3.4 Effects of reward magnitude on risk-taking 
Second, we tested which brain regions involved in risk-taking were 
modulated by the amount of reward at stake. We performed voxelwise 
ANOVAs testing for linear changes in activation as a function of reward 
size on the High-Risk > Low-Risk contrast across participants. The 
ANOVA testing for a linear increase in activation as a function of 
increasing reward (-3 -1 1 3 contrast) revealed significant clusters of 
activation in the right  putamen (peak at  24, 15, 3, z = 4.40), t(1, 212) = 
4.51, p < .001, and bilateral amygdala (peaks at  -24, 0, -18, z = 3.88 and 
15, -6, 18, z = 3.59), t(1, 212) = 3.95, p < .001 and t(1, 212) = 3.65, p 
< .001, respectively (see Figure 6.2B). The ANOVA testing for a linear 
decrease in activation as a function of the amount  of reward (3 1 -1 -3 
contrast) did not result in any significant clusters. These analyses are 
consistent with the hypothesis that subcortical affective areas are 
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sensitive to the reward that  is associated with a risk. All significant 
clusters and corresponding MNI coordinates are reported in 
Supplemental Table 6.2.
Figure 6.2 A) Whole-brain results for the contrast of High-Risk and Low-Risk 
gambles for all participants combined modeled at the time the gamble options 
were presented.  B) Regions for which the contrast of High-Risk > Low-Risk 
gambles showed a parametric increase with the amount of reward. C) Dorsal 
ACC region which showed a linear decrease with age in the 2 Euro condition, 
when corrected for individual differences in risk-taking (top scatter plot), and 
plotted for the children (green) and adults (red) as a function of risk-taking in 
the 2 Euro condition (bottom scatter plot).  D) Region which shows an 
adolescent specific peak in activation for the High-Risk > Low-Risk contrast 
for high reward (4, 6, and 8 Euro) gambles combined.  All images are 
thresholded at p < .001 uncorrected, 10 contiguous voxels.  In scatter plots, 
data for 8-10-year-olds is presented in green, for 12-14-year-olds in blue, for 
16-17-year-olds in pink, and for 19-26-year-olds in red.
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6.3.5 Neural correlates of age-related differences in risk-taking 
To identify age-related differences in brain regions associated with risk-
taking, we modeled a linear increase (-3, -1, 1, 3), linear decrease (3, 1, 
-1, -3) and adolescent specific peak (-1 1 1 -1) as a function of Age 
group. We first tested these patterns in an ANOVA for High-Risk > 
Low-Risk decisions across all reward conditions. The linear decrease 
ANOVA resulted in a small cluster of activation in the dorsal ACC 
(peak at  12, 9, 27, z = 3.90), t(1, 54) = 4.22, p  < .001, and a larger 
cluster in the central opercular cortex/postcentral gyrus (peak at 51, -6, 
21, z = 4.44), t(1, 54) = 4.90, p < .001. No regions showed a linear 
increase with age or a peak in adolescence. Second, because we only 
found age-related differences in performance in the 2 Euro condition, 
but not in the higher reward conditions, we repeated these ANOVAs for 
the 2 Euro condition separately and for the higher reward conditions (4, 
6, 8 Euro) combined.
Contrary to our expectations, the analysis for the 2 Euro condition did 
not result  in any significant  clusters when testing for age differences. 
However, the significant differences in performance between the age 
groups in the 2 Euro condition could be a confounding factor. When we 
added the percentage of High-Risk gambles in the 2 Euro condition as a 
covariate factor to the ANOVA, we found a significant cluster in the 
dorsal ACC (peak at  12, 18, 48, z = 3.83), t(1, 54) = 4.14, p < .001 (see 
below for performance regressions, and Figure 6.2C), but  only at  a 
lower threshold (p < .005). The relation between age versus 
performance is described in more detail below. 
The same analysis for the higher reward conditions mirrored the results 
found for all reward amounts combined, showing a linear decrease with 
age in the same regions in the dorsal ACC (peak at 12, 9, 27, z = 4.46), 
t(1, 52) = 4.95, p < .001, and central opercular cortex (peak at 54, -3, 
12, z = 4.41), t(1, 52) = 4.88, p < .001. Again no regions showed a 
linear increase with age, but  for these high reward conditions (4, 6 and 8 
Euros combined) we found a small cluster in the medial OFC/
subcallosal cortex which showed a peak in activation for adolescents 
compared to children and adults (peak at  -9, 27, -12, z = 3.55), t(1, 52) 
= 3.80, p < .001 (see Figure 6.2D). All significant  clusters and 
corresponding MNI coordinates are reported in Supplemental Table 6.3. 
The results of the analyses comparing the different  age groups from late 
childhood through early adulthood are consistent  with the hypothesis 
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that risky decisions are associated with more ACC activation in 
children, and with the hypothesis that  risk-taking is associated with 
more activation in affective areas within the VMPFC in adolescents 
compared to children and young adults, but only when gambles are 
associated with a high potential reward. 
Figure 6.3 A) Clusters of activation in the ventral medial PFC/medial OFC 
that show a positive correlation with risk-taking. B) Clusters of activation in 
dorsal ACC and Insula that show a negative correlation with risk-taking. All 
images are thresholded at p < .001 uncorrected, 10 contiguous voxels. In 
scatter plots, data for 8-10-year-olds is presented in green, for 12-14-year-olds 
in blue, for 16-17-year-olds in pink, and for 19-26-year-olds in red.
Adolescent Risky Decision-Making: Neurocognitive Development | 127
6.3.6 Individual differences in Risk-taking 
More detailed analyses on individual participants’ behavioral data 
revealed that there were large individual differences in risk-taking 
within all age groups (see Supplemental Figure 6.2 for scatter plots). 
The second goal of this study was therefore to identify brain regions 
that contribute to these individual differences in the tendency to gamble. 
To this end, we added the average percentage of High-Risk choices as a 
regressor to the analysis on the contrast of High-Risk > Low-Risk 
decisions. 
As can be seen in Figure 6.3A, one region in the ventral medial PFC 
(peak at -3, 60, -12, z = 5.07), t(1, 56) = 5.74, p < .001, was more active 
in the High-Risk > Low-Risk contrast for those participants who chose 
the High-Risk gambles more often. In contrast, a large region in the 
dorsal medial PFC (with sub-clusters in the paracingulate gyrus; peak at 
6, 27, 39, z = 6.13, t(1, 56) = 7.36, p  < .001; and ACC; peak at  9, 36, 18, 
z = 5.49, t(1,56) = 6.35, p < .001), showed the opposite pattern; this 
region was more active in the High-Risk > Low-Risk contrast for 
individuals who chose the Low-Risk gambles more often (see Figure 
6.3B). The latter contrast  also showed increased activation in bilateral 
DLPFC, lat-OFC/Insula, and parietal cortex1  (see Supplemental Table 
6.4 for coordinates). 
Together, the results are consistent  with the hypothesis that activation in 
reward related areas within the medial PFC co-varies with risk-taking 
behavior, whereas activation in control areas in dorsal medial PFC and 
lateral PFC co-varies with risk-averse behavior2. 
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1 Additional analyses for the regions that were found in the general High-Risk 
vs. Low-Risk contrast (dorsal medial PFC, ventral medial PFC and subgenual 
ACC for High-Risk > Low-Risk and DLPFC for Low-Risk > High-Risk) 
showed that the ventral medial PFC cluster (peak at -6, 60, -6), which partly 
overlaps with the ventral medial PFC area identified in this regression analysis,  
showed a positive correlation with risk-taking as well.
2 The pronounced brain-behavior relations may explain why the developmental 
differences in the 2 Euro condition above could not be revealed; possibly, in 
this condition individual difference in performance are a stronger predictor of 
brain activity than differences in age. It should be noted that the correlation of 
risk-taking in the 2 Euro condition and average risk-taking across all reward 
conditions was high (r = .56, p < .001), therefore, the same analyses for the 2 
Euro condition mirror the effects across reward conditions.
6.3.7 Brain regions related to the processing of outcomes of High-Risk 
gambles 
To identify regions which respond to the receipt of a reward following 
High-Risk gambles, we performed a GLM analysis on the functional 
data modeled at  the onset of the outcome, and computed the voxelwise 
contrast  of Gain > No-Gain outcomes following High-Risk decisions 
across age groups. This analysis revealed large clusters of activation in 
the medial PFC and ventral striatum (see Figure 6.4A). The peak active 
voxel for the medial PFC cluster was located more ventral (peak at -3, 
45, -6, z = 6.27), t(1, 43) = 8.08, p < .001, and in addition we located a 
more dorsal sub-cluster (peak at 6, 51, 3, z = 6.37) , t(1, 43) = 8.29, p < .
001. Activation in the ventral striatum peaked in the left NAcc (peak at 
-9, 9, -9, z = 5.73), t(1, 43) = 7.08, p < .001, and right NAcc (peak at  9, 
15, -6, z = 6.30, t(1, 43) = 8.14, p < .001. No significant  clusters were 
found for the reverse No-Gain > Gain contrast. All clusters and 
corresponding MNI coordinates are reported in Supplemental Table 6.5. 
6.3.8 Effects of reward magnitude on outcome processing 
To identify brain regions which respond to parametric changes in the 
amount of reward, we tested for a linear change in activation as a 
function of increasing reward (-3 -1 1 3 contrast) in voxelwise ANOVAs 
on the Gain > No-Gain outcome contrast. The ANOVA testing for a 
linear increase in activation revealed significant clusters in the right 
putamen (peak at  24, 9, 0, z = 3.01 t (1, 209) = 3.05, p  = .001 and right 
VS/NAcc (peak at 9, 6, -12, z = 3.51 t (1, 209) = 3.57, p < .001 (see 
Figure 6.4B). The ANOVA testing for a linear decrease in activation as 
a function of the amount of reward associated with the decision (3 1 -1 
-3 contrast) did not result in any significant clusters. 
6.3.9 Neural correlates of age-related differences in outcome processing 
Our final analyses tested for age-related differences in neural responses 
to the outcome of High-Risk gambles (see Supplemental Figure 6.3 for 
Gain > No-gain contrast plotted for the age groups separately). We 
tested for three patterns of age-related change: linear increase (-3, -1, 1, 
3), linear decrease (3, 1, -1, -3) and a peak in adolescence (-1 1 1 -1) on 
the Gain > No-Gain outcomes across reward amounts. No regions were 
found that showed a linear change with development. In contrast, the 
peak model revealed activation in the caudate (peak at  21, 18, 9, z = 
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3.26 t(1, 40) = 3.52, p = .001) (see Figure 6.4C.), suggesting a peak in 
the responsiveness of this region to gains in adolescence. 
Figure 6.4 A) Whole-brain results for the contrast of Gain > No-Gain 
outcomes following High-Risk decisions for all participants combined modeled 
at the time the outcome was presented. B) Regions for which the contrast of 
Gain > No-Gain outcomes showed a parametric increase with the amount of 
reward. C) A region in the ventral striatum showed an adolescent specific peak 
in activation for the Gain > No-Gain contrast.  All images are thresholded at p 
< .001 uncorrected, 10 contiguous voxels. In scatter plots, data for 8-10-year-
olds is presented in green, for 12-14-year-olds in blue, for 16-17-year-olds in 
pink, and for 19-26-year-olds in red. 
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Together, the results from the outcome analyses are consistent  with the 
hypothesis of increased activation in the striatum for gain outcomes, 
and with the hypothesis that  this region is more responsive in mid-
adolescence. 
6.4 Discussion
The main goal of this study was to test  for two different  patterns of 
functional brain development that have been proposed to account  for 
adolescent risk-taking: an inverted U-shaped pattern for reward related 
regions with a peak in adolescence, and a linear pattern for regions 
associated with cognitive control. Recent  models of adolescent  risk-
taking have described risk-taking in adolescence as a consequence of 
these different developmental trajectories (Casey et  al., 2008; Ernst  et 
al., 2006; Steinberg et  al., 2008). Behaviorally, we found no age-related 
differences in risk-taking behavior for gambles associated with high 
rewards; all participants were more likely to take risks as the potential 
reward increased. These results are consistent  with prior studies which 
showed that  the ability to incorporate reward and probability 
information in decisions under risk is already mature by late childhood 
(Van Leijenhorst et al., 2008). Interestingly we found a linear decrease 
in risk-taking for ambiguous gambles; when the expected values of two 
choices were equal, and both options were associated with low reward, 
adults preferred to choose the low-risk gamble, whereas younger 
participants were more likely to choose the high-risk gamble. The 
finding that adults are risk averse in ambiguous risky situations is 
consistent with studies that have shown that adults often make risk-
averse decisions in the context of potential gains (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981), and with dual process models such as “Fuzzy-trace 
theory” (Reyna & Rivers, 2008). The latter theory offers an explanation 
for this finding by proposing that adult decision making in ambiguous 
situations is dependent on intuitive, rather than computational 
processes. This intuitive decision-making is thought to develop slowly, 
and because of this slow development, children rely more on 
computational strategies when making decisions, and their choices can 
therefore appear more rational (Reyna & Ellis, 1994; Rivers, Reyna & 
Mills, 2008).
The fMRI data associated with the decision and outcome phase of 
gambles resulted in two main findings: First, across ages, risky choices 
were associated with activation in the medial PFC and the ventral 
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striatum, whereas cautious choices were associated with activation in 
the lateral PFC. These results support the hypothesis that  the relative 
weight  of reward related regions (medial PFC and ventral striatum) and 
cognitive control related regions (lateral PFC) contributes to decision-
making under risk, in such a way that more activation in reward related 
regions is associated with risk-taking, whereas more activation in 
control related regions is associated with cautious behavior. Second, the 
results of our tests for linear and non-linear age-related changes are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the relative weight of control related 
regions and reward related regions changes across development (Casey 
et  al., 2008; Ernst  et al., 2006; Galvan et  al., 2006; Steinberg et  al., 
2008), and are in favor of models that  hypothesize that risky behavior in 
adolescence is a consequence of the different developmental trajectories 
for reward related and control related brain regions (Casey et  al., 2008; 
Galvan et al., 2006; Steinberg et al., 2008). 
6.4.1 Control related changes
Consistent with the prediction that cognitive control regions follow a 
linear change with development, we found a linear decrease in 
activation with age associated with risky choices in the dorsal ACC. 
This is consistent  with our earlier finding that  this region was more 
active in 9-12 year old participants compared to adults when 
participants had to identify the most likely outcome in a two-choice task 
which measured the ability to judge probability (Van Leijenhorst  et al., 
2006). The finding that  there is more activation in control related 
regions in children and adolescents compared to adults is also consistent 
with the results reported by Galvan et  al. (Galvan et al., 2006) who 
found a linear decrease in activation in the VLPFC with age in a 
delayed two-choice task in which reward amounts were varied, and with 
the finding that  activation in regions related to cognitive control often 
shows a shift from diffuse to focal activation (Durston et al., 2006). 
A different pattern, however, was reported by Eshel and colleagues 
(2007), who used a similar paradigm to the one used in the present 
study. Eshel et  al found more activation in the dorsal ACC and VLPFC 
for risky choices together with less risky behavior in adults compared to 
adolescents. These authors interpreted this increase in activation in 
these regions as reflecting an increased recruitment of cognitive control 
related regions associated with the regulation of risky decisions. One 
explanation for these contrasting findings could be found by examining 
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differences in the tasks that have been used. First, we aimed to control 
for differences in working memory ability between children, 
adolescents and adults by instructing participants that trials were not 
related and that therefore participants would not  have to remember their 
choices and the outcomes of previous trials. In addition, participants 
were told that only two gambles would be randomly chosen by the 
computer at  the end of the experiment  that  would determine their prize 
money. In contrast, in the Eshel et  al study participants were paid based 
on their cumulative earnings; increased recruitment of ventral PFC 
regions and ACC could reflect  differences in the strategies used by 
adolescents and adults in the context  of these different  task demands. 
Second, we only varied the amount of reward associated with the high-
risk gamble but not the probabilities associated with both choice 
options; in all high-reward conditions the high-risk gamble was also 
associated with the highest expected value. In the Eshel et  al. study, 
both the probability and the magnitude of reward was varied, and 
importantly, the expected value of the low-risk choice option was higher 
than that of the high-risk choice option. It is possible that  in the Eshel et 
al. study adults had a more accurate representation of the expected value 
associated with the two choice options (Levin, Weller, Pederson & 
Harshman, 2007), and consequently chose the options with the highest 
expected value more often (which were the low-risk choices). Possibly, 
activation in ACC and VLPFC could reflect processes important for 
forming this reward representation. For example, Smith et al. (2009) 
adapted the task used by Eshel et  al (2007), and demonstrated that 
different PFC regions specifically respond to reward, risk and 
probability. That  is, regions in the VMPFC responded to reward, and 
activation in dorsal ACC was interpreted in terms of response conflict. 
The decrease in ACC activation with age observed in the present  study 
could reflect a decreased need for cognitive control with increasing age. 
No regions showed a linear increase in activation with age, this finding 
could be interpreted as a reflection of the relatively low task demands in 
the current  study. In all age groups, DLPFC activation was associated 
with low-risk choices. Even though DLPFC is one of the last  regions to 
mature both structurally (Gogtay et al., 2004) and functionally (Bunge 
& Wright, 2007), the finding that the different age groups do not differ 
in recruitment of this region is consistent  with previous studies. These 
have shown that  children recruit lateral PFC regions and perform 
similar to adults when task demands are low, but differ from adults 
when the task is more difficult  (Crone, Wendelken, Donohue, Van 
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Leijenhorst & Bunge, 2006). In future studies it would be interesting to 
examine developmental changes in the effects of task difficulty and 
working memory demands on the recruitment  of control related 
circuitry in a decision-making context (Geier & Luna, 2009). 
6.4.2 Reward related changes
Consistent with the prediction that reward related regions follow a non-
linear change with development, a region in VMPFC and in the VS 
showed a peak in activation in adolescence, both during the decision 
phase of trials and during the outcome phase. This is the first study to 
report this peak in relation to risky choices in a decision-making 
paradigm. The Galvan et al. (2006) study compared children (7-11 
years), adolescents (13-17 years) and adults (23-29 years), but used a 
delayed response two-choice task in which participants did not  have to 
weigh probabilities and rewards. The Eshel et al. (2007) study did use 
an active gambling task, but these researchers only compared 
adolescents to adults, which did not enable them to test for a peak in 
brain responsiveness to risk and reward in adolescence. The comparison 
of adolescents and adults did not result in differences between these age 
groups in activation in the VS during the decision phase (Eshel et  al., 
2007). However, the processing of reward outcomes in these 
participants was associated with more activation in the VS in 
adolescents compared to adults (Ernst  et  al., 2005). These finding are 
consistent with prior results, showing that the  neural response to 
rewards is larger during the outcome phase of trials than during the 
decision phase (Van Leijenhorst et al., 2009). Finally, the brain region 
that showed a peak in activation in adolescence during the decision 
phase was more anterior (VMPFC/subcallosal cortex) compared to the 
region that showed this peak during the outcome phase (VS/caudate). 
6.4.3 Individual differences
One interesting finding in the current  experiment  is that  the behavioral 
data do not  reveal a peak in risk-taking in adolescence. This finding is 
not uncommon, other studies have also failed to report this peak 
behaviorally (Van Leijenhorst  et  al., 2008), and more often linear 
changes in risk-taking behavior (Crone, Bullens, Van der Plas, Kijkuit 
& Zelazo, 2008) are reported (see also Boyer (2006) for a review). 
These findings reflect  the difficulty of showing deviant adolescent 
behavior in a controlled experimental setting. Importantly, when 
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differences in behavior are small, or even absent, fMRI can reveal a 
difference in the neural correlates of this behavior across development 
and can help build hypotheses. To better understand the relation 
between risk-taking behavior as it  is observed in everyday life and the 
developmental changes in brain circuitry important  for decision-making 
observed in the laboratory, future studies could benefit from examining 
how individual differences in behavior relate to changes in brain 
function across development.
In the present study individual differences in risk-taking behavior in the 
task were associated with activation in regions in medial PFC, and not 
with activation in the VS. Interestingly, activation in control related 
regions in dorsal medial PFC showed a negative correlation with risk-
taking behavior, whereas activation in reward related regions in 
VMPFC showed a positive correlation with risk-taking. These findings 
suggest  the possibility that  the function of these regions is associated 
with participants’ behavioral preferences. A similar dissociation 
between dorsal and ventral MPFC regions activation in relation to risk 
preference in adults has been reported recently by Xue et al. (2009). 
These authors suggest  that  a strong reward related signal in VMPFC 
could cause risky behavior, whereas a strong signal in dorsal medial 
PFC could act  as a warning signal to prevent  risky behavior. The results 
from the present  study extend these findings and suggest  that the 
relation between activation in these regions and behavior could be 
related to participants’ subjective experience. The VMPFC regions that 
show a positive correlation with risk-taking were more active when risk 
averse participants avoided the high-risk option, but showed the 
opposite pattern for participants who preferred the high-risk gamble on 
most trials risk; for these participants VMPFC was most active when 
they chose the high-risk option. Together with the finding that  activation 
in VMPFC regions in all participants is associated with High-Risk 
choices and with the receipt  of gain feedback, these individual 
differences data stress the need for a better understanding of the role of 
sub regions of VMPFC and their development (Kringelbach & Rolls, 
2004; O'Doherty, 2007; Wallis, 2007). 
A question that we could not address in this study but that will be 
important  to examine in future studies is whether monetary rewards 
hold comparable subjective value for children, adolescents and adults. It 
could be that  the peak in reward related regions in adolescence is 
observed because the potential monetary reward is more important for 
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adolescents compared to children and adults. However, the observation 
that similar brain regions respond to parametric changes in reward value 
in all age groups and the finding that response time profiles are similar 
across age groups argue against  this possibility. Nonetheless, this will 
be an important issue to tackle in future experiments.  
6.4.4 Conclusion
  
In summary, the current  findings demonstrate that  brain regions 
implicated in reward processing and cognitive control in decision-
making under risk follow distinct developmental trajectories. Reward 
related regions show an increased sensitivity to rewards in adolescence 
and follow an inverted U-shaped developmental pattern, whereas 
cognitive control related regions mature slowly and follow a linear 
development. In addition, patterns of activation in dorsal and ventral 
medial PFC are related to individual differences in risk-taking 
propensity. These findings support the hypothesis that risky behavior in 
adolescence follows from an imbalance caused by different 
developmental trajectories of motivational and regulatory brain circuitry 
(Casey et  al. 2008; Galvan et al. 2006; Steinberg et al. 2008). 
Importantly, the relative contributions of reward related and control 
relate regions to decision-making vary with individual differences in 
risk-taking propensity in all age groups. Future studies should take 
individual differences into account in order to identify those adolescents 
who are at risk.
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Supplemental Figure 6.1 Average Reaction times (RT) for High-Risk and Low-
Risk gambles shown for each Reward condition (2, 4,  6 and 8 Euro), and Age 
group (8-10-year-olds, 12-14-year-olds,  16-17-year-olds, and 19-26-year-
olds). Error bars depict standard error. 
Supplemental Figure 6.2 Average %  of High-Risk gambles shown for each 
Reward condition (2,  4, 6 and 8 Euro) and each participant.  Data for 8-10-
year-olds is presented in green, for 12-14-year-olds in blue, for 16-17-year-
olds in pink, and for 19-26-year-olds in red. The Age x Risk correlation was 
significant in the 2 Euro condition. 
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Supplemental Figure 6.3 Whole-brain results for the contrast of Gain > No-
Gain outcomes following High-Risk decisions for the separate age groups 
[MNI 9, 15, -6]. All images are thresholded at p < .005 uncorrected,  10 
contiguous voxels.
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Supplemental Table 6.1 Activation related to high-risk and low-risk decisions 
for 8-10, 12-14, 16-17 and 19-26 year olds, at p < .001 uncorrected; with 














All ages R Occipital Pole 12 -102 12 4.57 130 p < .001
L Subcallosal cortex -3 21 -6 4.34 18 p = .10
L Occipital Pole -12 -105 3 4.34 20 p = .09
L Frontal pole/VMPFC -6 60 -6 3.96 12 p = .17
L Paracingulate gyrus -12 51 18 3.62 23 p = .07
8-10 yrs no significant clusters
12-14 yrs no significant clusters
16-17 yrs L Subcallosal cortex -3 27 -6 3.85 14 p = .05
19-26 yrs R Anterior cingulate 
gyrus 12 42 3 3.70 13 p = .04
L-R > H-R
All ages R Middle frontal gyrus 39 24 36 4.49 54 p = .009
R Superior parietal lobe 24 -42 39 4,15 13 p = .16
8-10 yrs no significant clusters
12-14 yrs no significant clusters
16-17 yrs L Postcentral gyrus -33 -33 54 4.73 34 p = .004
R Lateral occipital 
cortex 18 -72 45 4.23 33 p = .005
L Lateral occipital 
cortex -15 -72 45 3.89 13 p = .06
R Middle frontal gyrus 33 0 57 3.88 11 p = .08
L Superior parietal lobe -21 -48 60 3.44 13 p = .06
19-26 yrs R Lateral occipital 
cortex 45 -69 33 3.78 12 p = .05
R Middle frontal gyrus 33 30 48 3.65 11 p = .06
R Central opercular 
cortex 48 -6 6 3.65 11 p = .06
L Postcentral gyrus -6 -36 69 3.64 16 p = .03
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Supplemental Table 6.2 Linear changes in activation for High-Risk > Low-
Risk contrast related to reward magnitude across age, at p < .001 uncorrected; 
with extent threshold of 10 voxels. 
Contrast Region MNI coordinates 








Increase (-3 -1 1 3)
All ages R Putamen 24 15 3 4.40 47 p = .02
L Superior temporal 
gyrus -57 -39 9 4.16 228 p < .001
L Parahippocampal 
gyrus -27 -36 -15 4.12 38 p = .03
L Superior parietal lobe -24 -48 63 4.03 128 p < .001
R Parietal operculum 
cortex 39 -30 21 3.96 47 p = .02
L Parahippocampal 
gyrus -24 0 -18 3.88 39 p = .03
L Superior parietal lobe -30 -48 63 3.81 46 p = .02
R Superior temporal 
gyrus 63 -24 15 3.70 16 p = .13
R Posterior cingulate 
gyrus 15 -15 39 3.64 12 p = .19
R Superior frontal gyrus 21 -6 63 3.62 17 p = .12
R Amygdala 15 -6 -18 3.59 46 p = .02
R Middle temporal 
gyrus 60 -54 3 3.56 37 p = .03
Decrease (3 1 -1 -3)
all ages no significant clusters
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Supplemental Table 6.3 Changes in activation for High-Risk > Low-Risk 
contrast related to linear and non-linear age changes, at p < .001 uncorrected; 
with extent threshold of 10 voxels. 
Contrast Region MNI coordinates








Increase with age (-3 -1 1 3)
all rewards                                     no significant clusters
2 Euro no significant clusters
4, 6, 8 
Euro no significant clusters
Decrease with age (3 1 -1 -3)
All rewards
R Postcentral gyrus 51 -6 21 4.44 96 p = .001
R Parahippocampal 
gyrus 21 -15 -24 4.07 19 p = .09
R Anterior cingulate 
gyrus 12 9 27 3.90 14 p = .14
R Lateral occipital 
cortex 36 -63 3 3.53 10 p = .21
2 Euro no significant clusters
4, 6, 8 
Euro
R Anterior cingulate 
gyrus 12 9 27 4.46 19 p = .08
R Central opercular 
cortex 54 -3 12 4.41 102 p < .001
R Hippocampus 27 -15 -21 3.65 10 p = .19
Peak in adolescence (-1 1 1 -1)
all rewards                           no significant clusters
2 Euro no significant clusters
4, 6, 8 
Euro L Subcallosal cortex -9 27 -12 3.55 10 p = .19
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Supplemental Table 6.4 Regions showing a positive or negative correlation 
with the average % of High-Risk gambles across age, at p < .001 uncorrected; 
with extent threshold of 10 voxels. 
Contrast Region MNI coordinates









all ages L Frontal pole/VMPFC -3 60 -12 5.07 42 p = .02
L Middle temporal 
gyrus -57 -9 -18 4.94 127 p < .001
L Inferior frontal gyrus -54 27 12 4.59 35 p = .03
R Superior temporal 
gyrus 54 0 -15 4.42 223 p < .001
L Superior temporal 
gyrus -66 -36 3 4.30 51 p = .01
L Precuneus cortex -6 -57 18 3.95 31 p = .04
R Supramarginal gyrus 66 -24 33 3.89 19 p = .09
L Superior frontal gyrus -21 30 39 3.89 12 p = .17
R Parietal operculum 
cortex 51 -30 18 3.75 11 p = .19
L Posterior cingulate 
gyrus -15 -45 36 3.67 18 p = .09
Negative correlation
all ages R (Para)cingulate gyrus 6 27 39 6.13 1067 p < .001
R Orbital frontal cortex 30 24 -9 6.0 291 p < .001
L Superior parietal lobe -30 -60 48 5.24 995 p < .001
L Inferior frontal gyrus -36 6 27 5.23 231 p < .001
R Posterior cingulate 
gyrus 6 -24 27 5.11 141 p < .001
L Anterior Insula -30 18 3 4.88 129 p < .001
R Lateral occipital 
cortex 30 -63 45 4.63 480 p < .001
R Basal ganglia 12 3 -6 4.45 45 p = .01
L Frontal pole -30 48 18 4.20 142 p < .001
R Frontal pole 36 51 15 4.16 113 p < .001
R Occipital pole 30 -90 -9 3.85 24 p = .06
R Middle frontal gyrus 33 0 51 3.71 32 p = .03
L Occipital pole -27 -96 0 3.71 46 p = .01
L Lateral occipital 
cortex -36 -78 -15 3.69 14 p = .14
R Middle frontal gyrus 51 15 42 3.64 16 p = .12
R occipital pole 24 -102 0 3.38 12 p = .17
        
142 | Chapter 6
Supplemental Table 6.5 Activation related to Gain feedback following high-
risk gambles across age groups and for 8-10, 12-14, 16-17 and 19-26 year olds 
separately, at p < .001 uncorrected; with extent threshold of 10 voxels.
Contrast Region MNI coordinates








Gain > No-Gain 
all ages L Frontal medial cortex -3 45 -6 6.27 10993 p < .001
      R Nucleus 
Accumbens 9 15 -6 6.30
      L Nucleus 
Accumbens -9 9 -9 5.73
      R Paracingulate 
gyrus 6 51 3 6.37
R Inferior temporal 
gyrus 63 -42 -15 5.71 394 p < .001
L Inferior temporal 
gyrus -57 -27 -21 4.94 365 p < .001
L Occipital pole -27 -102 -6 4.74 65 p = .005
R Putamen 30 -15 -3 3.68 55 p = .009
L Precentral gyrus -45 -12 36 3.44 17 p = .12
L Postcentral gyrus -57 -12 36 3.44 15 p = .14
8-10 yrs no significant clusters
12-14 yrs L Precentral gyrus -6 -24 69 4.83 755 p < .001
R Frontal pole 15 48 42 4.80 422 p < .001
L Anterior cingulate 
gyrus -9 42 3 4.53 644 p < .001
L Middle frontal gyrus -39 39 36 4.51 40 p = .001
R Orbital frontal cortex 21 36 -12 4.46 119 p < .001
L Lateral occipital 
cortex -45 -66 45 4.41 126 p < .001
L Caudate -12 12 12 4.33 31 p = .003
R Inferior temporal 
gyrus 60 -45 -18 4.32 29 p = .003
R Middle frontal gyrus 42 12 48 3.99 28 p = .004
R Supramarginal gyrus 60 -33 45 3.97 15 p = .03
R Middle frontal gyrus 33 33 48 3.96 40 p = .001
L Amygdala -18 3 -15 3.96 34 p = .002
R Frontal pole 48 48 15 3.95 26 p = .005
L Middle temporal 
gyrus -60 -33 -18 3.85 46 p < .001
R Lateral occipital 
cortex 48 -66 33 3.81 45 p < .001
Superior frontal gyrus 0 12 69 3.79 28 p = .004
R Middle frontal gyrus 45 33 33 3.75 20 p = .01
L Central opercular 
cortex -54 3 3 3.74 18 p = .02
L Middle frontal gyrus -36 9 51 3.69 11 p = .05
L Parahippocampal 
gyrus -24 -18 -33 3.66 22 p = .009
L Middle frontal gyrus -33 18 -30 3.49 14 p = .03
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R Anterior insula 42 18 0 3.47 14 p = .03
R Lateral occipital 
cortex 51 -72 -12 3.45 10 p = .06
16-17 yrs L Posterior cingulate 
gyrus -6 -39 27 4.96 1730 p < .001
L Hippocampus -30 -12 -24 4.82 295 p < .001
R Paracingulate gyrus 15 45 9 4.59 332 p < .001
L Postcentral gyrus -33 -30 60 4.57 28 p = .001
R Central opercular 
cortex 57 3 9 4.55 16 p = .006
R Putamen 18 15 -6 4.53 144 p < .001
R Middle frontal gyrus 45 27 36 4.48 26 p = .001
L Lateral occipital 
cortex -51 -78 -3 4.45 278 p < .001
R Supramarginal gyrus 33 -42 36 4.34 41 p < .001
L Putamen -18 18 -12 4.26 68 p < .001
L Frontal pole -39 48 12 4.26 12 p = .01
L Paracingulate gyrus -3 39 30 4.23 248 p < .001
R Orbital frontal cortex 36 36 -18 4.16 10 p = .02
L Superior frontal gyrus -24 30 48 4.12 14 p = .009
L Frontal pole -24 42 -12 4.08 26 p = .001
R Superior frontal gyrus 15 18 48 3.99 10 p = .02
R Anterior cingulate 
gyrus 6 6 30 3.97 53 p < .001
L Superior frontal gyrus -6 18 66 3.95 36 p < .001
R Caudate 12 -12 18 2.87 50 p < .001
R Temporal pole 18 9 -30 3.85 18 p = .004
R Lateral occipital 
cortex 54 -66 27 3.80 38 p < .001
L Lateral occipital 
cortex -51 -75 21 3.65 10 p = .02
R Thalamus 9 -30 12 3.65 26 p = .001
R Occipital pole 12 -96 -6 5.74 13 p = .01
R Lateral occipital 
cortex 33 -90 -9 5.64 22 p = .002
R Frontal pole 36 45 -3 5.62 33 p < .001
R Supramarginal gyrus 45 -30 36 3.56 20 p = .002
R Angular gyrus 54 -51 45 3.39 39 p < .001
19-26 yrs R Frontal pole 9 63 6 4.85 356 p < .001
L Frontal pole -39 42 -3 4.72 62 p < .001
L Supramarginal gyrus -57 -36 48 4.20 11 p = .01
R Lateral occipital 
cortex 51 -66 27 3.80 23 p = .001
L Lateral occipital 
cortex -39 -63 24 3.79 37 p < .001
L Precuneus cortex -15 -63 39 3.74 11 p = .01
L Lateral occipital 
cortex -33 -81 42 3.70 22 p = .001
No-Gain > Gain 
all ages no significant clusters
8-10 yrs no significant clusters
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12-14 yrs no significant clusters
16-17 yrs no significant clusters
19-26 yrs no significant clusters
        




Developmental trends for object 
    and spatial working memory: A 
psychophysiological analysis
This study examined developmental trends in object and spatial working 
memory (WM) using heart rate (HR) to provide an index of covert cognitive 
processes.  Participants in four age groups (6-7, 9-10, 11-12, 18-26, n = 20 
each) performed object and spatial WM tasks, in which each trial was followed 
by feedback. Spatial WM task performance reached adult levels before object 
WM task performance. The differential developmental trends for object and 
spatial WM found in this study are taken to suggest that these WM components 
are separable.  Negative performance feedback elicited HR slowing that was 
more pronounced for adults than for children. The development of performance 
monitoring as indexed by covert HR slowing following performance feedback 
contributes to WM performance.
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7.1 Introduction
Working memory (WM) comprises those functional components of 
cognition that  allow humans to comprehend and mentally represent 
their immediate environment, to retain information about their 
immediate past experience, to support  the acquisition of new 
knowledge, to solve problems, and to formulate, relate, and act on 
current goals (Baddeley & Logie, 1999). Therefore, WM is a key 
component  of human cognition. The developmental literature has 
consistently shown that children’s ability to maintain and manipulate 
information in WM develops slowly, and does not  reach mature levels 
until late childhood (Casey, Giedd & Thomas, 2000; Diamond, 2002; 
Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge & Wearing, 2004; Hamilton, Coates & 
Heffernan, 2003; Hitch, 2002; Logie & Pearson, 1997; Pickering, 2001; 
Pickering, Gathercole, Hall & Lloyd, 2001). WM is an important 
contributor to many abilities that are acquired during the school-age 
period, such as reading and mathematics (Cowan et al., 2003; 
Gathercole, 2004; Hitch, Towse & Hutton, 2001) and it is often 
conceptualized as the driving force behind cognitive development 
(Case, 1992; Pascual-Leone, 1995, Kail, 1990).
One of the most generally accepted conceptualizations of WM come 
from a model developed by Baddeley and Hitch (Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974; Baddeley, 1992a; 1992b). This model suggests that  WM is a 
construct consisting of multiple specialized components of cognition, 
including a supervisory system (the “central executive”) and specialized 
temporary memory systems; a phonologically based store (the 
phonological loop) and a visuospatial store (the visuospatial sketchpad). 
The central executive is involved in the control and regulation of the 
WM system. It is considered to perform various executive functions, 
such as coordinating the two temporary memory systems, focusing and 
switching attention, and activating representations within long-term 
memory. Despite the fact  that  the unitary structure of the central 
executive has been called into question (e.g., Alloway, Gathercole & 
Pickering, 2006 Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Kane et 
al., 2004; Bayliss, Jarrold, Gunn, & Baddeley, 2003; Wagner, Bunge & 
Badre, 2004, see also: Friedman & Miyake, 2000; Miyake, Friedman, 
Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001), WM is generally agreed to consist  of 
multiple specialized temporary memory systems.
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Many studies have focused on phonological short-term memory in 
adults (Baddeley, 1992a, 1992b; Smith & Jonides, 1997) and in children 
(Alloway & Gathercole, 2005; Baddeley, Gathercole & Papagno, 1998; 
Cowan, 2002; Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge & Wearing, 2004; 
Gathercole & Hitch, 1993; Hitch, 2002). Visuospatial short-term 
memory has received less attention and is less well understood than 
phonological WM. Initially, visuospatial WM was assumed to be a 
unitary system for setting up and manipulating visuospatial images as 
well as storing short-term visuospatial information (Baddeley & Hitch, 
1974; Baddeley, 1992a, 1992b). Numerous studies however, have 
shown a double dissociation between tasks for object and spatial WM 
suggesting empirical evidence for the existence of separate 
subcomponents within the visuospatial sketchpad (Della Sala, Gray, 
Baddeley, Allamano, & Wilson, 1999; Hecker & Mapperson, 1997; 
Klauer & Zhao, 2004; Logie, 1995; Mecklinger & Pfeiffer, 1996; Smith 
et  al, 1995; Belger et  al., 1998; Nystrom et  al., 2000). Animal and 
human neuroimaging studies, for example, have shown that spatial and 
object  memory are related to activation in different brain regions, the 
dorsal and ventral prefrontal cortex, respectively (Courtney, 
Ungerleider, Keil & Haxby, 1996; Wilson, O’Scalaidhe, Goldman-
Rakic, 1993).
Recent studies that have attempted to examine the development of 
separate subcomponents for object  and spatial WM in a single design 
(Hamilton, Coates, & Heffernan, 2003; Logie & Pearson, 1997; 
Pickering, Gathercole, Hall & Lloyd, 2001) suggest that  developmental 
trajectories for object and spatial WM components can be dissociated 
through use of the developmental fractionation technique (Hitch, 1990). 
According to this technique, age-related changes in object  WM have 
been observed to follow a slower trajectory than age-related changes in 
spatial WM. However, Hamilton, Coates and Heffernan (2003) argued 
that these findings should be interpreted with caution given their 
observation that WM performance is influenced by age-related changes 
in the speed of information processing and by executive control 
functions. Importantly, the relative contribution of these factors to WM 
performance was found to differ between age groups complicating the 
assessment  of developmental trends in WM. Similarly, in the context  of 
the multi-component  WM model (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) we should 
take into account  to what extent tasks used to assess object and spatial 
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WM components tap control functions exercised by the central 
executive (Hitch, Towse & Hutton, 2001; Klauer & Zhao, 2004). 
Executive control functions may well continue to develop into 
adolescence (Diamond, 2002; Huizinga, Dolan & Van der Molen, 2006; 
Luna, Garver, Urban, Lazar & Sweeney, 2004; Stuss 1992; Welsh, 
2002), complicating the interpretation of the results of studies of WM 
development.
The primary goal of the present study was to examine developmental 
trends in object  and spatial WM while keeping procedural differences 
between object and spatial WM tasks minimal. Participants were 
presented with series of stimuli ranging between 4 and 8 items. They 
were required to respond to the stimulus using one button when the 
stimulus was new (object task) or presented in a new location (spatial 
task), and another button when the stimulus had been presented 
previously in the series (object  task) or when it  occupied a location that 
it had occupied previously (spatial task). The participants also 
performed two control tasks in which the previously presented stimuli 
(object task) or locations (spatial task) were cued. Memory demands 
were allegedly absent in the control tasks, therefore response speed and 
accuracy were assumed not to discriminate between different series 
lengths, and between object  and spatial WM control tasks. In addition, a 
reaction time task as a measures of basic performance speed and the 
Random Number Generation (RNG) task, a task that  has been 
demonstrated in the past to provide a  reliable indicator of executive 
control function (Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny & Duncan, 1998; Miyake 
et  al., 2000; Towse & Neil, 1998).were included to allow for an 
assessment  of their potential contribution to developmental trends in 
object and spatial WM
A secondary goal of the present study was to examine developmental 
trends in object  and spatial WM vis-à-vis the recordings of the 
participants’ heart rate (HR) during task performance. There is a large 
body of research showing a bi-directional relation between HR and 
information processing demands. HR decelerates during the deployment 
of attention in the service of detecting potentially relevant  information, 
whereas processing and transforming that  information is associated with 
HR speeding (Lacey & Lacey, 1974; for a review: Van der Molen, 
Somsen & Orlebeke, 1985). In previous work, HR has been observed to 
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slow when participants anticipate a target stimulus embedded in a series 
of non-target stimuli, with more slowing when the number of non-target 
stimuli preceding the target stimulus increased (Van der Molen, Somsen 
& Jennings, 2000). This anticipatory slowing of HR became more 
pronounced with advancing age from middle childhood into 
adolescence and adulthood (Van der Molen, Somsen & Jennings, 2000). 
In related studies, focusing on the processing of feedback stimuli, HR 
was found to decelerate in anticipation of performance feedback with 
added deceleration when the information provided by the feedback was 
negative (Crone et al., 2003). The cardiac changes associated with 
feedback processing were less pronounced during childhood compared 
to adolescent and adult participants (Crone, Jennings & Van der Molen, 
2004). Finally, it has been shown that mnemonic task demands induce 
HR speeding, the more so when the task demands on memory 
processing increase (e.g., Backs & Seljos, 1994; for a review see 
Jennings, 1986).
The pattern of findings that  emerged from the HR literature on 
information processing provides the context  for a set  of specific 
predictions regarding the relation between object  and spatial WM on the 
one hand and cardiac changes on the other. First, preparing for the WM 
target  stimulus is predicted to induce an anticipatory HR deceleration 
that returns to baseline at the time of the initiation of the response (e.g., 
Somsen, Van der Molen, Jennings & Orlebeke, 1985). Second, 
increasing demands on WM should elicit  an acceleratory HR trend 
reducing the peak of anticipatory deceleration (e.g., Backs & Seljos, 
1994). Assuming that WM demands are similar for object  and spatial 
WM tasks, anticipatory HR changes should not differentiate between 
tasks. Third, the anticipation of performance feedback was assumed to 
induce added deceleration that  is larger for negative feedback compared 
to positive feedback (e.g., Crone et  al., 2003). The cardiac changes 
associated with feedback processing were predicted to be smaller in 
children compared to adults (Crone, Jennings & Van der Molen. 2004; 
Van der Molen, Somsen & Jennings, 2000). Finally, it  was assumed that 
the magnitude of the cardiac changes associated with feedback 
processing is proportional to the ability to detect  that  an error has been 
made in response to the target stimulus. This ability should decrease 
with increasing WM load and should be less pronounced for children 
compared to adults. In sum, this study aimed at investigating 
developmental trends in object and spatial WM using HR changes as 
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Three groups of children and one group of young adults participated in 
the study; twenty 6-7 year-olds (11 girls, M = 6.6, SE = .68), twenty 
9-10 year-olds (11 girls, M = 9.7, SE = .72), twenty 11-12 year-olds (11 
girls, M = 11.9, SE = .70) and twenty 18-26 year-olds (10 females, M = 
21.9, SE = 2.09). The young adults were students at the University of 
Amsterdam who received course credit for participating. The children 
were recruited through a local school, and were selected with the help 
of their teachers and with their parents’ consent. Children who 
participated in the study had average or above average IQ according to 
teacher reports. Participants with learning disorders, behavioral 
disorders or a history of neurological impairments were excluded from 
the study. No detailed information regarding parental income, parental 
education level, or family size of the participants was collected. 
However, participants were mostly Caucasian, and tended to come from 
middle class families. 
7.2.2 Experimental Tasks 
Stimulus Displays
For the object  tasks, two displays were presented on each trial, a 
stimulus display and an outcome display. The object WM task stimulus 
display consisted of a square box at the center of the screen in which 
different  abstract  symbols were presented in sequential order. Abstract 
figures (www.cog.brown.edu/~tarr/stimuli.html#pw) were used to 
minimize the possibility that participants would use verbal strategies. In 
the spatial WM task 4, 6, or 8 square boxes were presented in a vertical 
row at the center of the screen. On each trial, a happy face was 
presented on one of the square boxes.  Participants were told that the 
square boxes in both the object task and the spatial task each contained 
a reward, and were instructed to collect as many rewards as possible. To 
this end, they were required to press one of two keys (‘Z’ or ‘/’) with 
their left or right  index finger respectively. The keys corresponded to 
the options ‘open the box’ and ‘do not open the box’. The assignment of 
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keys was counterbalanced across participants and kept  fixed across the 
experiment. Participants were not instructed to respond as fast as 
possible. A representation of the stimulus displays used in the object and 
spatial WM tasks and an example of a trial are presented in Figure 7.1. 
Participants were instructed that in the object  WM task, a box should be 
opened every time a new figure was presented, but  should be kept 
closed when an earlier displayed figure was presented. In the spatial 
WM task participants were instructed to open a box every time the 
happy face was presented in a new location, and not  when it appeared in 
one of the locations it was presented in before.
Figure 7.1 Object WM task trial with examples of positive ($), negative (x) and 
non-informative (■) feedback displays. The bottom half of the figure shows the 
task design and stimulus displays for the experimental and control conditions 
of the WM tasks. See text for details about stimulus presentation. 
This manipulation required participants to keep track of the figures that 
were already seen within the sequence and the locations that  had 
already been occupied. Upon pressing one of the keys, the stimulus 
display was replaced by the outcome display showing a square 
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containing a ‘$’ sign, indicating that the box was opened correctly, or an 
‘X’ sign, indicating that the box was opened incorrectly. If the 
participant decided not to open the box, it turned black irrespective of 
the accuracy of the participant’s decision.
The task consisted of two separate conditions. In the experimental 
condition, the edge of the square box was always green in the object 
WM task, and the square boxes were always green in the spatial WM 
task, therefore the participants needed to remember if a figure had been 
seen before, or if a happy face had previously appeared in a location. In 
the control condition, all performance requirements were the same, 
except  that  in this condition in the object  task the edge of the square box 
turned red when a previously seen figure was presented, and in the 
spatial task the square box in which the happy face appeared turned red 
when it  was a location where it had appeared before.  The order of 
experimental and control conditions was counterbalanced across 
participants. The presentation time of the target stimulus was response-
terminated. A response resulted in a 1000 ms blank screen, followed by 
a 1000 ms outcome display. The inter-trial interval varied between 500, 
1000, 1500 or 2000 ms. 
Task Design. 
In each block, three series of trials consisting of 4, 6, or 8 different 
abstract symbols or spatial locations were presented. Thus, both the 
object  and spatial WM tasks consisted of Load 4, 6, and 8 trials. 
Symbols and locations were presented 6, 10, or 14 times, requiring 
participants to open the box 4, 6 and 8 times and keeping it closed 2, 4 
and 6 times, respectively (see Figure 7.1). Which stimuli were repeated 
was pseudo-randomized to ensure that  two consecutive trials were never 
identical and that the stimulus associated with the final trial in a series 
had not been previously seen. Participants had to keep stimuli active in 
memory throughout the series. During both WM tasks, the Load 4, 6, 
and 8 trial series were presented 4 times in the control condition and 4 
times in the experimental condition. Consequently a total of 24 Load 4 
trials, 40 Load 6 trials, and 56 Load 8 trials were presented in both the 
experimental and control condition, resulting in 120 trials for the 
control condition and 120 trials for the experimental condition in total. 
To familiarize participants with the stimuli and procedure, they received 
a block of practice trials consisting of two series of 6 and 8 
experimental and control trials at the beginning of each task.
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Speed of Processing (SP)Task                                                            
The SP task was based on a 2-choice reaction time task adopted from 
Van den Wildenberg (2003). In the SP task, an arrow was presented in 
the center of the screen, pointing to the left  or to the right. Participants 
had to respond to this arrow as quickly and accurately as possible by 
pressing the ‘Z’ or ‘/’ key with their left or right index finger, 
corresponding to the direction of the arrow.  The response-to-stimulus 
interval was set at 1000 ms. Participants received a block of 15 practice 
trials at  the beginning of the task. The task consisted of a series of 75 
trials.
Random Number Generation (RNG) Task 
The RNG task was a computer version of the RNG task (Huizinga, 
Dolan & Van der Molen, 2006) developed by Towse & Neil (1998). 
Participants were required to generate numbers randomly by pressing 
keys, labeled 1 to 10, on a computer keyboard. A brightly colored star 
was shown for 1000 ms on each trial, after which it was replaced by a 
question mark indicating that  participants should respond as fast as 
possible. The response-to-stimulus interval was set  at  1000 ms. 
Participants received a block of 15 practice trials at the beginning of the 
task. The RNG task consisted of a block of 75 trials.
Exit Interview 
Upon completing the experiment, all participants were asked if they had 
used any particular strategy when performing the WM tasks. Special 
attention was given to any kind of verbal strategies participants might 
have used. These strategies were probed by questions like: “How did 
you remember which box you should open or how did you remember 
which object was old or new?” All answers were quantified, using two 
categories. Participants who reported they were “naming the abstract 
figures” were coded as having used a verbal strategy. Participants 
reporting, for example, to have “just  looked at  the pictures” were coded 
as using a non-verbal strategy.  
Psychophysiological Measures. 
During the WM tasks, the electrocardiogram (ECG) and respiration 
were continuously recorded. The ECG was recorded from three 
electrodes, attached via the modified lead-2 placement. Respiration was 
recorded through a sensor situated across the abdomen. The signals 
were sampled and recorded by a computer at  a rate of 400 Hz. The 
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recorded Inter-Beat Intervals (IBIs) were screened for physiologically 
impossible readings and artifacts. These were corrected by adjusting 
specific parameters in the program that  extracted the IBIs from the 
digitized ECGs. The respiration signal was used only to eliminate heart 
rate changes associated with gross respiratory changes (Jennings et  al., 
1981).
Procedure. 
All participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory or 
classroom. All participants completed all tasks. Each session began with 
attaching the physiological equipment and ended with the exit-
interview. The tasks were presented in two possible orders: RNG, 
Spatial WM, Object WM and RT or vice versa. Stimuli were presented 
in color against  a white background on a 15-inch computer screen 
placed at  a distance of 70 centimeters from the participant. Preceding 
each task participants were given written instructions, which were 
shown on the screen. To make sure that  even the youngest  children 
understood the instructions, these were also read to the participants and 
care was taken that all participants understood the instructions after 
practice. The two WM tasks took approximately 25 minutes each to 
complete. The other tasks lasted approximately 5 minutes each. There 
were short  breaks between all tasks, and children were given a drink 
and a cookie halfway through the experiment. Including instructions 
and breaks, participants spent approximately 90 minutes in the 
laboratory or classroom. 
7.3 Results
Results will be presented in two major sections. The performance 
results will be presented first, followed by the presentation of the HR 
findings. 
7.3.1 Behavioral Data
The performance of participants was examined by computing accuracy 
and median reaction times. The data were then submitted to repeated 
measures ANOVAs with Age Group (4), as a between-subjects factor 
and Task (object/spatial) and Condition (experimental/control), and 
Load (4, 6 or 8) as within-subjects factors. 
156 | Chapter 6
Response Accuracy on the WM Tasks
The accuracy scores for each age group are presented in Figure 7.2. 
Main effects for Age Group, Task, Condition and Load were significant 
(all p’s < .001, all ηp2  > .521) and these effects were qualified by a 
significant four-way interaction between Age Group, Load, Condition 
and Task, F (6, 152) = 8.04, p  < .001, ηp2 = .241. The four-way 
interaction was followed up by separate ANOVAs for the experimental 
and control conditions. The ANOVA on the data from the control 
condition did not result in any significant  effects, p’s > .05. In contrast, 
the ANOVA for the experimental condition yielded a Load x Task Type 
interaction, F (2, 152) = 16.34, p < .001, ηp2 = .177, that  showed a larger 
increase in the percentage of errors with an increase in WM load for the 
spatial WM task (15%) than for the object WM task (7%). This 
interaction was qualified by a three way-interaction between Age 
Group, Load and Task Type, F (6, 152) = 9.34, p < .05, ηp2 = .269. 
Separate analyses revealed a significant  interaction between Age Group 
and task demands for the spatial WM task, F (6, 152) = 13.28, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .344. Comparisons between age groups indicated that the effect  of 
spatial WM load was significantly larger in the in 6-7 year olds 
compared to the 9-10 year olds, F(2, 76) = 4.63 p < .05, ηp2  = .109, the 
11-12 year olds, F (2, 76) = 22.16 p < .001, ηp2  = .368, and the 18-26 
year olds, F(2, 76) = 29.78 p < .001, ηp2  = .439. The 9-10 year olds 
showed a larger effect  of increasing WM load than the 11-12 year olds, 
F (2, 76) = 6.74, p < .01, ηp2  = .151, and the 18-26 year olds, F(2, 76) = 
12.24, p < .001, ηp2  = .244. Finally, the 11-12 year olds and 18-26 year 
olds did not differ significantly from each other, p = .28, ηp2  = .033. 
Similar analyses done on the performance data generated by the Object 
task revealed only a main effect of Age Group, p < .001, ηp2  = .463, but 
no Load x Group interaction, p > .05, ηp2  = .067. Thus, in the Object 
task, the effect of WM load did not  differ between age groups. 
However, a repeated measures ANOVA on the Object task data with 
Age Group (4),  as a between-subjects factor and Condition 
(experimental/control), and Load (4, 6 or 8) as within-subjects factors, 
did result  in a Condition x Age Group interaction, F (3, 76) = 12.09, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .323. The decrease in accuracy in the experimental 
condition, relative to the control condition, was smaller in older 
participants. Comparisons between age groups showed that the increase 
in the percentage of errors as a function of WM load was significantly 
larger for 6-7 year olds (22%) than for 9-10 year olds (15%), F (1, 38) = 
9.80 p < .01, ηp2  = /205, 11-12 year olds (16%), F (1, 38) = 7.71 p  < .
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01, ηp2  = .169, and 18-25 year olds (8%), F(1, 38) = 42.20 p < .001, ηp2 
= .526. The 9-10 year olds did not differ from the 11-12 year olds, p = .
98, ηp2  = .000, but  the 9-10 year olds and the 11-12 year olds performed 
significantly worse than the 18-25 year olds (F (1, 38) = 11.05, p < .01, 
ηp2  = .225, and F (1, 38) = 8.53, p < .001, ηp2  = .183, respectively). 
Thus, spatial WM performance, as indexed by accuracy, reached adult 
levels earlier (at  age 11-12) than object WM performance (beyond age 
11-12). 
Figure 7.2 Average percentage of errors in the experimental and control 
condition as a function of increasing WM load for each age group and both 
WM tasks separately. Age differences are observed in the experimental 
condition for both the spatial and object WM tasks.
Response Speed on the WM Tasks 
Median reaction times (RT) for each Age Group, WM task, Condition, 
and WM load are presented in Table 1. A similar ANOVA as for 
accuracy was performed on the speed of responding and the RT results 
generally parallel the accuracy results. Again, all main effects were 
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significant (all p’s <.001, all ηp2  > .121). These effects were qualified by 
a four-way interaction between Age Group, Load, Condition and Task 
Type, F (6, 152) =3.50, p  < .01, ηp2  = .121. A follow-up ANOVA on the 
RTs that  emerged from the control task did not result  in significant 
effects (all p’s > .05, all ηp2  < .556). Subsequent analyses for the 
experimental condition resulted in a significant Task x Load x Group 
interaction, F (6, 152) = 2.85, p < .05, ηp2  = .101. The analyses done on 
the data from the Spatial WM task yielded a significant  Load x Group 
interaction, F (6, 152) = 3.19, p < .01, ηp2  = .112. This interaction 
revealed that  the effect  of an increase in WM load in 6-7 year olds 
differed significantly from the effect in 9-10 year olds, F(2, 76) = 3.82, 
p < .05, ηp2  = .091, in the 11-12 year olds, F (2, 76) = 4.02, p  < .05, ηp2 
= .096, and in the 18-26 year olds F(2, 76) = 4.30, p < .05, ηp2  = .102. 
RT  increased with WM load in all age groups but reached a plateau for 
the 6-7 year olds when WM load increased from 6 to 8 locations; M = 
1533, SE = 138.1 and M = 1488, SE = 114.7, respectively. 
A similar analysis on the data from the Object WM task yielded only a 
main effect of Age Group, F (3, 76) = 15.60, p < .001, ηp2  = .381. Post 
hoc Tukey tests revealed that  the 6-7 year olds responded slower (M = 
1872, SE = 94.8) than the 9-10 year olds (M = 1347, SE = 94.8), the 
11-12 year olds (M = 1151, SE = 94.8), and the 18-25 year olds (M = 
1021, SE = 94.8). Load did not alter the preceding effects.  In broad 
outline, these results are consistent  with the accuracy results reported 
previously. That  is, performance reached an adult  level for the spatial 
WM task earlier than for the object WM task.
Response Speed on the SP Task. 
Performance on the SP task was evaluated by computing accuracy and 
median RT  for each participant. The SP  data were then submitted to a 
one way-ANOVA with Group (4) as between-subjects factor. The 
ANOVA for accuracy showed a main effect of Group, F (3, 76) = 18.56, 
P < .001. Post hoc Tukey tests revealed that  6-7 year olds were less 
accurate (M = 15.9 %, SE = 8.2) than the 9-10 year olds (M = 7.7 %, SE 
= 6.1), the 11-12 year olds (M = 3.6 %, SE = 3.0) and the 18-26 year 
olds (M = 3.9 %, SE = 5.4). The three oldest  groups did not  differ 
significantly from each other. The ANOVA done on the speed of 
responding showed a main effect  of Group as well, F (3, 76) = 36.20, p 
< .001. Post  hoc Tukey tests indicated that the 6-7 year olds (M = 
588.67, SE = 91.4) responded slower than the 9-10 year olds (M = 
160 | Chapter 6
511.66, SE = 86.3), the 11-12 year olds (M = 457.71, SE = 54) and the 
18-26 year olds (M = 362.37, SE = 35.8). Mean SP  did not differ 
between the 9-10 year olds and 11-12 year olds, but  the oldest group 
responded faster than all three younger groups (all p’s <.05). Finally, 
correlations between speed and accuracy were not significant.
Random Number Generation (RNG).
Performance on the RNG task was assessed using Towse and Neil’s 
(1998) RgCalc program which produces several different  indices of 
“randomness”. The Random Number Generation (RNG) index was used 
for our purposes. The RNG index provides the frequency of response 
pairs, and this frequency value may vary between 0 (fully random) and 
1 (fully predictable). The RNG frequency index was submitted to a one 
way ANOVA with Age Group (4), as a between-subjects factor, and 
RNG, as within-subjects factor. The ANOVA failed to reveal significant 
differences between age groups, p = .46.
SP and RNG Predictors. 
SP scores were submitted as covariates in an ANCOVA on the WM data 
with Age Group (4), as a between-subjects factor, and Task (object, 
spatial), Condition (experimental, control) and Load (4, 6 or 8), as 
within-subjects factors. Importantly, the previously observed four-way 
interaction between Task x Load x Condition x Group remained 
significant, F (6, 150) = 3.75, p < .01, ηp2  = .131, when SP was added as 
covariate. The ANCOVA revealed a significant  interaction between SP 
and Condition, F (1, 75) = 6.93, p < .01, ηp2  = .085. An additional 
correlation analysis was performed to examine this interaction. The 
correlation analysis showed that the difference in accuracy between the 
experimental and control condition correlated significantly with SP, r 
= .63, n = 80, p < .001. The partial correlation, corrected for age group, 
was also significant, r = .29, n = 77, p < .01. This positive relation 
indicated that  accuracy on WM tasks increased as participants 
responded faster on the SP  task. This association was consistent  across 
all age groups. RNG scores were submitted as covariates in a similar 
ANCOVA on the WM data. Again, the previously observed four-way 
interaction between Task x Load x Condition x Group remained 
significant, F (6, 150) = 8.14, p < .001, ηp2  = .246. However, correlation 
analyses for difference scores between the experimental and control 
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conditions did not  show a significant correlation with RNG for the 
object (p >. 05), and spatial (p >. 05) WM tasks.
Verbal Strategies. 
The exit interview showed that several participants used a verbal 
strategy in the WM tasks. For the Spatial WM task 10% of 6-7 year 
olds, 15% of 9-10 year olds, 35% of 11-12 year olds and 20% of 18-26 
year olds reported to have used a verbal strategy. However, for the 
object  task respectively 10%, 35%, 55% and 100% of participants 
reported using a verbal strategy. To determine whether verbal strategy 
use influenced WM task performance, the data were submitted to 
repeated measures ANOVAs with Age Group (2) and Strategy (verbal, 
non-verbal), as between-subjects factors, and Condition (experimental, 
control) and Load (4, 6 or 8), as within-subjects factors. The data of the 
6-7 year olds and 18-26 year olds were not  included in this analysis, as 
only 10% of participants in the youngest group and all participants in 
the oldest  group indicated that  they used a naming strategy when 
performing the object  WM task. Consequently, the Age Group factor 
had only two levels (9-10-years vs. 11-12-years). The ANOVAs were 
performed on the data of each WM task, separately. The ANOVA done 
on the Spatial WM task data yielded a significant Condition by Strategy 
interaction, F (1, 36) = 6.43, p < .05, ηp2  = .152. Post  hoc analyses 
showed that participants who used a verbal strategy were more accurate 
in the experimental condition than participants who did not (M = 9.77, 
SE = .95 vs. M = 5.57, SE = 1.78, respectively), F (1, 36) = 4.33, p < .
05, ηp2  = .107, but  not  in the control condition, p > .05, ηp2  = .010. 
Likewise, the ANOVA done on the Object  WM task data showed that 
participants who used a verbal strategy were more accurate than 
participants who did not  use a verbal strategy when performing the 
experimental task (M = 23.86, SE = 1.56 vs. M = 16.35, SE = 1.74) , F 
(1, 36) = 10.30, p < .01. ηp2  = .223.  Age group did not  alter any of these 
effects.
7.3.2 Heart Rate Changes
The HR analyses are presented in two separate sections. The first set  of 
analyses focused on the HR changes associated with the processing of 
the target  stimulus and the second set  of analyses focused on cardiac 
responses associated with the processing of the feedback stimulus. 
Cardiac Response Associated With Target Processing. 
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The cardiac response associated with the processing of the target 
stimulus in the control and experimental condition for the object  and 
spatial WM tasks is presented in Figure 7.3. In this figure, the cardiac 
response is plotted in terms of inter-beat  intervals (IBIs). Thus, a 
lengthening of IBI indicates a slowing of HR. 
Figure 7.3 Six IBIs are plotted around the presentation of the stimulus (IBI 0). 
Average IBI length is plotted for the control and experimental condition for 
both WM tasks and for each age group separately. Heart rate slows during 
stimulus presentation, but the relative slowing is reduced in the object WM 
task.
  
The cardiac response is plotted around the presentation of the target 
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stimulus. That  is, the target stimulus occurred during the IBI indicated 
as IBI-0 in the figure. The preceding IBI (IBI-1) and subsequent IBI’s 
(IBI1, IBI2, IBI3 and IBI4) are plotted around the IBI of the target 
stimulus (IBI0). The IBI response is plotted relative to a pre-target 
stimulus baseline (IBI-2; i.e., two IBIs preceding the IBI of the target 
stimulus). 
The plots presented in Figure 7.3 show the cardiac response that is 
typically observed when participants prepare for a significant stimulus. 
That is, an IBI lengthening (i.e., cardiac slowing) preceding the stimulus 
and a return to baseline (acceleratory recovery) upon the initiation of 
the response to the stimulus. In addition, it  can be seen that cardiac 
slowing is considerably less pronounced in the object  WM task 
compared to the spatial WM task. Quite unexpectedly, the plots 
presented in Figure 7.3 show that the difference between object and 
spatial tasks occurred both for the experimental and control conditions. 
Finally, Figure 7.4 shows that WM load exerted only minimal effects in 
the object WM task in contrast to a pronounced effect  that the highest 
WM load has in the spatial WM task. The visual impressions created by 
Figure 7.3 and 7.4 were verified statistically by a repeated measures 
ANOVA done on IBI1, with Group (4), as a between subjects factor, 
and Task (object, spatial), Condition (experimental, control), and Load 
(4, 6, or 8), as within subjects factors. The analysis focuses on the IBI 
following the presentation of the stimulus (IBI 1), since previous studies 
showed that IBI 1 shows the most pronounced effects of the 
experimental manipulation for both stimulus processing (Somsen et al., 
1985) and feedback processing (Crone, Jennings & Van der Molen, 
2004; Crone et al., 2003). 
The ANOVA yielded a significant  main effect of Task, F (1, 76) = 
37.87, p < .001, ηp2  = .333, that was qualified by an interaction between 
Task and Load, F (2, 152) = 4.46, p < .05, ηp2  = .055. This interaction 
was not altered by the effect of Condition, p > .05, ηp2  = .028. Follow-
up analyses performed on the data of the experimental condition 
revealed a significant Task by Load interaction, F (2, 152) = 6.37, p < .
001, ηp2  = .077. Load altered the cardiac response in the spatial WM 
task, F (2, 152) = 11.40, p < .001, ηp2  = .130, but  did not  in the object 
WM task, p > . 10, ηp2  = .000 (see Figure 7.4). Importantly, Age Group 
effects were absent, with the exception of an interaction between 
Condition and Age Group that approached significance, F (3, 76) = 
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2.29, p = .085, ηp2  = .083. This interaction is plotted in Figure 7.3. This 
figure shows that  the difference between experimental and control 
conditions is much more pronounced in the child groups compared to 
adult  participants. A post-hoc analysis, collapsing data across the two 
youngest  groups and the two oldest  groups, indicated that  the IBI 
shortening (i.e., cardiac speeding) induced by the mnemonic task 
demands was more pronounced in the younger compared to the older 
participants, F (1, 78) = 6.50, p < .02, ηp2  = .077. Finally, correlations 
between IBI1 and performance measures were all non-significant.
Figure 7.4 Six IBIs are plotted around the presentation of the stimulus (IBI 0). 
Average IBI length is plotted for WM loads 4,  6, and 8, in the control and 
experimental condition for both WM tasks. HR shows anticipatory slowing 
before stimulus presentation, and an overall relative acceleration in relation to 
high memory demands.
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Cardiac Response Associated with Feedback Processing. 
The IBI response associated with the feedback stimulus is plotted in 
Figure 7.5. The feedback stimulus is presented during IBI0 and the 
preceding (IBI-1) and subsequent IBIs (IBI1 and IBI2) are plotted as 
well. The cardiac response is plotted relative to a pre-stimulus baseline 
(IBI-2). The left panel of Figure 7.5 presents the IBI response 
associated with positive or negative feedback following the participant’s 
decision to open a box (i.e., when it  was judged that  a stimulus was new 
or a location occupied for the first time). It  can be seen that  positive 
feedback is followed by a prompt return to baseline. In contrast, 
negative feedback is associated with added cardiac slowing (i.e., a 
lengthening of the IBIs subsequent to the feedback IBI). The right panel 
of Figure 7.5 displays the IBI response associated with the stimulus 
following the decision not  to open the box (i.e., when it was judged that 
a stimulus had been seen previously or a location occupied before). 
Note that  in this case the stimulus was always the same (a black screen) 
and did not  provide feedback concerning the correctness of the 
participant’s decision. Thus, in the right  panel, ‘correct’ and ‘error’ refer 
to the response, not  to information that is provided by the feedback. Yet, 
it  can be seen that  acceleratory recovery is postponed on error trials 
relative to correct trials.
Figure 7.5 Four IBIs are plotted around the presentation of the feedback (IBI 
0). IBI  length is plotted for errors and correct responses and for the feedback 
and no- feedback conditions separately. HR slows following erroneous 
responses, in both FB conditions.
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The analysis will again focus on IBI 1 (the IBI following the 
presentation of the feedback), since this IBI was previously found to 
show the most pronounced effects of the experimental manipulation for 
feedback processing (Crone, Jennings & Van der Molen, 2004; Crone et 
al., 2003). The cardiac response associated with feedback processing 
was statistically examined by performing a repeated measures ANOVA 
on IBI1 with Age Group (4), as a between subjects factor, and Task 
(Object/Spatial), Feedback (informative/ uninformative), and Accuracy 
(correct/incorrect), as within subjects factors. The factor ‘Feedback’ 
refers to informative stimuli indicating that  the decision to open the box 
was correct  or incorrect  vs. uninformative stimuli keeping participants 
uncertain about  the correctness of their decision to leave to box closed. 
In the latter case, participants had to rely on their own ability to register 
errors. The ANOVA yielded a  significant main effect of Accuracy, F (1, 
73) = 21.52, p < .001, ηp2  = .228. Stimuli following an error delayed 
acceleratory recovery relative to stimuli following correct  decisions. 
The interaction between Accuracy and Feedback just failed to reach an 
acceptable level of significance, F (1, 73) = 3.69, p = .059, ηp2  = .048. 
This interaction was not altered by Task, p >. 05, ηp2  = .024, or Age 
Group, p >. 05, ηp2  = .058. There was a significant  interaction between 
Task and Feedback, F (1, 73) = 4.25, p < .05, ηp2  = .055, showing more 
pronounced cardiac slowing when feedback was informative compared 
to when it  was uninformative but this interaction is difficult  to interpret 
as the higher-order interaction with Accuracy was lacking, p > .05, ηp2 
= .024.
More importantly, the Age Group by Accuracy interaction reached 
significance, F (3, 73) = 4.37, p < .01, ηp2  = .152. This interaction is 
plotted in Figure 7.6. All age groups exhibit the cardiac slowing 
associated with the stimulus presented following an incorrect  response 
but the slowing increased with advancing age. More specifically, the 
IBI1 difference between correct and error trials failed to attain 
significance in the two younger age groups, p’s > .15, ηp2 ’s < .065, but 
reached significance in the 11-12 year-olds, F (1, 19) = 4.57, p < .05, 
ηp2  = .194, and it  was  significant  in adult  participants, F (1, 16)= 14.65, 
p < .001, ηp2  = .478. Interestingly, the higher-order interaction between 
the effects of Age Group, Accuracy, and Feedback fell short  of 
significance, p = .22, ηp2  = .058, suggesting that children’s performance 
monitoring ability develops slowly for both internal (uninformative 
feedback) and external (feedback) error detection.
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Figure 7.6 Four IBIs are plotted around the presentation of the feedback (IBI 
0). IBI length is plotted for errors and correct responses for each age groups 
separately. HR slows following performance errors, but this slowing is larger 
for older age groups.
7.4  Discussion
The primary goal of the present study was to examine developmental 
trends in object  and spatial WM while avoiding procedural differences 
between tasks and using control tasks with zero memory demands as a 
baseline. Age groups performed equally well on the object and spatial 
control tasks with error rates below 10% for all three series lengths. 
These data suggest  that  the assessment of object  and spatial WM 
performance is not  confounded by unwanted procedural differences 
between WM tasks. The pattern of results observed in the experimental 
conditions of the object  and spatial WM tasks show clear differences. 
The results of the spatial WM task show that  all age groups performed 
equally accurate when the series length was short  (i.e., 4 items). Using a 
WM load of only four items the performance of all age groups equalled 
the performance on the spatial control task (i.e., error rate less than 
10%). However, in all age groups, performance declined when WM 
load increased, while staying above chance level. Interestingly, this 
decline was more pronounced for younger age groups. All age groups 
differed significantly from each other with the exception of the 11-12 
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year-olds and the adult participants. This finding indicates that spatial 
WM memory reached mature levels by the end of middle childhood.  
The results that  emerged from the object  WM task show adult  error 
rates for the lowest  WM load that were similar to the the results 
obtained for the spatial task (below 10%). However, in children error 
rates were higher, the more so when children were younger (in the 
youngest  age group error rates approached 30%).  The difference in 
error rates between the 11-12 years-olds and adults suggest that object 
WM continues to develop into adolescence.
Why did imposing a WM load demand in the experimental condition of 
the object  WM task have such a detrimental effect on children’s 
performance compared to the effect that a similar manipulation had on 
their performance in the experimental condition of the spatial WM task, 
while the performance difference between memory tasks was 
considerably less pronounced for the adult participants? The data 
suggest  that the object WM task is more difficult  than the spatial WM 
task, adults may have compensated for this difficulty by adopting a 
verbal strategy. All adults reported to have used a verbal stimulus-
coding strategy when performing the object  WM task whereas only 
10% of the youngest  children did, and this finding is consistent  with 
studies on the use of verbal strategies (Palmer, 2000; Pickering, 2001). 
The analysis aiming at  the potential influence of verbal strategy use 
indicated that participants who used a verbal strategy were more 
accurate in performing the object WM task than those who did not  (84 
% vs. 76 %, respectively). Therefore, the differences in performance 
between age groups is likely to be due to differences in the way 
participants approached the task, rather than differences in WM 
capacity per se.
Previously, Hamilton, Coates and Heffernan (2003) reported that 
developmental trends in object and spatial WM may be obscured by 
concurrent changes in basic processing speed and/or executive control 
function (see also: Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge & Wearing, 2004; 
Hitch, 2002; Kail, 1992; Kail & Park, 1994; Logie & Pearson, 1997; 
Pickering, 2001). In order to assess the potentially compromising effect 
of developmental change in basic processing speed, a standard choice 
reaction task was adopted from the literature (Van den Wildenberg & 
Van der Molen, 2004) and included in the present  study. This task 
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yielded the typical age-related increase in the speed and accuracy of 
responding, consistent with prior studies (Case, Kurland & Goldberg, 
1982; Fry & Hale, 2000; Luna et  al., 2004; Salthouse, 1992). When 
basic processing speed was included as covariate in the analysis 
examining the speed of responding on the object and spatial WM task 
all significant effects continued to exist. The pattern of significant 
effects that was obtained for the speed of responding on the WM tasks 
showed a relatively more protracted development of object WM relative 
to spatial WM, paralleling the findings observed for accuracy. 
Interestingly, correlation analyses revealed in all age groups that, as 
participants were faster on the standard choice reaction task, they 
responded more accurately on the WM tasks. This finding is consistent 
with the hypothesis of basic processing speed as a cognitive primitive 
(e.g., Baltes, Staudinger, Lindenberger, 1999) and the notion  that basic 
processing speed provides a major dimension of individual differences 
in intelligence rather than developmental change in cognitive capacities 
(e.g., Anderson, 2001; but  see Cerella & Hale, 1994). Hamilton, Coates 
and Heffernan (2003) observed that developmental differences in 
executive control function may compromise WM development. 
Executive control function is a multi-facetted concept that  may have 
several indicators (Diamond, 2002; Miyake et al., 2000; Huizinga, 
Dolan & Van der Molen, 2006; Welsh et  al. 1991; Welsh, 2002). In the 
present  study, a single indicator, derived from the RNG task, was used 
that has been demonstrated in the past to provide a  reliable indicator of 
executive control function (Baddeley, Emsly, Kolodny & Duncan, 1998; 
Miyake et al., 2000; Towse & Neil, 1998). Prior studies administering 
this task to children reported a mild developmental improvement in 
random generation between 7 years of age and adulthood (Rabinowitz, 
Dunlap, Grant & Campione, 1989; Towse & Mclachlan, 1999). In the 
current study, however, the performance on the RNG task failed to 
discriminate between age groups. Moreover, correlating the RNG index 
of executive control function with the performance measures derived 
from the WM tasks failed to reveal any significant associations. 
However, a single index of executive control function probably does not 
provide sufficient insight. Therefore, these findings do not speak to the 
issue of a potential confound between developmental trends in WM and 
executive control function.  
  
A particular feature of the present  study was the use of heart  rate 
changes in order to provide a convergent measure of WM load and to 
170 | Chapter 6
assess developmental change in feedback and error processing vis-à-vis 
the WM task demands. The advantage of this measure is that phasic 
IBIs allow the study of time specific processing (stimulus vs. feedback 
monitoring) that cannot be observed on the basis of behavior only. The 
cardiac response showed the typical response associated with the 
preparation for a significant  stimulus and the speeded response to it -
anticipatory HR slowing with added deceleration upon the detection and 
processing of the target  stimulus which is then followed by acceleratory 
recovery associated with the initiation of the motor response (e.g., 
Somsen, Van der Molen, Jennings & Orlebeke, 1985; for a review: Van 
der Molen, Somsen & Orlebeke., 1985). We expected that imposing a 
demand on WM would induce an acceleratory trend, thereby reducing 
the maximum deceleratory amplitude of the cardiac response. In 
general, the cardiac results were consistent with this expectation. That 
is, maximum heart rate slowing was depressed considerably when WM 
demands were added to the object  task and to the spatial task but, in the 
latter task, only for the highest  WM load. The cardiac response did not 
differentiate between the control and the experimental spatial tasks for 
low WM loads. The object WM task induced a much stronger 
acceleratory trend compared to the spatial WM task. This differential 
effect  was smallest  for the adult participants. The latter finding could be 
due to qualitative changes in task performance with advancing age. 
Future work should examine this possibility by manipulating WM 
demands across a larger range.
The cardiac response associated with error and feedback processing 
yielded a particularly interesting finding. As predicted, negative 
feedback induced added cardiac slowing that was more pronounced 
with advancing age (e.g., Crone et al., 2003; Crone, Jennings & Van der 
Molen, 2004). The cardiac slowing to negative feedback has been 
interpreted to signal a monitoring mechanism that  enables improving of 
performance on subsequent  trials (e.g., Crone, Jennings & Van der 
Molen, 2004). The increase in cardiac slowing to negative performance 
feedback with advancing age has been taken to suggest that  the 
monitoring mechanism does not reach mature levels until adolescence 
or even young adulthood (Crone, Jennings & Van der Molen, 2004). 
The current  findings extend the results reported previously by showing 
that cardiac slowing also occurs following uninformative feedback after 
an erroneous response. This finding indicates that  cardiac slowing is a 
manifestation of a monitoring mechanism signaling that  performance 
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needs to be adjusted, based on the processing of external feedback or on 
the internal detection that  an error has occurred. In this regard, the 
cardiac response is similar to the error-related negativity (ERN) that  can 
be recorded over central brain regions (e.g., Holroyd & Coles, 2002; 
Miltner, Braun & Coles, 1997). 
In conclusion, the main finding that  emerged from the present study is 
the separability of developmental trends for object and spatial WM. 
This finding is consistent with a host  of studies suggesting a 
fractionation of visuospatial WM into separate visual and spatial 
components (for a recent review Klauer & Zhao, 2004). This finding is 
consistent also with the developmental literature suggesting that object 
and spatial WM mature along different trajectories (Hamilton, Coates, 
& Heffernan, 2003; Logie & Pearson, 1997; Pickering, Gathercole, Hall 
& Lloyd, 2001). The current  HR analysis provided converging evidence 
by showing that object  WM demands contribute to the acceleratory 
trend of the cardiac response to a greater extent compared to spatial 
WM demands hereby mirroring and supporting the behavioral findings. 
Moreover, not  only processing demands during the presentation of WM 
items, but also the subsequent monitoring of performance is related to 
overall WM performance, and both processes are sensitive to 
developmental change. These results demonstrate that stimulus 
processing and outcome monitoring should be studied in parallel and 
that psychophysiological measures contribute to our understanding of 
monitoring processes important for WM functioning that  cannot  be 
studied on the basis of behavior alone.






The research described in this thesis aimed to gain insight  in risky 
behavior in adolescence, by examining the development  of decision-
making in relation to brain development. Chapter 1 describes two 
existing possible explanations for adolescent risky behavior, the first 
explanation focuses on the development of cognitive control, and states 
that adolescents’ immature ability to control their impulses may bias 
them to act risky. The second explanation focuses on emotional/
motivational processes, and suggests that adolescents engage in risky 
behavior because they respond stronger to the possible rewards 
associated with risks than children and adults do. This thesis describes 
experiments that  examine developmental changes in three cognitive 
processes that  contribute to mature decision-making, the ability to 
estimate the probabilities, the ability to weigh potential positive and 
negative consequences associated with a risk, and cognitive control 
abilities. Chapters 2, 3, and 7 describe studies on developmental 
changes in the processes that form the building blocks of more complex 
decision-making under risk. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 explore the relative 
contributions of reward sensitivity and cognitive control to decision-
making across development. The results from this thesis show that 
developmental models that  try to explain risky behavior in adolescence 
can gain from knowledge about brain maturation, and from models of 
age related changes in brain function. In addition, based on these new 
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insights from developmental fMRI studies, adolescent risk-taking can 
be explained as the consequence of a difference in the developmental 
time course of reward related and cognitive control related brain 
circuitry. An increase in reward sensitivity early in adolescence is 
proposed to drive teens to take risks; while the ability to control these 
impulses does not fully develop until late adolescence.
8.2 Development of the neural correlates of basic decision-
 making processes
Chapter 2 describes an fMRI study in which we examined the ability to 
estimate probabilities. Participants aged 9 to 12-year-olds and young 
adults tried to gain as many points as possible by identifying the choice 
option associated with the highest  probability in a two-choice gambling 
task. On half of the trials, this was an easy task, the probability of 
choosing the right  choice option and winning a point was high (low-risk 
gambles), on the other half of the trials this choice was more difficult, 
and the probability of winning was low (high-risk gambles). This was 
the first  developmental fMRI study that examined the neural correlates 
of cognitive control as well as reward processing. We examined brain 
activation patterns at  the moment that participants made their decision 
and at  the moment  they saw the outcome of their choice. Performance 
differences were minimal, and overall children and adults recruited 
similar brain regions when performing this task. However, there were 
differences in the extent  of activation between children and adults. At 
the moment of the decision, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was 
more active for high-risk gambles than for low-risk gambles, but  this 
difference was larger for 9-12 year olds than for adults. The ACC is 
considered a key cognitive control region (Miltner et al., 2003; 
Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone & Nieuwenhuis, 2004), and this 
finding suggests that  in children the more ambiguous decisions were 
associated with increased cognitive control. Activation in two other 
regions which have been linked to cognitive control and decision-
making in adults, the dorsolateral PFC (DLPFC) and the orbitofrontal 
cortex (OFC) were also more active during high-risk relative to low-risk 
choices, but these regions were not differentially activated for children 
and adults. When the outcome of gambles was presented, in children, 
relative to adults, the lateral OFC was more active for losses relative to 
wins. This difference was taken to suggest  that children experienced 
losses as more aversive than adults. 
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Further support for the continued maturation of cognitive control during 
adolescence is presented in Chapter 7. This chapter describes a study on 
the development of object and spatial working memory (WM) and 
related feedback processing and performance monitoring. WM and the 
ability to process feedback and monitor one's performance are key 
components of cognitive control. In addition to behavioral measures this 
study describes measures of heart rate (HR) changes, which provided an 
index of covert  cognitive processes. Participants from 4 age groups (6–
7, 9–10, 11–12, and 18–26 years old) performed object and spatial WM 
tasks, in which each trial was followed by feedback. We showed that 
WM for Object and Spatial information followed dissociable 
developmental time courses. Spatial WM task performance reached 
adult  levels of performance by age 11, while object  WM task 
performance showed continued change with development during 
adolescence. This was also seen in improved performance monitoring as 
reflected in HR slowing elicited by negative performance feedback. 
This slowing was larger in adults than in children, and did not  reach 
adult  levels at age 12, which suggests that  performance monitoring 
continues to change during adolescence. 
The second important  basic process important in theories on adolescent 
risk-taking is developmental change in the sensitivity to rewards. In 
previous studies the motivational circuitry of the brain had been found 
to be either over-recruited (Ernst et al., 2005; May et  al., 2004) or 
under-recruited (Bjork et al., 2004) in adolescents. These conflicting 
findings limited our understanding of the reasons behind adolescent 
risky behavior. One of the confounds of these prior studies is associated 
with differences in response demands and performance (i.e., leading to 
strategic differences and making comparisons between age groups 
difficult). To examine the basic processes in the brain related to 
anticipation of winning or losing, we performed a second 
developmental fMRI experiment (Chapter 3)  in which we compared 
10-12 year olds, 14-15 year olds, and 18-25 year olds using a slot 
machine task that  did not  require any active decisions or behavior on the 
part of the participant. We used this passive experimental task to control 
for possible confounds of behavioral requirements that  could complicate 
the interpretation of age related differences. The results of this study 
reveal differences between adolescents and young adults during both the 
anticipation and the processing of rewards. Received rewards and the 
anticipation of possible rewards resulted in activation in reward related 
limbic regions, including the nucleus accumbens and the insula, and 
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elicited the most pronounced activation in the adolescent  brain. In 
contrast, in adults we found control regions in the PFC to be most 
active; the OFC was responsive to the omission of rewards in this age 
group, but not in adolescents. These findings support the hypothesis that 
reward related regions are more responsive in adolescence.
Taken together, the results from the experiments described in Chapters 2 
and 7 support the hypothesis that cognitive control functions continue to 
develop during adolescence, and that these functions contribute to 
mature task performance. The result  from the experiment described in 
Chapter 3 suggest that  there are fundamental differences in the way that 
reward related brain regions, the VS in particular, respond in mid-
adolescence. These results informed the interpretation of the results 
from the experiments described in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 in which reward 
sensitivity and cognitive control both contribute to decision-making, 
and in which rewards were dependent on performance. 
8.3 Development of decision-making under risk; relative 
 contributions of cognitive control and reward sensitivity
Chapter 4 describes a behavioral study in which an adapted version of 
the paradigm that  was introduced in Chapter 2 was used. In this version 
of the paradigm both the probability of winning and the size of the 
reward that could be gambled with were manipulated. Participants from 
5 age groups (8-9, 11-12, 14-15, 17-18, 25-30 years old) were asked to 
try to win as many credits as they could by choosing between high-risk/
low-probability gambles associated with a higher number of credits, and 
low-risk/high-probability gambles associated with 1 credit. We tried to 
control for age related differences in WM capacity that  could make the 
task relatively more difficult for younger participants, by presenting all 
the information that was needed to make a good decision on every trial. 
Because of this, no information had to be remembered, or inferred over 
the course of the task. Earlier studies that have found decision-making 
skills to improve until late adolescence did not  control for this (Crone & 
Van der Molen, 2004; Hooper, Luciana, Conklin & Yarger, 2004). In 
contrast  to these earlier studies, we found no performance differences 
between the age groups. This suggests that when all the information that 
has to be included in a decision is available, the ability to weigh 
probabilities and potential rewards is mature in children as young as 8 
years old. These findings suggest that  risky behavior in adolescence is 
not caused by an immature ability to understand the decisions that have 
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to be made. However, when decisions are more complex, for example 
because risk information has to be inferred based on performance 
feedback, decision-making differences are observed until late 
adolescence. 
As described above psychophysiological measures can gain insight  into 
age related changes in cognitive processes in the absence of differences 
in behavior. This inspired the study described in Chapter 5 which aimed 
to test  the hypotheses that adolescent  decision-making is biased towards 
taking risks because of an increased sensitivity to possible rewards and 
immature cognitive control. In this experiment adolescents from three 
age groups (11-12-year-olds, 14-15-year-olds, and 17-18-year-olds) 
chose between high-risk and low-risk probabilistic gambles with 
varying magnitudes of reward. We modified the Cake Gambling Task to 
enable us to measure heart rate changes. In addition, in this experiment 
participants gambled with and for a monetary reward. Results showed 
that risk-taking decreased with age, and the HR data showed that 11-12-
year-olds showed a heightened sensitivity to rewards. Age-related 
changes in HR responses were related to the anticipation of the outcome 
of risky decisions, not  to the evaluation of outcomes. These findings 
support the hypothesis that a heightened sensitivity to rewards 
contributes to adolescent  risk-taking, and suggest  that developmental 
changes are related to the way adolescents weigh the potential reward 
when they make a decision. These results fit  well with recent theories 
on adolescent risk-taking, described in more detail in the next section. 
8.4 The adolescent brain: Control and emotion out of balance 
In Chapter 6 we directly tested the hypothesis that  reward related and 
control related brain regions follow different  developmental trajectories 
in an fMRI experiment. Participants chose between Low-Risk gambles 
associated with a high probability of obtaining a small reward (1 Euro) 
and High-Risk gambles associated with a smaller probability of 
obtaining a higher reward (2, 4, 6, or 8 Euro). We examined brain 
activation patterns during choice selection and outcome processing in 
participants from four age groups (pre-pubertal children, early 
adolescents, older adolescents and young adults). Behavioral findings 
showed similar behavior across age groups; participants in all age 
groups were more willing to take a risk when the potential reward was 
higher. But, with age risk-taking decreased for low rewards. The fMRI 
results confirmed that High-Risk choices were associated with 
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activation in VMPFC, whereas Low-Risk choices were associated with 
activation in lateral PFC. Activation in dorsal ACC showed a linear 
decrease with age, whereas activation in VMPFC showed an inverted-U 
shaped developmental pattern, with a peak in adolescence. Gain 
following High-Risk choices was associated with activation in the 
VMPFC and VS, and this VS activation peaked in adolescence. These 
results support the hypothesis that  risky behavior in adolescence follows 
from an imbalance caused by different  developmental trajectories of 
reward related and regulatory brain circuitry. We argue that in future 
studies adolescent development should be examined in terms of the 
interplay between subsystems, rather than the development of single 
mechanisms. 
8.5 Conclusions and future directions
The two theoretical accounts presented in Chapter 1 provide different 
predictions with respect to the development of risk-taking behavior. 
Behavioral changes in risk taking across development, are sometimes 
described in terms of a linear decrease as a consequence of increasing 
cognitive control from childhood to adulthood (Crone & Van der 
Molen, 2004; Reyna & Ellis, 1994), and sometimes in terms of a peak 
in adolescence as a consequence of heightened arousal in this 
developmental phase (Arnett, 1992; Steinberg, 2004). The research 
presented in this thesis supports the hypothesis that  risky behavior in 
adolescence follows from an imbalance caused by different 
developmental trajectories of motivational and regulatory brain circuitry 
(Casey, Getz & Galvan, 2008; Galvan et  al. 2006; Steinberg 2008). We 
argue that recent  theories based on these insights from  developmental 
neuroimaging studies provide a framework for understanding risky 
behavior in adolescence that enables these perspectives to be integrated 
and can account  for the inconsistent findings in the literature. Because 
risky behavior has been difficult  to measure in a laboratory context, 
psychophysiological and neuroImaging approaches have been 
particularly valuable. These techniques have helped gain insight into 
cognitive processes that could not be observed on a behavioral level. 
Taken together, the studies in this thesis suggest that  adolescents risky 
behavior is the consequence of increased sensitivity to rewards, paired 
with immature cognitive control abilities. This conclusion is consistent 
with recent theories which suggest  that reward related and cognitive 
control related brain systems are complimentary, and together produce 
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decision-making. The first, evolutionary older, system builds on 
subcortical structures that  have been linked to the processing of 
emotionally salient information, such as the amygdala and the nucleus 
accumbens (Ernst  et al., 2005; Galvan et al., 2006) and VMPFC, 
whereas the second, evolutionary younger, system that is important  for 
the control of impulses builds on cortical brain regions, including the 
lateral PFC/OFC and the ACC (Adolphs, 2003). Age related differences 
in risk-taking are proposed to be associated with the different patterns 
of functional development followed by these two brain systems (Casey 
et al., 2008; Rivers, Reyna & Mills, 2008; Steinberg, 2008). These 
differential developmental patterns produce a fragile balance between 
impulses and control in adolescence. We argue that during development 
both systems contribute to decision-making, but that behavior is 
dependent on the relative strength of each system in a given situation.
 
Figure 8.1 Schematic representation of the relative contributions of cognitive 
control and emotion/arousal brain systems to decision-making across 
development.  The grey border depicts the difference between both systems in 
adolescence. Figure A. shows the pattern of brain activation of control relative 
to emotion arousal regions in neutral conditions,where cognitive control is 
sufficient to prevent risk-taking; Figure B.shows the same pattern in conditions 
of increased emotion/arousal, when immature cognitive control abilities cannot 
prevent risk-taking.
Figure 8.1A shows a schematic representation of the contribution of 
both systems as a function of age in an emotionally neutral situation 
(such as often seen in laboratory tasks). In this situation emotion and 
cognitive control are balanced, and the model would predict  a linear 
decrease in risk-taking behavior with age, as a consequence of a linear 
increase in cognitive control abilities. Figure 8.1B shows the situations 
in which the balance is disturbed, because either the emotion-arousal 
network is overactive relative to the control network (as in everyday 
arousing situations for example in the presence of peers), or because the 
immature cognitive control abilities are insufficient  to cope with task 
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requirements (as for example when complex decisions have to be 
made). In these situations we predict a peak in risk-taking in 
adolescence.
Previous studies examining the development of risk-taking in 
adolescence have used different tasks and methods, and the integration 
of these methods (including laboratory and real-life assessments, and 
cognitive, emotional and social task manipulations) is necessary for a 
full understanding of this phase in development. Adolescence is a 
unique developmental period that can be characterised by different 
types of developmental stages. For example, teens can be pre-pubertal, 
pubertal or post-pubertal, and from a cognitive and social perspective, 
teens can be referred to as in early, middle, or late adolescence. These 
distinct stages should be recognized, and studied in order to further 
disentangle the effects of puberty related hormonal changes and brain 
maturation.
A recent study illustrates the importance of taking these changes into 
account, and shows the benefits of using a theoretical approach based 
on the assessment of cognitive processes that are important in the 
development  of decision-making in terms of their developmental time 
course and psychophysiological manifestation. During adolescence, 
friendships change and peers become more and more important. For 
example, more and more time is spent in the presence of peers than in 
the presence of parents. It  has been suggested that  the opinions of peers 
become more important as well (Harris, 1995). In an experimental study 
on the influence of peers on adolescent risk-taking, adolescents (13-16-
years-old), young adults (18-22-years-old), and adults (24-years-old) 
played a risk-taking game in the presence of peers and alone (Gardner 
& Steinberg, 2005). This study showed a disproportionate increase in 
the number of risky decisions in the presence of peers in adolescents, 
not adults. It  could be that in this task the presence of peers, or the need 
to fit in, influenced the emotion and arousal brain network in 
adolescents to such an extent that  it  led to risk-taking. This illustrates 
that because of differences in brain function, a situation that would 
seem risky to adults could be perceived differently by adolescents. For 
example, because of the presence of friends, the same situation might  be 
perceived as fun by adolescents and scary by adults.
Even though neuroimaging has provided strong evidence for 
developmental change in brain structure and function and has vastly 
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increased our understanding of child development, many questions still 
remain to be answered. One of the major limitations of current fMRI 
research is the limited ability to explain individual differences in 
behavior. For example, the results described in Chapter 6 show that 
differences in risk-taking propensity in the task modulated brain 
activation in all age groups. Unfortunately, traditional fMRI analyses do 
not have enough power to draw conclusions about individuals 
(Logothetis, 2008; Poldrack, 2006). Even though many cognitive 
functions have been mapped onto specific brain regions, this does not 
mean that these regions are uniquely responsible for these functions. 
Conventional fMRI analyses do not allow us to infer from brain 
activation in a specific region, what  cognitive process takes place. 
Using the traditional analysis methods available today we cannot 
predict if an adolescent is at  a heightened risk based on their brain 
activation, because activation in a particular region for an individual 
could be different from the average of the group. Future studies should 
take these individual differences into account, in particular in the 
context of studies on development. Individual differences in 
performance as well as patterns of brain activation are especially large 
in children and adolescents. The studies described in this thesis, and the 
potential consequences of adolescent risky behavior underline the 
importance of further research. We argue that it  will be important  for 
future studies to take individual differences into account, and strive for 
a more detailed understanding of the relation between patterns of brain 
activation and cognition. The first  studies aimed at resolving this issue 
are currently under way.
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Samenvatting en Conclusies
De adolescentie is een fascinerende levensfase. In een relatief korte 
periode, ongeveer tussen het  tiende en twintigste levensjaar, veranderen 
kinderen langzaam maar zeker in volwassenen. Deze transformatie gaat 
gepaard met grote veranderingen in het uiterlijk, het  psychosociaal en 
cognitief functioneren en het  gedrag. Eén van de veranderingen die de 
adolescentie kenmerken is een toename in risicovol gedrag. In de 
context van dit  proefschrift definiëren we risicovol gedrag als gedrag 
dat mogelijke negatieve gevolgen heeft. Dit  is een brede definitie en 
deze negatieve gevolgen kunnen variëren van vervelend tot zeer ernstig. 
We weten bijvoorbeeld dat adolescenten vergeleken met kinderen en 
volwassenen, een grotere behoefte aan spanning en sensatie rapporteren. 
Bovendien piekt het  aantal behandelingen op de eerste hulp afdeling 
van ziekenhuizen als gevolg van bijvoorbeeld ongelukken of overmatig 
alcoholgebruik in de adolescentie. Het in dit proefschrift beschreven 
onderzoek had tot  doel meer inzicht  te krijgen in risicovol gedrag in de 
adolescentie, door de ontwikkeling van het  vermogen beslissingen te 
nemen in relatie tot de ontwikkeling van de hersenen te bestuderen.
De ontwikkeling van technieken om de structuur en functies van de 
hersenen in kaart  te brengen, zoals Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) 
en functionele MRI (fMRI), hebben de laatste jaren bijgedragen aan een 
grote toename in de kennis over de ontwikkeling van de hersenen. Deze 
kennis heeft geleid tot nieuwe inzichten in de veranderingen in gedrag 
gedurende de adolescentie. MRI is een niet-invasieve techniek en 
daarom ook geschikt  voor onderzoek bij kinderen en jongeren. Recent 
grootschalig longitudinaal MRI onderzoek in de Verenigde Staten naar 
de ontwikkeling van de structuur van de hersenen van kinderen en 
adolescenten tussen de 4 en 22 jaar oud heeft  aangetoond dat de 
ontwikkelingsgerelateerde veranderingen in de structuur van de 
hersenen gedurende de adolescentie omvangrijker zijn dan lange tijd 
werd gedacht (Gogtay et al., 2004) en dat deze veranderingen niet in 
alle hersengebieden met dezelfde snelheid plaatsvinden. 
 
De hersenen zijn opgebouwd uit  grijze stof (de cellichamen en 
dendrieten van neuronen) en witte stof (deze bevat de in myeline 
ingebedde axonen van neuronen en vormt de verbinding tussen de grijze 
stof gebieden). De witte stof neemt lineair toe tot  in de volwassenheid, 
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terwijl de ontwikkeling van grijze stof volgens een omgekeerde U-vorm 
verloopt  (Giedd et al., 1999). Het  aantal neuronen en de verbindingen 
tussen deze neuronen neemt  toe vanaf de geboorte en piekt aan het 
begin van de adolescentie. Vanaf dit moment  neemt de hoeveelheid 
grijze stof weer af. Neuronen en verbindingen tussen neuronen die niet 
noodzakelijk zijn verdwijnen en de belangrijke verbindingen worden 
versterkt. 
De ontwikkeling van fMRI heeft het mogelijk gemaakt niet  alleen de 
structuur van de hersenen, maar ook de werking van de hersenen te 
bestuderen. Omdat fMRI ook geschikt  is voor onderzoek bij kinderen 
en jongeren beschikken we voor het eerst in de geschiedenis over een 
techniek waarmee we de werkende hersenen in beeld kunnen brengen 
bij deze leeftijdsgroepen. De laatste jaren is op deze manier het 
ontwikkelende brein steeds beter in kaart  gebracht en zijn belangrijke 
verschillen ontdekt  in de patronen van hersenactiviteit tussen kinderen, 
adolescenten en volwassenen. In sommige gevallen vertonen kinderen 
en volwassenen hetzelfde gedrag, maar blijken er wel verschillen te zijn 
in de processen in de hersenen die ten grondslag liggen aan dit  gedrag. 
Recent  fMRI onderzoek, waaronder ook het in dit  proefschrift 
beschreven onderzoek heeft op deze manier bijgedragen aan een beter 
begrip van risicovol gedrag in de adolescentie.
In Hoofdstuk 1 worden twee in de literatuur heersende mogelijke 
verklaringen voor risicovol gedrag in de adolescentie beschreven. De 
eerste verklaring richt  zich op de ontwikkeling van cognitieve controle. 
Met  cognitieve controle worden een aantal fundamentele mentale 
processen bedoeld die ons in staat stellen ons gedrag te controleren en 
doelgericht te handelen. Van deze processen zoals werkgeheugen (het 
vermogen informatie in een actieve staat  vast te houden en te 
bewerken), selectieve aandacht  (het vermogen onze aandacht te richten 
op een aspect van de omgeving en tegelijkertijd andere aspecten te 
negeren) en inhibitie (het vermogen irrelevante gedachten en gedrag te 
onderdrukken) is aangetoond dat ze pas een volwassen niveau bereiken 
tijdens de adolescentie. Een toename van cognitieve controle wordt 
verondersteld te leiden tot  een verbetering van het vermogen 
beslissingen te nemen en hierdoor tot een afname van risicovol gedrag. 
Deze eerste verklaring veronderstelt dat  adolescenten eerder geneigd 
zijn risico te nemen omdat  ze nog onvoldoende in staat zijn om hun 
gedrag te controleren.  
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De tweede verklaring richt  zich op emotionele/motivationele processen, 
en veronderstelt dat adolescenten risicovol gedrag vertonen omdat  ze 
vergeleken met  kinderen en volwassenen, sterker reageren op de 
mogelijke positieve gevolgen die met  het nemen van een risico 
geassocieerd zijn. 
In dit  proefschrift worden experimenten beschreven die aan de 
ontwikkeling gerelateerde veranderingen in drie cognitieve processen 
onderzoeken; het vermogen de kans op winst  in te schatten, het 
vermogen de mogelijke positieve en negatieve gevolgen die 
geassocieerd zijn met een risico tegen elkaar af te wegen, en processen 
die belangrijk zijn voor cognitieve controle. Hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 7 
beschrijven studies naar ontwikkelingsveranderingen in de processen 
die de bouwstenen vormen van het meer complexe vermogen 
beslissingen te nemen. Hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6 beschrijven studies naar 
deze meer complexe beslissingen en verkennen mogelijke 
veranderingen in de relatieve bijdrage van de gevoeligheid voor 
beloning en cognitieve controle bij het  nemen van beslissingen 
gedurende de ontwikkeling van de late kindertijd tot de volwassenheid. 
De in dit  proefschrift  beschreven resultaten laten zien dat  kennis over de 
ontwikkeling van de hersenen, en leeftijdsgerelateerde veranderingen in 
de functie van de hersenen kan bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling van 
modellen die proberen risicovol gedrag in de adolescentie te verklaren. 
Zo blijkt bijvoorbeeld dat  gebaseerd op nieuwe, met behulp van fMRI 
studies verkregen, inzichten risicogedrag in de adolescentie kan worden 
verklaard als het  gevolg van een verschil in het  ontwikkelingstraject van 
belonings- en cognitieve controle gerelateerde netwerken in de 
hersenen. Een toename in de gevoeligheid voor beloningen vroeg in de 
adolescentie wordt verondersteld tieners aan te zetten tot het  nemen van 
risico's; terwijl het  vermogen deze impulsen te controleren pas laat in de 
adolescentie volledig ontwikkeld is.
De ontwikkeling van de neurale correlaten van basisprocessen die 
betrokken zijn bij beslissingsgedrag.
Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft  een fMRI studie waarin we 9- tot 12-jarigen en 
jong volwassenen vroegen kansen in te schatten. In dit  experiment 
vroegen we deelnemers om zoveel mogelijk punten te winnen door 
steeds de meest  waarschijnlijke van twee onzekere uitkomsten te 
kiezen. We ontwikkelden voor dit  doel een taak waarbij deelnemers 
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taarten te zien kregen die bestonden uit bruine stukken (chocoladetaart) 
en roze stukken (aardbeientaart) in verschillende verhoudingen. Bij 
iedere keuze kon een punt worden gewonnen of verloren. Er waren 
makkelijke keuzes (1 of 2 stukken hadden een contrasterende kleur) en 
moeilijkere keuzes (3 of 4 stukken hadden een contrasterende kleur). 
Zowel 9-12 jarige kinderen als jong volwassenen waren goed in staat  de 
meest  waarschijnlijke uitkomst te kiezen. We onderzochten bij iedere 
beslissing de activiteit in de hersenen op het  moment  dat de deelnemers 
hun keuze maakten en op het moment dat ze de uitkomst van hun keuze 
zagen. Dit was het eerste fMRI experiment waarin bij kinderen jonger 
dan 12 de werking van de hersenen tijdens het nemen van beslissingen 
voor een beloning werd onderzocht. Bij kinderen en jong volwassenen 
bleken grotendeels dezelfde hersengebieden betrokken te zijn bij het 
uitvoeren van deze taak, maar er waren ook verschillen tussen de 
leeftijdsgroepen. Zo was bij alle deelnemers een gebied in het  voorste 
gedeelte van de hersenen dat  geassocieerd is met cognitieve controle, de 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), meer actief bij de moeilijke 
beslissingen dan bij de makkelijke beslissingen. Het  verschil in 
activiteit bij deze verschillende typen beslissingen was echter groter 
voor de 9-12 jarigen. Dit suggereert dat zij een groter beroep moesten 
doen op cognitieve controleprocessen bij de moeilijke keuzes dan de 
volwassenen, zelfs al maakten ze uiteindelijk dezelfde keuze. Twee 
andere gebieden die in eerdere studies bij volwassenen al betrokken 
bleken bij het nemen van beslissingen, de Dorsolaterale Prefrontale 
Cortex (DLPFC) en Orbitofrontale Cortex (OFC) waren ook in deze 
studie meer actief bij moeilijke keuzes ten opzichte van makkelijke 
keuzes. Maar de activiteit  in deze gebieden verschilde niet tussen 
kinderen en volwassenen. Er was wel een verschil in hersenactiviteit 
tussen de leeftijdsgroepen op het  moment dat  deelnemers de uitkomst 
van hun beslissingen te zien kregen. Het laterale gedeelte van de OFC 
was meer actief bij verlies ten opzichte van winst bij kinderen, bij 
volwassenen was dit  verschil er niet. We interpreteerden dit  resultaat  als 
een aanwijzing dat  kinderen verlies als vervelender ervoeren dan 
volwassenen.
Verdere ondersteuning voor het  idee dat  cognitieve controle ontwikkeld 
gedurende de adolescentie wordt beschreven in Hoofdstuk 7. Dit 
hoofdstuk beschrijft een studie naar de ontwikkeling van het 
werkgeheugen voor object- en ruimtelijke informatie. Ook wordt de 
verwerking van feedback over de prestatie en het monitoren van het 
gedrag onderzocht. Werkgeheugen, het vermogen feedback te 
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verwerken en het vermogen het  eigen gedrag te monitoren zijn 
belangrijke componenten van cognitieve controle. In dit  experiment 
bestudeerden we niet  alleen het gedrag van de deelnemers, maar 
onderzochten we ook veranderingen in de hartslag. Deze veranderingen 
kunnen een indicatie geven van cognitieve processen die niet op grond 
van gedrag te meten zijn. We vroegen deelnemers uit 4 leeftijdsgroepen 
(6–7, 9–10, 11–12 en 18–26 jaar) object- en ruimtelijke informatie te 
onthouden en gaven ze feedback over hun prestatie. Uit de resultaten 
bleek dat  het  werkgeheugen voor ruimtelijke informatie sneller 
ontwikkelt dan dat voor object  informatie. Het werkgeheugen voor 
ruimtelijke informatie van deelnemers vanaf 11 jaar was al even goed 
als dat  van volwassenen, terwijl het werkgeheugen voor object 
informatie nog geen volwassen niveau had bereikt op 12-jarige leeftijd 
en nog gedurende de adolescentie verbeterde. De hartslagresultaten 
lieten zien dat  ook het vermogen het eigen gedrag te monitoren toenam 
gedurende de adolescentie. De hartslag vertraagde nadat deelnemers een 
fout  hadden gemaakt. Deze vertraging wordt gezien als een effect van 
een toename in de betrokkenheid van cognitieve capaciteit, en deze was 
groter in volwassenen dan in kinderen. De hartslagreactie had 
bovendien bij de 11-12-jarigen nog geen volwassen niveau bereikt, wat 
opnieuw suggereert dat  het  vermogen de eigen prestatie te monitoren 
gedurende de adolescentie toeneemt.  
Het  tweede belangrijke basisproces dat een rol speelt in theorieën over 
risicogedrag in de adolescentie is de aan de ontwikkeling gerelateerde 
verandering in de gevoeligheid voor beloningen. Eerdere studies 
hebben gevonden dan het  systeem in de hersenen dat belangrijk is voor 
het verwerken van beloningen meer actief is in adolescenten (Ernst et 
al., 2005; May et  al., 2004), of juist  minder actief (Bjork et  al., 2004). 
Deze schijnbaar tegenstrijdige bevindingen maken het moeilijker de 
oorzaken van risicovol gedrag in de adolescentie te begrijpen. De 
interpretatie van deze resultaten wordt bemoeilijkt door grote 
verschillen in de gebruikte taken en het  beroep dat deze taken doen op 
de deelnemers. Het is bijvoorbeeld mogelijk dat  adolescenten een 
andere strategie gebruiken dan volwassenen om dezelfde taak uit  te 
voeren, dit  zou de vergelijking tussen deelnemers van verschillende 
leeftijden bemoeilijken. Ook is het mogelijk dat  adolescenten een risico 
als minder groot of een beloning als groter ervaren dan volwassenen. 
Om fundamentele verschillen in het  systeem in de hersenen dat 
belangrijk is voor de verwerking van beloningen te onderzoeken en 
tegelijkertijd deze problemen in de interpretatie te voorkomen deden we 
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een tweede fMRI experiment waarin we een passieve taak gebruikten 
(Hoofdstuk 3). We vroegen 10-12-, 14-15- en 18-23-jarige deelnemers 
in een fMRI scanner te kijken naar drie gokkasten. Door op een knop 
drukten startten deelnemers de gokkasten, en verscheen er 
achtereenvolgens in iedere gokkast  een plaatje. Wanneer alle drie de 
plaatjes gelijk waren (bijvoorbeeld wanneer drie keer een plaatje van 
een kiwi verscheen) wonnen zij een klein geldbedrag. Het is belangrijk 
op te merken dat in deze taak beloningen niet afhankelijk waren van het 
gedrag of de beslissingen van de deelnemer, en eventuele verschillen in 
de activiteit in het beloningssysteem in de hersenen dus niet 
samenhangen met verschillen in gedrag of strategieën. De resultaten van 
deze studie lieten verschillen tussen adolescenten en jong volwassenen 
zien tijdens het  wachten op mogelijke winst en tijdens het verwerken 
van uitgekeerde winst. In beide situaties waren gebieden in de hersenen 
die belangrijk zijn voor het verwerken van beloningen actief. Deze 
gebieden, waaronder het  voorste gedeelte van de Insula, en in de 
nucleus accumbens (NAcc) in het ventrale gedeelte van het striatum 
(VS), waren meer actief bij de 10-12 en 14-15-jarige adolescenten dan 
bij volwassenen. De hersenen van volwassenen reageerden anders. Bij 
hen vonden we vooral dat  gebieden in de prefrontale cortex (PFC) actief 
waren; de OFC was alleen in volwassenen actief wanneer verwachtte 
winst  uitbleef. Deze resultaten ondersteunen de hypothese dat  gebieden 
in de hersenen die belangrijk zijn voor het verwerken van beloningen 
actiever zijn in de adolescentie.
Samengenomen ondersteunen de resultaten van de in de hoofdstukken 2 
en 7 beschreven experimenten de hypothese dat cognitieve controle 
functies tijdens de adolescentie nog ontwikkelingsveranderingen laten 
zien. De resultaten van het  in hoofdstuk 3 beschreven experiment 
suggereren dat   er fundamentele verschillen zijn in de manier waarop 
beloningsgebieden in de hersenen, in het bijzonder in het VS, reageren 
in het midden van de adolescentie. Deze resultaten vormden de basis 
voor de experimenten die in de hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6 zijn beschreven. 
In deze experimenten waren beloningen wel afhankelijk van het  gedrag 
van de deelnemers en speelden zowel de gevoeligheid voor beloningen 
als cognitieve controle een rol bij het nemen van beslissingen.   
Ontwikkeling van het vermogen beslissingen te  nemen in risicovolle 
situaties; relatieve bijdragen  van cognitieve controle  en gevoeligheid 
voor beloningen
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Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft een gedragsstudie waarin gebruik werd gemaakt 
van een aangepaste versie van het  paradigma dat in Hoofdstuk 2 werd 
gebruikt. In deze versie van de taak werden zowel de kans op winst als 
de grootte van de beloning waarmee gegokt  kon worden gemanipuleerd. 
We vroegen deelnemers uit  5 leeftijdsgroepen (8-9, 11-12, 14-15, 17-18, 
25-30 jaar) te proberen zoveel mogelijk punten te winnen door 
herhaaldelijk te kiezen tussen een gok met  een hoog risico en een lage 
kans op een groot  aantal punten of een gok met  een laag risico en een 
grotere kans op één punt. We probeerden te controleren voor 
leeftijdsgerelateerde verschillen in werkgeheugencapaciteit die de taak 
relatief moeilijker zou kunnen maken voor jongere deelnemers door alle 
informatie die nodig was om een beslissing te nemen op het scherm te 
tonen bij iedere keuze. Om deze reden was het  voor deelnemers niet 
nodig om voor hun beslissingen relevante informatie te onthouden of 
ontdekken tijdens het uitvoeren van de taak. In eerdere studies waarin 
gevonden werd dat het  vermogen beslissingen te nemen tot  de late 
adolescentie toeneemt werd hier niet voor gecontroleerd (Crone & Van 
der Molen, 2004; Hooper, Luciana, Conklin & Yarger, 2004). Anders 
dan in deze eerdere studies vonden wij geen verschillen in prestatie 
tussen de leeftijdsgroepen. Dit suggereert dat in een situatie waarin alle 
informatie die nodig is om een beslissing te nemen beschikbaar is, het 
vermogen kansen in te schatten en mogelijke beloningen af te wegen al 
op volwassen niveau is in kinderen van 8 jaar oud. Deze bevindingen 
suggereren dat  risicovol gedrag in de adolescentie niet  het  gevolg is van 
een onvermogen om beslissingen en de mogelijke gevolgen daarvan te 
begrijpen. Maar, wanneer beslissingen meer complex zijn, bijvoorbeeld 
omdat risico-informatie moet  worden geleerd op basis van feedback 
over het gedrag zijn verschillen in prestatie tot in de late adolescentie te 
zien.
Zoals hierboven al beschreven kunnen psychofysiologische maten 
inzicht  geven in leeftijdsgerelateerde veranderingen in cognitieve 
processen wanneer deze niet  op grond van het gedrag te meten zijn. Dit 
gegeven was de aanleiding voor het  in Hoofdstuk 5 beschreven 
experiment. In dit experiment  toetsen we de hypothese dat adolescenten 
eerder risicovolle beslissingen nemen omdat ze gevoeliger zijn voor 
mogelijke beloningen en omdat  ze over onvolwassen cognitieve 
controle vaardigheden beschikken. Aan dit  experiment namen 
adolescenten uit drie leeftijdsgroepen deel (11-12, 14-15 en 17-18 jaar). 
We vroegen hen ook in deze studie herhaaldelijk te kiezen tussen een 
gok met  een hoog risico of laag risico en varieerden de hoogte van de 
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beloning die gewonnen kon worden. We pasten de Taarten Goktaak aan 
om het  mogelijk te maken hartslagveranderingen te meten, en we lieten 
de deelnemers in dit experiment spelen om Euro's in plaats van punten. 
De resultaten van deze studie lieten zien dat de bereidheid risico te 
nemen afnam met leeftijd. Bovendien lieten de hartslagdata een 
verhoogde reactie op beloningen zien in 11-12-jarigen. Deze 
leeftijdsgerelateerde verschillen in de hartslagreactie werden gevonden 
tijdens de anticipatie op de uitkomst  van risicovolle beslissingen, niet 
tijdens het  verwerken van die uitkomst. De resultaten van deze studie 
ondersteunen opnieuw het  idee dat een verhoogde gevoeligheid voor 
mogelijke beloningen bijdraagt aan het  nemen van risico's in de 
adolescentie en suggereren dat  leeftijdsgerelateerde veranderingen 
samenhangen met de manier waarop adolescenten mogelijke beloningen 
verwerken op het moment  dat ze een beslissing nemen. Dit idee sluit 
aan bij recente theorieën over risicogedrag in de adolescentie die in het 
volgende gedeelte verder zullen worden besproken.  
Het adolescentenbrein: Controle en emotie uit balans
In Hoofdstuk 6 werd de hypothese dat beloningsgebieden en 
controlegebieden verschillende ontwikkelingstrajecten volgen getoetst 
in een fMRI experiment. Deelnemers kozen tussen een laagrisico gok 
waarmee ze een grote kans hadden op het winnen van een kleine 
beloning (1 Euro) en een hoogrisico gok waarmee ze een kleine kans 
hadden op een grotere beloning (2, 4, 6 of 8 Euro). We bestudeerden 
opnieuw de hersenactiviteit op het  moment dat  de keuze werd gemaakt 
en op het moment dat  de uitkomst werd verwerkt  bij deelnemers uit  4 
leeftijdsgroepen (8-10, 12-14, 16-17 en 19-25 jaar). Het  gedrag van de 
deelnemers was vergelijkbaar in de verschillende leeftijdsgroepen; in 
alle leeftijdsgroepen waren deelnemers meer bereid risico te nemen 
wanneer de mogelijke beloning die daarmee gewonnen kon worden 
hoog was dan wanneer die laag was. Maar, voor keuzes waarbij de 
mogelijke beloning klein was, nam de bereidheid een groot risico te 
nemen af met  leeftijd. De fMRI resultaten bevestigden dat hoogrisico 
keuzes geassocieerd waren met activiteit  in de ventromediale PFC 
(VMPFC), terwijl laagrisico keuzes geassocieerd waren met activiteit in 
de laterale PFC. Activiteit van het dorsale gedeelte van de ACC liet  een 
lineaire afname met leeftijd zien, terwijl VMPFC activiteit een piek 
vertoonde in de adolescentie. Winst  na hoogrisico keuzes hing samen 
met activiteit  in de VMPFC en het VS, en deze VS activiteit  piekte in de 
adolescentie. Deze resultaten ondersteunen de hypothese dat risicovol 
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gedrag in de adolescentie voortvloeit uit een disbalans die het gevolg is 
van verschillende ontwikkelingstrajecten van belonings- en 
controlegebieden in de hersenen. We stellen dat in toekomstige studies 
ontwikkelingsveranderingen in de adolescentie als het gevolg van 
veranderingen in het samenspel van subsystemen in de hersenen en niet 
als het  gevolg van de ontwikkeling van aparte mechanismen zouden 
moeten worden bestudeerd.
Conclusies en toekomstperspectief
De twee theorieën die in Hoofdstuk 1 zijn beschreven leiden tot 
verschillende voorspellingen over de ontwikkeling van risicovol gedrag. 
Het  eerste perspectief voorspelt  dat  risicovol gedrag in de adolescentie 
een lineaire afname laat zien als gevolg van een toename van cognitieve 
controle van de kindertijd tot  in de volwassenheid, terwijl het  tweede 
perspectief een piek in risicovol gedrag in de adolescentie voorspelt die 
het gevolg is van een toename van de emotionele/motivationele 
processen in deze fase van de ontwikkeling.
Het  in dit  proefschrift  beschreven onderzoek ondersteunt de hypothese 
dat risico gedrag in de adolescentie het gevolg is van een onbalans in de 
hersenen die voortvloeit  uit  de verschillende ontwikkelingstrajecten die 
worden gevolgd door hersengebieden die belangrijk zijn voor het 
motiveren  van gedrag aan de ene kant, en gebieden die belangrijk zijn 
voor het reguleren van gedrag aan de andere kant. We stellen dat recente 
theorieën die gebaseerd zijn op neuro-imaging onderzoek bij kinderen 
en jongeren een raamwerk kunnen vormen waarbinnen verschillende 
theorieën over risicovol gedrag in de adolescentie kunnen worden 
verenigd en schijnbaar tegenstrijdige bevindingen in de literatuur 
kunnen worden verklaard. Omdat het  tot nu toe lastig is gebleken 
risicovol gedrag in een laboratorium context  te onderzoeken is 
onderzoek waarbij gebruik wordt gemaakt  van psychofysiologische 
maten of technieken waarmee het brein in beeld kan worden gebracht 
erg waardevol gebleken. Deze technieken hebben het mogelijk gemaakt 
veranderingen in de ontwikkeling te bestuderen die niet  op basis van 
gedrag zichtbaar zijn.
Samengevat, veronderstellen de studies die in dit  proefschrift worden 
beschreven dat  risicovol gedrag in de adolescentie het  gevolg is van een 
toename in de gevoeligheid voor beloningen, samen met een langzame 
ontwikkeling van cognitieve controle. Deze conclusie is consistent  met 
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recente theorieën die veronderstellen dat belonings- en cognitieve 
controle systemen in de hersenen complementair zijn en samen 
bijdragen aan het  tot  stand komen van beslissingen. Het 
beloningssysteem is evolutionair gezien ouder en bouwt  op subcorticale 
structuren in de hersenen zoals de NAcc, de Amygdala en het 
ventromediale gedeelte van de PFC, waarvan bekend is dat  ze een rol 
spelen bij de verwerking van emotioneel geladen informatie. Het 
tweede, evolutionair jongere systeem dat  belangrijk is voor de controle 
van impulsen bouwt op corticale gebieden waaronder de laterale PFC en 
de ACC. Leeftijdsgerelateerde verschillen in risico gedrag worden 
verondersteld het gevolg te zijn van de verschillende patronen van 
functionele ontwikkeling die door deze twee systemen in het  brein 
worden gevolgd.
Deze verschillende ontwikkelingspatronen hebben een kwetsbare balans 
tussen impulsen en controle in de adolescentie tot  gevolg. We stellen dat 
gedurende de ontwikkeling beide systemen bijdragen aan het  nemen 
van beslissingen, maar dat  het uiteindelijke gedrag afhankelijk is van de 
relatieve sterkte van ieder systeem in een bepaalde situatie. In Figuur 
1A is een schematische weergave te zien van de bijdrage van beide 
systemen gedurende de ontwikkeling in een emotioneel neutrale situatie 
(zoals we bijvoorbeeld zien in het laboratorium tijdens een experiment). 
Figuur 1 Schematische weergave van de relatieve bijdrage van cognitieve 
controle en emotie/arousal systemen in de hersenen aan beslissingsgedrag 
gedurende de ontwikkeling. Het grijze kader geeft het verschil tussen beide 
systemen in de periode van de adolescentie weer. In Figuur A. is het patroon 
van hersenactiviteit van controle- ten opzichte van emotie/arousal gebieden te 
zien in een neutrale context; In dit geval is de cognitieve controle toereikend 
om risicogedrag te voorkomen. In Figuur B is hetzelfde patroon te zien, in een 
meer emotionele context. In dit geval kan risicovol gedrag niet worden 
voorkomen door ontoereikende cognitieve controle.
In deze situatie zijn emotie en cognitieve controle in balans, en 
voorspelt  het model een lineaire afname in risicogedrag met  leeftijd, als 
gevolg van een lineaire toename in  cognitieve controle. In Figuur 1B is 
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een situatie te zien waarin er sprake is van onbalans, omdat het emotie 
netwerk relatief actiever is dan het controle netwerk (zoals we vaak zien 
in spannende situaties buiten het laboratorium), of omdat  het 
onvolwassen controle netwerk ontoereikend is (bijvoorbeeld wanneer 
beslissingen erg complex zijn). In deze situaties voorspellen we een 
piek in risicogedrag in de adolescentie.
Eerdere studies naar de ontwikkeling van risicogedrag in de 
adolescentie maakten gebruik van verschillende taken en methoden, en 
het integreren van deze methoden (zoals onderzoek in een laboratorium 
of in het  dagelijks leven en de manipulatie van cognitieve, emotionele 
en sociale factoren in gebruikte taken) is nodig om deze fase in de 
ontwikkeling volledig te begrijpen. De adolescentie is een unieke 
periode in de ontwikkeling die op verschillende manieren kan worden 
gekenmerkt. Tieners kunnen bijvoorbeeld worden getypeerd als pre-
puberaal, puberaal of post-puberaal, of vanuit een cognitief en sociaal 
perspectief als in de vroege, midden of late adolescentie. Deze 
verschillende fasen zouden moeten worden erkend, en bestudeerd om de 
effecten van hormonale veranderingen die samenhangen met de 
puberteit en effecten die samenhangen met de ontwikkeling van de 
hersenen te kunnen onderscheiden.
Het  bestuderen van het ontwikkelingsverloop en de psychofysiologische 
uiting van cognitieve processen die belangrijk zijn voor de ontwikkeling 
van het vermogen beslissingen te nemen draagt  bij aan het  verfijnen van 
de theorie over ontwikkelingsveranderingen gedurende de adolescentie. 
Hierbij is het  belangrijk rekening te houden met  de eerder genoemde 
verschillende fasen binnen de periode van de adolescentie. Een recente 
studie illustreert  de voordelen van het toepassen van een dergelijke 
theoretische benadering. 
 
Gedurende de adolescentie veranderen vriendschappen en worden 
leeftijdgenoten belangrijker. Adolescenten brengen bijvoorbeeld steeds 
meer tijd door met  leeftijdgenoten dan met hun ouders, en de mening 
van leeftijdgenoten wordt belangrijker (Harris, 1995). In een experiment 
dat als doel had de invloed van leeftijdgenoten op risicogedrag in de 
adolescentie te meten, speelden adolescenten (van 13-16 aar oud), jong 
volwassenen (van 18-22 jaar oud) en volwassenen (24 jaar oud) een 
risico spel. Ze deden dit  alleen, of in het bijzijn van twee leeftijdgenoten 
(Gardner & Steinberg, 2005). Deze studie liet  zien dat er sprake was 
van een disproportionele toename in het nemen van risico in 
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aanwezigheid van leeftijdgenoten bij adolescenten, maar niet bij 
volwassenen. Mogelijk beïnvloedde de aanwezigheid van 
leeftijdgenoten, of de behoefte er bij te horen, het emotie/motivatie 
netwerk in de hersenen van adolescenten en leidde dit tot risicogedrag. 
Deze studie geeft ook een voorbeeld van een situatie waarin verschillen 
in de manier waarop het brein functioneert kunnen verklaren dat 
adolescenten dezelfde keuze die door volwassenen als risicovol wordt 
ervaren anders interpreteren. De aanwezigheid van vrienden leidde er in 
dit  voorbeeld mogelijk toe dat adolescenten de situatie vooral als leuk 
interpreteerden en volwassenen als gevaarlijk.
Hoewel onderzoek met beeldgevende technieken zoals MRI en fMRI 
heeft  gezorgd voor sterke ondersteuning van het  idee dat de structuur en 
werking van de hersenen verandert  gedurende de ontwikkeling, en heeft 
geleid tot  een grote toename van het  begrip van de ontwikkeling van 
kinderen, zijn er nog vele vragen niet beantwoord. Eén van de grootste 
beperkingen van het huidige fMRI onderzoek is het  beperkte vermogen 
individuele verschillen in gedrag te verklaren. Bijvoorbeeld, de in 
hoofdstuk 6 beschreven resultaten laten zien dat  verschillen in de 
bereidheid risico te nemen gerelateerd waren aan verschillen in 
patronen van hersenactiviteit  in alle leeftijdsgroepen. Maar helaas zijn 
de huidige analysetechnieken niet  in staat conclusies te trekken over 
individuen in die groepen (Logothetis, 2008; Poldrack, 2006). Hoewel 
inmiddels een groot aantal cognitieve functies gerelateerd zijn aan 
specifieke hersengebieden betekent  dit  niet  dat  deze gebieden ook 
uitsluitend bijdragen aan deze functies. Conventionele fMRI analyses 
maken het  niet  mogelijk om op grond van activiteit in een bepaald 
gebied te zeggen welk cognitief proces plaatsvindt. We zijn dus niet  in 
staat te voorspellen welke adolescent een verhoogd risico loopt op basis 
van zijn of haar hersenactiviteit. Activiteit in een bepaald gebied voor 
een individu kan afwijken van het gemiddelde van de groep. In 
toekomstig onderzoek zal het  belangrijk zijn rekening te houden met 
deze verschillen tussen individuen, met name in de context  van 
onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling. Juist in kinderen en adolescenten zijn 
individuele verschillen in zowel gedrag als patronen van hersenactiviteit 
groot. Het  in dit proefschrift  beschreven onderzoek en de mogelijke 
nadelige gevolgen van risicogedrag in de adolescentie onderstrepen het 
belang van verder onderzoek in de toekomst. Dit  toekomstig onderzoek 
zou rekening moeten houden met  individuele verschillen en zou moeten 
streven naar een beter begrip van de relatie tussen patronen van 
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hersenactiviteit en cognitieve processen. Inmiddels is met dit onderzoek 
een start gemaakt.
Summary in Dutch  | 197
198
References
Achenbach T. M., (1991) Manual for the Child Behavior Checklist/4-18  
 (CBCL). Burlington: University of Vermont, Department  of 
 Psychiatry.
Acredolo, C., O'Connor, J., Banks, L., & Horobin, K. (1989). Children's 
 ability to make  probability estimates: Skills revealed through 
 application of Anderson's functional measurement 
 methodology. Child Development, 60 (4), 933-945.
Adleman, N. E., Menon, V., Blasey, C. M., White, C. D., Warsofsky, I. 
 S., Glover, G. H., et al. (2002). A developmental fmri study of 
 the stroop color-word task. NeuroImage, 16, 61-75.
Adolphs, R. (2003). Cognitive neuroscience of human social behaviour. 
 Nature Reviews  Neuroscience, 4 (3), 165-178.
Alloway T. P. & Gathercole S. E. (2005). Working Memory and short-
 term sentence  recall in young children. European Journal of 
 Cognitive Psychology, 17, 207-220.
Alloway, T. P., Gathercole, S. E., & Pickering, S. J. (2006). Verbal and 
 visuo-spatial short-term and working memory in children: Are 
 they separable? Child Development, 77, 1698-1716.
Anderson, M. (2001). Annotation: Conceptions of intelligence. Journal 
 of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 42, 287-298.
Arnett, J. (1992). Reckless behavior in adolescence: A developmental 
 perspective. Developmental Reviews, 12, 391–409.
Arnett, J. J. (1996). Sensation seeking, aggressiveness, and adolescent 
 reckless behavior. Personality and Individual Differences, 20 
 (6), 693-702.
Arnett, J. J. (1999). Adolescent  storm and stress, reconsidered. The 
 American Psychologist, 54 (5), 317-326.
Aron, A. R., Shohamy, D., Clark, J., Myers, C., Gluck, M. A., & 
 Poldrack, R. A.  (2004). Human midbrain sensitivity to 
 cognitive feedback and uncertainty during classification 
 learning. Journal of Neurophysiology, 92, 1144-1152. 
Backs, R. W. & Seljos, K. A. (1994). Metabolic and cardiorespiratory 
 measures of mental effort: The effects of level of difficulty in a 
 work ing memory t a sk . In terna t iona l Journa l o f 
 Psychophysiology, 16, 57-68.
Baddeley, A. D. & Hitch, G. J. (1974). Working memory. In: G. Bower 
 (Ed.), The  psychology of learning and motivation: Advances in 
 research and theory (pp. 47-90). New York: Academic Press.
 References  | 199
Baddeley, A. D. & Logie, R. H. (1999). Working memory: the multiple 
 component model. In. A. Miyake & P. Shah (Eds.) Models of 
 Working Memory (pp. 28-61). New York: Cambridge 
 University Press.
Baddeley, A. D. (1992a). Working memory. Science, 255, 556-559.
Baddeley, A. D. (1992b). Is working memory working? The fifteenth 
 Bartlett Lecture. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
 Psychology, 44a, 1-31.
Baddeley, A. D., Emslie, H., Kolodny, J., & Duncan, J. (1998). Random 
 generation and  the executive control of working memory. The 
 Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 51a, 819-852.
Baddeley, A. D., Gathercole, S. E. & Papagno, C. (1998). The 
 phonological loop as a language learning device. 
 Psychological Review, 105, 158-173.
Baltes, P. B., Staudinger, U. M. & Lindenberger, U. (1999). Lifespan 
 psychology:
Barcelo, F. & Knight, R. T. (2002). Both random and perseverative 
 errors underlie  WCST deficits in prefrontal changes. 
 Neuropsychologia, 40, 349-356.
Barcelo, F. (1999). Electrophysiological evidence of two different  types 
 of error in the  Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. Cognitive 
 Neuroscience, 10, 1299-1303.
Barraclough, D. J., Conroy, M. L. & Lee, D. (2004). Prefrontal cortex 
 and decision making in a mixed-strategy game. Nature 
 Neuroscience, 7, 404-410.
Bayliss, D. M., Jarrold, C., Gunn, D. M., & Baddeley, A. D. (2003). The 
 complexities of  complex span: Explaining individual 
 differences in working memory in children and adults. Journal 
 of Experimental Psychology: General, 132, 71-92.
Bechara, A. (2001). Neurobiology of decision-making: Risk and reward. 
 Seminars in Clinical Neuropsychiatry, 6, 205–216.
Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H. & Anderson, S. W. (1994). 
 Insensitivity to  future consequences following damage to 
 human prefrontal cortex. Cognition, 50,  7-15.
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. R. (2000). Emotion, decision 
 making and the  orbitofrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 10 (3), 
 295-307.
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D & Anderson, S. W. (1998). 
 Dissociation of working memory from decision-making within 
 the human prefrontal cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, 18, 
 428-437.
200  | References
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Tranel, D. & Damasio, A. R. (1997). 
 Deciding advantageously before knowing the advantageous 
 strategy. Science, 275, 1293-1295
Bechara, A., Tranel, D. & Damasio, H. (2000). Characterization of the 
 decision-making deficit of patients with ventromedial prefrontal 
 cortex lesions. Brain, 123, 2189-2202.
Bechara, A., Tranel, D., Damasio, H. & Damasio, A.R. (1996). Failure 
 to respond autonomically to anticipated future outcomes 
 following damage to the prefrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 6, 
 215-225.
Belger, A., Puce, A., Krystal, J. H., Gore, J. C., Goldman-Rakic, P. & 
 McCarthy, G.  (1998). Dissociation of mnemonic and 
 perceptual processes during spatial and  nonspatial working 
 memory using fMRI. Human Brain Mapping, 6, 14-32.
Beyth-Marom, R. Austin, L., Fischhoff, B., Palmgren, C., Jacobs-
 Quadrel, M. (1993). Perceived consequences of risky behaviors: 
 Adults and adolescents.  Developmental Psychology, 29 (3), 
 549-563.
Bjork, J. M., Knutson, B., Fong, G. W., Caggiano, D. M., Bennett, S. 
 M., & Hommer, D. W. (2004). Incentive-elicited brain 
 activation in adolescents: Similarities and differences from 
 young adults. Journal of Neuroscience, 24, 1793-1802.
Blakemore, S. J., & Choudhury, S. (2006). Development  of the 
 adolescent brain: Implications for executive function and social 
 cognition. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 47 (3), 
 296-312.
Boyer, T. W. (2006). The development of risk-taking: A multi-
 perspective review. Developmental Review, 26 (3), 291-345.
Boyer, T. W. (2007). Decision-making processes: Sensitivity to 
 sequentially experienced outcome probabilities. Journal of 
 Experimental Child Psychology, 97, 28-43.
Breiter, H. C., Aharon, I., Kahneman, D., Dale, A., & Shizgal, P. (2001). 
 Functional imaging of neural responses to expectancy and 
 experience of monetary gains and losses. Neuron, 30 (2), 
 619-639.
Brett  M, Anton J-L, Valabregue R, Poline J-B. (2002). Region of 
 interest analysis using  an SPM toolbox [abstract] 8th 
 International Conference on Functional Mapping of the Human 
 Brain, June 2-6, Sendai, Japan. NeuroImage, 16, 2.
 References  | 201
Bunge, S. A., & Wright, S. B. (2007). Neurodevelopmental changes in 
 working memory and cognitive control. Current Opinions in 
 Neurobiology, 17 (2), 243-250.
Bunge, S. A., Dudukovic, N. M., Thomason, M. E., Vaidya, C. J. & 
 Gabrieli, J. D. E. (2002a). Immature frontal lobe contributions 
 to cognitive control in children:  Evidence from fMRI. Neuron, 
 33, 301-311.
Bunge, S. A., Hazeltine, E., Scanlon, M. D., Rosen, A. C. & Gabrieli, 
 J.D. (2002b) Dissociable contributions of prefrontal and parietal 
 cortices to response selection. NeuroImage, 17, 1562-71.
Bush, G., Vogt, B. A., Holmes, J., Dale, A. M., Greve, D., Jenike, M. A., 
 & Rosen, B.R.  (2002). Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex: a role 
 in reward-based decision making. Proceedings of the National 
 Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 99, 
 523-528.
Byrnes, J. P. (1998). The nature and development of decision making: a 
    self-regulation model. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Carter, C. S., Botvinick, M. M., & Cohen, J. D. (1999). The contribution 
 of the anterior  cingulate cortex to executive processes in 
 cognition. Rev Neurosci, 10 (1), 49-57.
Carter, C., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Botvinick, M., Noll, D. & 
 Cohen, J. D. (1998). Anterior cingulate cortex, error detection, 
 and the on-line monitoring of performance. Science, 280, 
 747-749.
Case, R. (1992). The mind’s staircase: exploring the conceptual 
 underpinnings of children’s thought and knowledge. Hillsdale, 
 NJ: Erlbaum.
Case, R., Kurland, D. M., & Goldberg, J. (1982). Operational efficiency 
 and short-term  memory span. Journal of Experimental Child 
 Psychology, 33, 386-404.
Casey, B. J. et al. (1997) A developmental functional MRI study of 
    prefrontal activation during performance of a Go/No-go task. 
    Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 9, 835–847.
Casey, B. J., Galvan, A., Hare, T. A. (2005). Changes in cerebral 
 functional organization  during  c o g n i t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t . 
 Current Opinions in Neurobiology, 15, 239-244.
Casey, B. J., Getz, S., Galvan, A. (2008). The adolescent  brain. 
 Developmental Review,  28, 62-77.
Casey, B. J., Giedd J. N., Thomas, K. M. (2000). Structural and 
 functional brain development and its relation to cognitive 
 development. Biological Psychology, 54, 241-257.
202  | References
Casey, B. J., Jones, R. M., Hare, T. A. (2008b). The adolescent  brain. 
 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124, 111-126.
Casey, B. J., Cohen, J. D., Jezzard, P., Turner, R., Noll, D. C., Trainor, 
 R. J., ... Rapoport, J. L. (1995). Activation of prefrontal cortex 
 in children during a nonspatial working memory task with 
 functional MRI. Neuroimage, 2, 221-229.
Casey, B. J., Galvan, A., & Hare, T. A. (2005). Changes in cerebral 
 functional organization during cognitive development. Current 
 Opinions in Neurobiology, 15 (2), 239-244.
Casey, B. J., Getz, S., & Galvan, A. (2008). The adolescent brain. 
 Developmental  Review, 28, 62-77.
Casey, B. J., Giedd, J. N. & Thomas, K. M. (2000). Structural and 
 functional brain development  and it's relation to cognitive 
 development. Biological Psychology, 54, 241-257.
Casey, B. J., Tottenham, N., Liston, C., & Durston, S. (2005). Imaging 
 the developing  rain: What  have we learned about cognitive 
 development? Trends in Cognitive  Sciences, 9 (3), 104-110.
Casey, B. J., Davidson, M. & Rosen, B. (2002). Functional magnetic 
 resonance imaging: Basic principles of an application to 
 developmental science. Developmental  Science, 5, 301-309.
Cerella, J. & Hale, S. (1994). The rise and fall in information-
 processing rates over the life span. Acta Psychologica, 86, 
 109-97.
Cocosco, C. A., Kollokian, V., Kwan, R. K. S., & Evans, A. C. (1997). 
 Brain web: Online interface to a 3D MRI simulated brain 
 database. Neuroimage, 5, S452.
Cohen, M. X, Heller, A. S., Ranganath, C. (2005). Brain connectivity 
 with anterior cingulate and orbitofrontal cortices during 
 decision-making. Cognitive Brain Research, 23, 61-70.
Cohn, L. D., & Westenberg, P. M. (2004). Intelligence and maturity: 
 Meta-analytic evidence for the incremental and discriminant 
 validity of loevinger’s measure of ego development. Journal of 
 Personality and Social Psychology, 86 (5), 760-772
Cools, R., Clark, L., & Robbins, T. W. (2004). Differential responses in 
 human striatum  and prefrontal cortex to changes in object  and 
 rule relevance. The Journal of Neuroscience, 24, 1129-1135.
Cools, R., Clark, L., Owen, A. M., & Robbins, T. W. (2002). Defining 
 the neural mechanisms of probabilistic reversal learning using 
 event-related functional  magnetic resonance imaging. The 
 Journal of Neuroscience, 22, 4563-4567.
 References  | 203
Courtney, S.M., Ungerleider, L.G., Keil, K.,  Haxby, J.V. (1996). Object 
 and spatial visual working memory activate separate neural 
 systems in human cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 6, 39-49.
Cowan, N,  Towse, J. N., Hamilton, Z., Saults, J. S., Elliott, E. M., 
 Lacey, J. F. Moreno, M. V., & Hitch, G. J. (2003). Children's 
 working-memory processes: A  response-timing analysis. 
 Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 132 (1), 
 113-132.
Cowan, N. (2002). Childhood development of working memory: an 
 examination of two basic parameters. In: P. Graf & N. Ohta 
 (Eds.), Lifespan development of human  memory (pp. 39-57). 
 Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Critchley, H. D., Mathias, C. J., & Dolan, R. J. (2001). Neural activity 
 in the human brain relating to uncertainty and arousal during 
 anticipation. Neuron, 29, 537–545.
Critchley, H. D. (2005). Neural mechanisms of autonomic, affective, 
 and cognitive  integration. The Journal of Comparative 
 Neurology, 493 (1), 154-166.
Critchley, H. D., Corfield, D. R., Chandler, M. P., Mathias, C. J. & 
 Dolan, R. J. (2000). Cerebral correlates of autonomic 
 cardiovascular arousal: a functional neuroimaging 
 investigation in humans. The Journal of Physiology, 523, 
 259-270
Critchley, H. D., Mathias, C. J. & Dolan, R. J. (2001). Neural activity in 
 the human brain relating to uncertainty and arousal during 
 anticipation. Neuron, 29, 537-545.
Critchley, H. D., Mathias, C. J., Josephs, O., O'Doherty, J., Zanini, S., 
 Dewar, B., Cipolotti, L., Shallice, T. & Dolan, R. J. (2003). 
 Human cingulate cortex and autonomic control: converging 
 neuroimaging and clinical evidence. Brain, 126,  2139-2152
Crone, E. A. , Van der Veen, F. M. , Van der Molen, M. W. , Somsen, R. 
 J. M. , Van Beek, B. & Jennings, J. R. (2003). Cardiac 
 concomitants of feedback processing. Biological Psychology, 
 64, 143–156.
Crone, E. A., & Van der Molen, M. W. (2004). Developmental changes 
 in real-life decision-making: performance on a gambling task 
 previously shown to depend on  the ventromedial prefrontal 
 cortex. Developmental Neuropsychology, 25 (3),  251-279.
204  | References
Crone, E. A., & Van der Molen, M. W. (2007). Development of 
 decision-making in school-aged children and adolescents: 
 Evidence from heart  rate and skin conductance analysis. Child 
 Development, 78, 1288-1301.
Crone, E. A., Bullens, L., Van der Plas, E. A., Kijkuit, E. J., & Zelazo, P. 
 D. (2008). Developmental changes and individual differences in 
 risk and perspective taking in adolescence. Developmental 
 Psychopathology, 20 (4), 1213-1229.
Crone, E. A., Bunge, S. A., de Klerk, P., & Van der Molen, M. W. 
 (2005a). Cardiac concomitants of performance monitoring: 
 Context  dependence and individual differences. Cognitive Brain 
 Research, 23 (1), 93-106.
Crone, E. A., Bunge, S. A., Latenstein, H., & Van der Molen, M. W. 
 (2005b). Characterization of children's decision making: 
 Sensitivity to punishment frequency, not  task complexity. Child 
 Neuropsychology, 11 (3), 245-263.
Crone, E. A., Jennings, J. R. Van der Molen, M. W. (2004). 
 Developmental change in feedback processing as reflected by 
 phasic heart  rate changes. Developmental Psychology, 40, 
 1228-1238.
Crone, E. A., Somsen, R. J., Van Beek, B., & Van Der Molen, M. W. 
 (2004b). Heart  rate and skin conductance analysis of 
 antecendents and consequences of decision making. 
 Psychophysiology, 41 (4), 531-540.
Crone, E. A., Somsen, R. J., Zanolie, K., & Van der Molen, M. W. 
 (2006). A heart  rate analysis of developmental change in 
 feedback processing and rule shifting from childhood to early 
 adulthood. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 95 (2), 
 99-116.
Crone, E. A., Wendelken, C., Donohue, S., Van Leijenhorst, L., & 
 Bunge, S. A. (2006). Neurocognitive development of the ability 
 to manipulate information in working  memory. Proceedings 
 of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
 America, 103 (24), 9315-9320.
Dagher A. (2007). Shopping centers in the brain. Neuron, 53, 7-8.
Dahl, R. E. (2004). Adolescent  brain development: A period of 
 vulnerabilities and opportunities. Keynote address. Annals of 
 the New York Academy of Sciences, 1021 (1), 1-22.
 References  | 205
Dahl, R. E., & Gunnar, M. R. (2009). Heightened stress responsiveness 
 and emotional  reactivity during pubertal maturation: 
 Impl icat ions for psychopathology. Developmental 
 Psychopathology, 21 (1), 1-6.
Dale, A. M. (1999). Optimal experimental design for event-related 
 fMRI. Human Brain Mapping, 8, 109-114.
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes' error. New York: Grosset /Putnam.
Davidson, M. C., Amso, D., Anderson, L. C., & Diamond, A. (2006). 
 Development of cognitive control and executive functions from 
 4 to 13 years: Evidence from manipulations of memory, 
 inhibition, and task switching. Neuropsychologia, 44 (11), 
 2037-2078.
Davies, P. L., Segalowitz, S. J., & Gavin, W. J. (2004b). Development 
 of response-monitoring ERPs in 7- to 25-year-olds. 
 Developmental Neuropsychology, 25 (3), 355-376.
Davies, P. L., Segalowitz, S. J., & Gavin, W. J. (2004a). Development of 
 error-monitoring event-related potentials in adolescents. Annals 
 of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1021, 324-328.
Della Sala, S., Gray, C., Baddeley, A., Allamano, N. & Wilson, L. 
 (1999). Pattern span: a  tool for unwelding visuo-spatial 
 memory. Neuropsychologia, 37, 1189-1199.
Diamond, A. (2002). Normal development of prefrontal cortex from 
 birth to young  adulthood: Cognitive functions, anatomy and 
 biochemistry. In S. A. Knight  (Ed.), The Frontal Lobes. 
 London: Oxford University Press.
Donkers, F. C. L., Nieuwenhuis, S., Van Boxtel, G. J. M. (2005). 
 Mediofrontal negativities in the absence of responding. 
 Cognitive Brain Research, 25, 777-787.
Durston, S., Davidson, M. C., Tottenham, N., Galvan, A., Spicer, J., 
 Fossella, J. A., et al. (2006). A shift from diffuse to focal 
 cortical activity with development. Developmental Science, 9 
 (1), 1-8.
Eigsti, I., Zayas, V., Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., Ayduk, O., Dadlani, M. B., 
 et  al. (2006). Predicting cognitive control from preschool to late 
 adolescence and young  adulthood. Psychological Science, 17 
 (6), 478-484.
Elliott, R., Friston, K. & Dolan, R. (2000). Dissociable neural responses 
 in human reward systems. The Journal of Neuroscience, 20, 
 6159-6165.
206  | References
Engle, R. W., Tuholski, S. W., Laughlin, J. E., & Conway, A. R. A. 
 (1999). Working memory, short-term memory, and general fluid 
 intelligence: A latent variable approach. Journal of 
 Experimental Psychology: General, 125, 309–331.
Ernst, M., Nelson, E. E., Jazbec, S., McClure, E. B., Monk, C. S., 
 Leibenluft, E., Blair, J.  & Pine, D. S. (2005). Amygdala and 
 nucleus accumbens in responses to receipt  and omission of 
 gains in adults and adolescents. NeuroImage, 25, 1279-1291.
Ernst, M., Nelson, E. E., McClure, E. B., Monk, C. S., Munson, S., 
 Eshel, N., ... Pine, D. S. (2004). Choice selection and reward 
 anticipation: an fMRI study. Neuropsychologia, 42, 1585–1597.
Ernst, M., Pine, D. S., & Hardin, M. (2006). Triadic model of the 
 neurobiology of motivated behavior in adolescence. 
 Psychological Medicine, 36, 299-312.
Eshel, N., Nelson, E. E., Blair, J. R., Pine, D. S., & Ernst, M. (2007). 
 Neural substrates of choice selection in adults and adolescents: 
 Development  of the ventrolateral prefrontal and anterior 
 cingulate cortices. Neuropsychologia, 45, 1270–1279.
Fareri, D. S., Martin, L. N. & Delgado, M. R. (2008). Reward-related 
 processing in the human brain: developmental considerations. 
 Developmental Psychopathology, 20, 1191-1211.
Fellows, L. K., Farah, M. J. (2003). Ventromedial frontal cortex 
 mediates affective shifting in humans: evidence from a reversal 
 learning paradigm. Brain, 126,  1830-1837.
Fellows, L. K., Farah, M. J. (2005). Different  Underlying Impairments 
 in Decision-making Following Ventromedial and Dorsolateral 
 Frontal Lobe Damage in Humans. Cerebral Cortex, 15, 58-63.
Figner, B., Mackinlay, R. J., Wilkening, F., & Weber, E. U. (2009). 
 Affective and deliberative processes in risky choice: Age 
 differences in risk taking in the  Columbia Card Task. Journal 
 of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
 Cognition, 35(3), 709-730.
Friedman, N. P., & Miyake, A. (2000). Differential roles for visuospatial 
 and verbal working memory in situation model construction. 
 Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129, 61–83.
Fry, A. F. & Hale, S. (2000). Relationships among processing speed, 
 working memory, and fluid intelligence in children. Biological 
 Psychology, 54, 1-34.
Furby, L., & Beyth-Marom, R. (1992). Risk taking in adolescence: A 
 decision-making perspective. Developmental Review, 12, 1-44.
 References  | 207
Fuster, J. M. (2002). Frontal lobe and cognitive development. Journal of 
 Neurocytology, 31, 373-385.
Galvan, A., Hare, T. A., Davidson, M., Spicer, J., Glover, G., & Casey, 
 B. J. (2005). The role of ventral frontostriatal circuitry in 
 reward-based learning in humans. The Journalof Neuroscience, 
 25, 8650-8656.
Galvan, A., Hare, T. A., Parra, C. E., Penn, J., Voss, H., Glover, G., et al. 
 (2006). Earlier  development  of the accumbens relative to 
 orbitofrontal cortex might underlie risk-taking behavior in 
 adolescents. The Journal of Neuroscience, 26 (25), 6885-6892.
Galvan, A., Hare, T., Voss, H., Glover, G., & Casey, B. J. (2007). Risk-
 taking and the adolescent brain: Who is at risk? Developmental 
 Science, 10 (2), F8-F14.
Gardner, M., & Steinberg, L. (2005). Peer influence on risk taking, risk 
 preference, and  risky decision making in adolescence and 
 adulthood: An experimental study. Developmental Psychology, 
 41 (4), 625-635.
Garon, N. & Moore, C. (2004). Complex decision-making in early 
 childhood. Brain and Cognition, 551, 158-170.
Gathercole, S. E. & Hitch, G. J. (1993). Developmental changes in 
 short-term memory: A revised working memory perspective. In 
 A. Colllins, S. E. Gathercole, M. A. Conway, & P. E. Morris 
 (Eds.), Theories of memory (pp. 189-210). Hove, UK: 
 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Gathercole, S.E. (2004). Working memory and learning during the 
 school years. Proceedings of the British Academy, 125, 365–
 380.
Gathercole, S.E., Pickering, S. J., Ambridge, B. & Wearing, H. (2004). 
 The structure of Working Memory from 4 to 15 years of age. 
 Developmental Psychology, 40,  177-190.
Gehring, W. J. & Knight, R. T. (2000). Prefrontal-cingulate interactions 
 in action monitoring. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 516-520.
Gehring, W. J., & Willoughby, A. R. (2002). The medial frontal cortex 
 and the rapid processing of monetary gains and losses. Science, 
 295 (5563), 2279-2282.
Geier, C. & Luna, B. (2009). The maturation of incentive processing 
 and cognitive control. Pharmacology, Biochemistry, and 
 Behavior, 93, 212-221.
208  | References
Giedd, J. N., Blumenthal, J., Jeffries, N. O., Castellanos, F. X., Liu, H., 
 Zijdenbos, A., ... Rapoport, J. L. (1999).  Brain development 
 during childhood and adolescence: a longitudinal MRI study. 
 Nature Neuroscience, 2, 861-863.
Giedd, J. N. (2004). Structural magnetic resonance imaging of the 
 adolescent brain. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 
 1021, 77-85.
Gogtay N, Giedd J. N., Lusk L., Hayashi K. M., Greenstein D., Vaituzis 
 A. C., ... Thompson P. M. (2004). Dynamic mapping of human 
 cortical development  during childhood through early adulthood. 
 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
 States of America, 101, 8174-8179.
Hajcak, G., McDonald, N., & Simons, R. F. (2003). To err is autonomic 
 error-related brain potentials, ANS activity, and post-error 
 compensatory behavior.  Psychophysiology, 40 (6), 895-903.
Hall, G. S. (1904). Adolescence: It's psychology and it's relations to 
 physiology, anthropology, sociology, sex, crime, religion, and 
 education. New York: D. Appleton & Co.
Hamilton, C. J., Coates, R. O. & Heffernan, T. (2003). What  develops in 
 visuo-spatial working memory development? European Journal 
 of Cognitive Psychology, 15, 43-69.
Happeney. K. H., Zelazo, P. D. & Stuss, D. T. (2004). Development of 
 orbitofrontal function: Current themes and future directions. 
 Brain and Cognition, 55, 1-10.
Harris, J. R. (1995). Where is the child's environment? A groups 
 socialization theory of development. Psychological Review, 102 
 (3), 458-489.
Hecker, R. & Mapperson, B. (1997). Dissociation of visual and spatial 
 processing in working memory. Neuropsychologia, 35, 
 599-603.
Hitch, G. J. (1990). Developmental fractionation of working memory. 
 In: G. Vallar & T. Shallice (Eds), Neuropsychological 
 impairments of short-term  memory. (pp.  211-246). Cambridge, 
 UK: Cambridge University Press.
Hitch, G. J. (2002). Developmental changes in working memory: A 
 multicomponent view. In: P. Graf & N. Ohta (Eds.), Lifespan 
 development of human memory. (pp. 15-37). Cambridge, MA: 
 MIT Press.
 References  | 209
Hitch, G. J., Towse, J. N., Hutton, U. (2001). What limits children's 
 working memory span? Theoretical accounts and applications 
 for scholastic development. Journal of Experimental 
 Psychology: General, 130, 184-198. 
Holroyd, C. B. & Coles, M. G. H. (2002). The neural basis of human 
 error processing: Reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the 
 error-related negativity. Psychological  Review, 109, 679-709.
Holroyd, C.B., & Nieuwenhuis, S., Mars, R. B. & Coles, M. G. H. 
 (2004). Anterior cingulate cortex, selection for action and error 
 processing. In M. I. Posner (Ed.) Cognitive Neuroscience of 
 Attention. (pp. 21-23) New York: Guilford Press.
Hooper, C. J., Luciana, M., Conklin, H. M., & Yarger, R. S. (2004). 
 Adolescents' performance on the iowa gambling task: 
 Implications for the development  of decision making and 
 ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Developmental Psychology, 
 40 (6), 1148-1158.
Huettel S. A., Song A. W. & McCarthy G. (2005). Decisions under 
 uncertainty: Probabilistic context influences activation of 
 prefrontal and parietal cortices. The Journal of Neuroscience, 
 25, 3304-3311.
Huettel, S. A. (2006). Behavioral, but  not reward, risk modulates 
 activation of prefrontal,  parietal and insular cortices. Cognitive, 
 Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 6, 141-151.
Huizinga, M., Dolan, C. V., & Van der Molen, M. W. (2006). Age-
 related change in executive function: Developmental trends and 
 a latent variable analysis. Neuropsychologia, 44 (11), 2017-
 2036.
Huttenlocher, P. R. (1979). Synaptic density in human frontal cortex - 
 developmental  changes and effects of aging. Brain Research, 
 163, 195-205.
Jennings, J.R. (1986). Bodily changes during attending. In M. G. H. 
 Coles, E. Donchin, and S. W. Porges (Eds.). Psychophysiology: 
 systems, processes, and application (pp. 268-289). New York: 
 Guilford Press.
Jennings, J. R., & Van der Molen, M. W. (2002). Cardiac timing and the 
 central  regulation of action. Psychological Research, 66 (4), 
 337-349.
Jennings, J. R., Berg, W. K., Hutcheson, J. S., Obrist, P., Porges, S., 
 Turpin, G. (1981). Committee report. Publication guidelines for 
 heart rate studies in man. Psychophysiology, 18 (3), 226-231.
210  | References
Kahn, I., Yeshurun, Y., Rotshtein, P., Fried, I., Ben-Bashat, D. & 
 Hendler, T. (2002). The  role of the amygdala in signaling 
 prospective outcome of choice. Neuron, 33, 983-994.
Kail, R. (1990). The development of memory in children (3rd ed.). New 
 York: W. H. Freeman and Company.
Kail, R. (1992). Processing speed, speech rate, and memory. 
 Developmental Psychology, 28, 899–904.
Kail, R., & Park, Y.-S. (1994). Processing time, articulation time, and 
 memory span.  Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 57, 
 281–291.
Kane, M. J., Hambrick, D. Z., Tuholski, S. W., Wilhelm, O., Payne, T. 
 W., & Engle, R. W. (2004). The Generality of Working-Memory 
 Capacity: A Latent-Variable Approach to Verbal and Visuo-
 Spatial Memory Span and Reasoning. Journal of Experimental 
 Psychology: General, 133, 189-217.
Kelley, T. M. (2004). Positive psychology and adolescent mental health: 
 False promise or True breakthrough? Adolescence, 39, 257-278.
Kerr, A. & Zelazo, P. D. (2004). Development of ‘hot’ executive 
 function. The children’s  gambling task. Brain and Cognition, 
 55, 148-157.
Kirkham, N. Z. & Diamond, A. (2003) Sorting between theories of 
 perseveration: performance in conflict tasks requires memory, 
 attention and inhibition. Developmental Science, 6, 474-476.
Klauer, K. C. & Zhao, Z. (2004). Double dissociations in visual and 
 spatial short-term memory. Journal of Experimental 
 Psychology, 133, 355-381.
Klingberg, T., Forssberg, H. & Wessterberg (2002). Increased brain 
 activity in frontal and parietal cortex underlies the development 
 of visuo-spatial working memory capacity during childhood. 
 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14, 1-10.
Knutson, B., Greer, S. M. (2008). Anticipatory affect: neural correlates 
 and consequences for choice. Philosophical Transactions of the 
 Royal Society London B Biological Sciences, 363, 3771-3786.
Knutson, B., Adams, C. M., Fong, G. W., & Hommer, D. (2001). 
 Anticipation of  increasing monetary reward selectively recruits 
 nucleus accumbens. Journal of  Neuroscience, 21, 1-5.
Knutson, B., Wimmer, G. E., Kuhnen, C. M., & Winkielman, P. (2008). 
 Nucleus accumbens activation mediates the influence of reward 
 cues on financial risk taking. Neuroreport, 19 (5), 509-513.
 References  | 211
Kringelbach, M. L. & Rolls, E. T. (2004) The functional neuroanatomy 
 of the human orbitofrontal cortex: evidence from neuroimaging 
 and neuropsychology. Progress  in Neurobiology, 72, 341–372.
Kwon, H., Reiss, A. L., & Menon, V. (2002). Neural basis of protracted 
 developmental  changes in visuo-spatial working memory. 
 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
 States of America, 99 (20), 13336-13341.
Lacey, B. C. & Lacey, J. I. (1974). Studies of heart rate and other bodily 
 processes in sensorimotor behavior. In P. A. Obrist, A. H. Black, 
 J. Brenner, & L. V. DiCara (Eds.). Cardiovascular 
 Pschophysiology (pp. 538-564). Chicago: Aldine.
Ladouceur, C. D., Dahl, R. E., & Carter, C. S. (2004). Erp correlates of 
 action monitoring in adolescence. Annals of the New York 
 Academy of Sciences, 1021, 329-336.
Lejuez, C. W., Aklin, W. M., Zvolensky, M. J., & Pedulla, C. M. (2003). 
 Evaluation of the balloon analogue risk task (BART) as a 
 predictor of adolescent real-world risk-taking behaviours. 
 Journal of Adolescence, 26 (4), 475-479.
Levin, I., P., Weller, J., A., Pederson, A., A., & Harshman, L., A. (2007). 
 Age-related difference sin adaptive decision making: Sensitivity 
 to expected value in risky choice. Judgment and Decision 
 Making, 2 (4), 225-233.
Logie, R. H. & Pearson, D. G. (1997). The inner eye and the inner 
 scribe of visuospatial working memory: Evidence from 
 developmental fractionation. European Journal of Cognitive 
 Psychology, 9, 241-257.
Logie, R. H. (1995). Visuo-spatial working memory. Hove, UK: 
 Erlbaum.
Logothetis, N. K. (2008). What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do       
     with fMRI, Nature, 453,  869–878. 
Luna, B., Garver, K.E., Urban, T.A., Lazar, N.A., & Sweeney, J.A. 
 (2004). Maturation of  cogn i t ive p rocesses f rom la te 
 childhood to adulthood. Child Development, 75 (5), 1357-1372.
Luna, B., Thulborn, K. R., Munoz, D. P., Merriam, E. P., Garver, K. E., 
 Minshew, N. J., ... Sweeney, J. A. (2001). Maturation of Widely 
 Distributed Brain Function Subserves Cognitive Development. 
 Neuroimage, 13, 786–793.
212  | References
Maia, T. V. & McClelland, J. L. (2005). The somatic marker hypothesis: 
 still many questions but no answers. Response to Bechara et al. 
 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 162-164.
Maia, T. V. & McClelland, J. L. (2004). A reexamination of the 
 evidence for the somatic marker hypothesis: What  participants 
 really know in the Iowa gambling task. Proceedings of the 
 National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
 101, 16075-16080.
Manes, F., Sahakian, B., Clark, L., Rogers, R., Antoun, N., Aitken, M., 
 Robbins, T. (2002). Decision-making following damage to the 
 prefrontal cortex. Brain, 125,  624-639.
Masten, A. S., Hubbard, J. J., Gest, S. D., Tellegen, A., Garmezy, N., & 
 Ramirez, M. (1999). Competence in the context of adversity: 
 Pathways to resilience and maladaptation from childhood to late 
 adolescence. Development and  Psychopathology, 11, 143-169.
May, J. C., Delgado, M. R., Dahl, R. E., Stenger, V. A., Ryan, N. D., 
 Fiez, J. A. & Carter, C. S. (2004). Event-related functional 
 magnetic resonance imaging of  reward-related brain circuitry 
 in children and adolescents. Biological Psychiatry, 55, 359-366.
McClure, S. M., Berns, G. S., & Montague, P. R. (2003). Temporal 
 prediction errors in a passive learning task activate human 
 striatum. Neuron, 38, 339-346.
McClure, S.M., Laibson, D.I., Loewenstein, G. & Cohen, J.D. (2004) 
 Separate Neural Systems Value Immediate and Delayed 
 Monetary Rewards. Science, 306, 503-507.
Mecklinger, A. & Pfeiffer, E. (1996). Event-related potentials reveal 
 topographical and temporal distinct neuronal activation patterns 
 for spatial and object  working memory. Cognitive Bain 
 Research, 4, 211-224.
Miltner, W. H. M., Braun, C. H. & Coles, M. G. H. (1997). Event-
 related brain potentials following incorrect feedback in a time-
 estimation task: Evidence for a  generic neural system for error 
 detection. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 9,  788-798.
Miltner, W. H., Lemke, U., Weiss, T., Holroyd, C., Scheffers, M. K., & 
 Coles, M. G. (2003). Implementation of error-processing in the 
 human anterior cingulate cortex: A source analysis of the 
 magnetic equivalent  of the error-related  negativity. Biological 
 Psychology, 64, 157-166.
 References  | 213
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M. (1989). Delay of gratification 
 in children. Science, 244, 933-938.
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, 
 A. & Wager, T.  D. (2000). The unity and diversity of executive 
 functions and their contributions to complex ‘frontal lobe’ 
 tasks: A latent  variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41, 
 49-100.
Miyake, A., Friedman, N., Rettinger, D. A., Shah, P., & Hegarty, M. 
 (2001). How are visuospatial working memory, executive 
 functioning, and spatial abilities related? A latent-variable 
 analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 130, 
 621–640.
Nelson, E. E., Leibenluft, E., McClure, E. B. & Pine, D. S. (2005). The 
 social re-orientation of adolescence: a neuroscience perspective 
 on the process and its relation to psychopathology. 
 Psychological Medicine, 35, 163-174.
Nelson, C. A., Monk, C. S., Lin, J., Carver, L. J., Thomas, K. M. & 
 Truwit, C. L. (2000) Functional neuroanatomy of spatial working 
 memory in children. Developmental Psychology,36,109-116.
Nieuwenhuis, S., Slagter, H. A., von Geusau, N.J., Heslenfeld, D. J. & 
 Holroyd, C. B. (2005) Knowing good from bad: Differential 
 activation of human cortical areas by positive and negative 
 outcomes, The European Journal of Neuroscience, 21 (11), 
 3161-3168.
Nystrom, L. E., Braver, T. S., Sabb, F. W., Delgado, M. R., Noll, D. C. 
 & Cohen, J. D.  (2000). Working memory for letters, shapes, 
 and locations: fMRI evidence against  stimulus-based regional 
 organization in human prefrontal cortex. Neuroimage, 11, 
 424-446.
O’Doherty, J., Critchley, H., Deichmann, R. & Dolan, R. J. (2003). 
 Dissociating valence of outcome from behavioral control in 
 human orbital and ventral prefrontal cortices. The Journal of 
 Neuroscience, 23, 7931-7939.
O’Doherty, J. P., Kringelbach, M. L., Rolls, E. T., Hornak, J. & 
 Andrews, C. (2001). Abstract reward and punishment  
 representation in the human orbitofrontal cortex. Nature 
 Neuroscience, 4, 95-102.
O'Doherty, J. P. (2007). Lights, camembert, action! The role of human 
 orbitofrontal cortex in encoding stimuli, rewards and choices. 
 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1121, 254-272.
214  | References
O'Doherty, J. P., Deichmann, R., Critchley, H. D., & Dolan, R. J. 
 (2002). Neural responses during anticipation of a primary taste 
 reward. Neuron, 33 (5), 815-826.
Overman, W. H. (2004). Sex differences in early childhood, 
 adolescence, and adulthood, on tasks that  rely on orbitofrontal 
 cortex. Brain and Cognition, 55, 134-147.
Overman, W. H., Frassrand, K., Ansel, S., Trawalter, S., Bies, B., & 
 Redmond, A. (2004). Performance on the Iowa card task by 
 adolescents and adults. Neuropsychologia, 42 (13), 1838-1851.
Palmer, S. (2000). Working memory: A developmental study of 
 phonological recoding.  Memory, 8, 179-193.
Pascual-Leone, J. (1995). Learning and development  as dialectical 
 factors in cognitive growth. Human Development, 38, 338-348.
Paulus, M. P., Rogalsky, C., Simmons, A., Feinstein, J. S. & Stein, M. 
 B. (2003). Increased activation in the right insula during risk-
 taking decision making is related to harm avoidance and 
 neuroticism. NeuroImage, 19, 1439 –1448.
Paulus, M. P., Hozack, N. Frank, L. & Brown, G. G. (2002). Error Rate 
 and Outcome Predictability Affect Neural Activation in 
 Prefrontal Cortex and Anterior Cingulate during Decision-
 Making. NeuroImage, 15, 836–846.
Paulus, M. P., Hozack, N., Zauscher, B., McDowell, J. E., Frank, L., 
 Brown, G. G. & Braff, D. L. (2001). Prefrontal, parietal, and 
 temporal cortex networks underlie decision-making in the 
 presence of uncertainty. NeuroImage, 13, 91-100.
Piaget, J., & Inhelder, B. (1975). The origin of the idea of chance in 
 children. New York: Norton (Original work published 1951).
Pickering, S. J. (2001). The development of visuo-spatial working 
 memory. Memory, 9, 423-432.
Pickering, S. J., Gathercole, S. E., Hall, M. E. & Lloyd, S. A. (2001). 
 Development of memory for pattern and path: Further evidence 
 for the fractionation of visuo-spatial memory. The Quarterly 
 Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54 (2), 397-420.
Poldrack, R. A. (2006) Can Cognitive Processes Be Inferred from 
 Neuroimaging Data? Trends in Cognitive Science, 10,b 59–63. 
Posner, M. I., & Rothbart, M. K. (1998). Attention, self-regulation and 
 consciousness.  Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
 Society London B Biological Sciences, 353 (1377), 1915-1927.
 References  | 215
Prencipe, A. & Zelazo, P. D. (2005) Development of affective decision 
 making for self  and other: Evidence for the integration of first- 
 and third-person perspectives. Psychological Science, 16, 
 501-505.
Preuschoff, K., Quartz, S. R., & Bossaerts, P. (2008). Human insula 
 activation reflects risk prediction errors as well as risk. The 
 Journal of Neuroscience, 28, 2745-2752.
Rabinowitz, F. M., Dunlap, W. P., Grant, M. J., & Campione, J. C. 
 (1989). The rules used by children and adults in attempting to 
 generate random numbers. Journal of Mathematical 
 Psychology, 33, 227-287.
Raven, J., Raven, J. C., & Court, J. H. (1998). Manual for raven's 
 progressive matrices and vocabulary scales. Section 1:General 
 overview. San Antonia TX: Harcourt Assessment.
Reyna, V. F., & Ellis, S. C. (1994). Fuzzy-trace theory and framing 
 effects in children's risky decision making. Psychological 
 Science, 5, 275-279.
Reyna, V. F., & Rivers, S. E. (2008). Current theories of risk and 
 rational decision making. Developmental Review, 28 (1), 1-11.
Ridderinkhof, K. R., Ullsperger, M., Crone, E. A., & Nieuwenhuis, S. 
 (2004). The role of the medial frontal cortex in cognitive 
 control. Science, 306 (5695), 443-447.
Ridderinkhof, K.R. & Van der Molen, M.W. (1995) A 
 psychophysiological analysis of  developmental differences in 
 the ability to resist interference. Child Development, 66, 
 1040-1056.
Rivers, S. E., Reyna, V. F., & Mills, B. (2008). Risk taking under the 
 influence: A fuzzy-trace theory of emotion in adolescence. 
 Developmental Review, 28, 107-144.
Rodriguez, P. F., Aron, A., & Poldrack, R. (2005). Ventral-striatal / 
 nucleus-accumbens sensitivity to prediction errors during 
 classification learning. Human Brain Mapping, 27, (4), 
 306-313.
Rogers, R., Everitt, B. J., Baldacchino, A., Blackshaw, A. J., Swainson, 
 R., Wynne, K., ...  Robbins, T. W. (1999). Dissociable deficits in 
 decision making cognition of  chronic amphetamine abusers, 
 opiate abusers, patients with focal damage to the prefrontal 
 cortex, and tryptophan depleted  normal volunteers: evidence 
 for monoaminergic mechanisms. Neuropharmacology, 20, 
 322-339.
216  | References
Rogers, R. D., Ramnani, N., Mackay, C., Wilson, J. L., Jezzard, P., 
 Carter, C. S., &  Smith, S. M. (2004). Distinct  portions of 
 anterior cingulate cortex and medial prefrontal cortex are 
 activated by reward processing in separable phases of decision-
 making cognition. Biological Psychiatry, 55, 594-602. 
Rolls, E. T. (1999). The brain and emotion, Oxford: Oxford University 
 Press
Rolls, E. T. (2000). The orbitofrontal cortex and reward. Cerebral 
 Cortex, 20, 284-294.
Rowe, J. B., Toni I., Josephs, O., Frackowiak, R. S., Passingham, R. E. 
 (2000). The prefrontal cortex: response selection or 
 maintenance within working memory? Science, 5471, 
 1656-1660.
Salthouse, T. A. (1992) Influence of processing speed on adult age 
 differences in working  memory. Acta Psychologica, 79, 
 177-170.
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Gibbs, S. E., Khanna, K., Nielsen, L., 
 Carstensen, L. L., Knutson, B. (2007). Anticipation of monetary 
 gain but  not  loss in healthy older adults. Nature Neuroscience, 
 10, 787-791.
Scheres, A., Dijkstra, M., Ainslie, E., Balkan, J., Reynolds, B., Sonuga-
 Barke, E., et  al.  (2006). Temporal and probabilistic discounting 
 of rewards in children and adolescents: Effects of age and 
 ADHD symptoms. Neuropsychologia, 44, 2092-2103.
Schlottmann, A. (2001). Children's probability intuitions: 
 Understanding the expected value of complex gambles. Child 
 Development, 72 (1), 103-122.
Schoenbaum, G., Chiba, A. A. & Gallagher, M. (2000). Changes in 
 functional connectivity in orbitofrontal cortex and basolateral 
 amygdala during learning and reversal training. The Journal of 
 Neuroscience, 20, 5179-5189.
Shaw, P., Kabani, N. J., Lerch, J. P., Eckstrand, K., Lenroot, R., Gogtay, 
 N., et al. (2008). Neurodevelopmental trajectories of the human 
 cerebral cortex. The Journal of Neuroscience, 28 (14), 
 3586-3594.
Shoda, Y., Mischel, W. & Peake, P. K. (1990). Predicting adolescent 
 cognitive and self-regulatory competencies from preschool 
 delay of gratification: Identifying diagnostic conditions. 
 Developmental Psychology, 26, 978-986. 
 References  | 217
Smith, B. W., Mitchell, D. G., Hardin, M. G., Jazbec, S., Fridberg, D., 
 Blair, R. J., et al. (2009). Neural substrates of reward 
 magnitude, probability, and risk during a wheel of fortune 
 decision-making task. NeuroImage, 44 (2), 600-609.
Smith, E. E. & Jonides, J. (1997). Working memory: A view from 
 neuroimaging. Cognitive Psychology, 33, 5-42.
Smith, E. E., Jonides, J., Koeppe, R. A., Awh, E., Schumacher, E. H. & 
 Minoshima, S.  (1995). Spatial versus object  working memory: 
 PET  investigations. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 7, 
 337-356.
Somsen, R. J., Jennings, J. R., & Van der Molen, M. W. (2004). The 
 cardiac cycle time effect  revisited: Temporal dynamics of the 
 central-vagal modulation of heart rate in human reaction time 
 tasks. Psychophysiology, 41 (6), 941-953.
Somsen, R. J., Van der Molen, M. W., Jennings, J. R., & Orlebeke, J. F. 
 (1985). Response initiation, not completion, seems to alter 
 cardiac cycle length. Psychophysiology,  22 (3), 319-325.
Somsen, R. J., Van der Molen, M. W., Jennings, J. R., & Van Beek, B. 
 (2000). Wisconsin card sorting in adolescents: Analysis of 
 performance, response times and heart  rate. Acta Psychologica, 
 104 (2), 227-257.
Sowell, E. R., Thompson, P. M., Leonard, C. M., Welcome, S. E., Kan, 
 E., & Toga, A.  W. (2004). Longitudinal mapping of cortical 
 thickness and brain growth in normal children. The Journal of 
 Neuroscience, 24 (38), 8223-8231.
Spear, L. P. (2000). The adolescent brain and age-related behavioral 
 manifestations.  Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 24, 
 417- 463.
Steinberg, L. (2004). Risk taking in adolescence: What  changes and 
 why? Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1021, 
 51-58.
Steinberg, L. (2005). Cognitive and affective development  in 
 adolescence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 69-74.
Steinberg, L. (2008). A social neuroscience perspective on adolescent 
 risk-taking. Developmental Review, 28, 78-106.
Steinberg, L., Albert, D., Cauffman, E., Banich, M., Graham, S., & 
 Woolard, J. (2008). Age differences in sensation seeking and 
 impulsivity as indexed by behavior and  self-report: Evidence 
 for a dual systems model. Developmental Psychology, 44, 
 1764-1778.
218  | References
Steinberg, L. & Scott, E.S. (2003). Less guilty by reason of 
 adolescence: Developmental immaturity, diminished 
 responsibility, and the juvenile death penalty. The American 
 Psychologist, 58, 1009-1018.
Stuss, D. T. (1992). Biological and psychological development of 
 executive functions. Brain and Cognition, 20, 8-23.
Talairach, J. & Tourneaux, P. (1988). Co-Planar Stereotactic Atlas of 
 the Human Brain. New York: Thieme.
Thomas, K. M., King, S. W., Franzen, P. L., Welsh, T. F., Berkowitz, A. 
 L., Noll, D. C.,  Birmaher, V. & Casey, B. J. (1999). A 
 developmental functional MRI study of spatial working 
 memory. NeuroImage, 10, 327-338.
Thompson, C., Barresi, J., & Moore, C. (1997). The development of 
 future-oriented  prudence and altruism in preschoolers. 
 Cognitive Development, 12, 199–212.
Tobler, P. N., Christopoulos, G. I., O'Doherty, J. P., Dolan, R. J., 
 Schultz, W. (2008). Neuronal distortions of reward probability 
 without choice. The Journal of Neuroscience, 28, 11703-11711.
Tom, S. M., Fox, C. R., Trepel, C., & Poldrack, R. A. (2007). The neural 
 basis of loss aversion in decision-making under risk. Science, 
 315, 515-518.
Tomb, I., Hauser, M., Deldin, P., Caramazza, A. (2002). Do somatic 
 markers mediate decisions on the gambling task? Nature 
 Neuroscience, 5, 1103-1104; author reply 1104.
Towse, J. N. & McLachlan, A. (1999). An exploration of random 
 generation among children. British Journal of Developmental 
 Psychology, 17,  363-380.
Towse, J. N. & Neil, D. (1998). Analysing human random behaviour: A 
 review of methods used and a computer program for describing 
 performance. Behavior  Research Methods, Instruments, & 
 Computers, 30, 583-591.
Tremblay, L., & Schultz, W. (1999). Relative reward preference in 
 primate orbitofrontal cortex. Nature, 398, 704–708.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the 
 psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453-458.
Ursu, S. T. & Carter, C. S. (2005). Outcome representations, 
 counterfactual comparisons and the human orbitofrontal cortex: 
 Implications for neuroimaging studies of decision-making. 
 Cognitive Brain Research, 23, 51–60.
 References  | 219
Van den Wildenberg, W. P. M. & Van der Molen, M. W. (2004) 
 Developmental trends in simple and selective inhibition of 
 compatible and incompatible responses. Journal of 
 Experimental Child Psychology, 87 (3), 201-220.
Van den Wildenberg, W. P. M. (2003). Perspectives on stopping 
 behavior: Process analysis of stop-signal inhibition. Universiteit  
 van Amsterdam.
Van der Molen, M. W., Somsen, R. J. M. & Jennings, J. R. (2000). 
 Developmental  change in auditory selective attention as 
 reflected by phasic heart rate changes. Psychophysiology, 37 
 (5), 626-633.
Van der Molen, M. W., Somsen, R. J. M. & Orlebeke, J. F. (1985). The 
 rhythm of the heart beat  in information processing. Advances in 
 Psychophysiology, 1, 1-88
Van der Molen, M.W. & Molenaar, P. C. M. (1994). Cognitive 
 psychophysiology: A window to cognitive development and 
 brain maturation. G. Dawson, K. W. Fisher (Eds.) Human 
 behavior and the developing brain. Guilford Publications, New 
 York.
Van der Veen, F. M., Van der Molen, M. W., Crone, E. A., & Jennings, J. 
 R. (2004). Phasic heart  rate responses to performance feedback 
 in a time production task: Effects of information versus valence. 
 Biological Psychology, 65 (2), 147-161.
Van Leijenhorst, L., Crone, E. A., & Bunge, S. A. (2006). Neural 
 correlates of developmental differences in risk estimation and 
 feedback processing. Neuropsychologia, 44 (11), 2158-2170.
Van Leijenhorst, L., Crone, E. A., & Van der Molen, M. W. (2007). 
 Developmental  trajectories for object and spatial working 
 memory: A psychophysiological analysis. Child Development, 
 78 (3), 987-1000.
Van Leijenhorst, L., Westenberg, P. M., & Crone, E. A. (2008). A 
 developmental study of risky decisions on the cake gambling 
 task: Age and gender analyses of probability estimation and 
 reward evaluation. Developmental Neuropsychology, 33 (2), 
 179-196.
Van Leijenhorst, L., Zanolie, K., Van Meel, C. S., Westenberg, P. M., 
 Rombouts, S. A. R. B., & Crone, E. A. (in press). What 
 motivates the adolescent? Brain regions mediating reward 
 sensitivity across adolescence. Cerebral Cortex.
220  | References
Van Leijenhorst, L., Westenberg, P. M., & Crone, E. A., (manuscript in 
 revision). A Heart Rate Analysis of Risky Decision-Making, 
 Reward Sensitivity and Outcome Monitoring in Adolescence. 
Van Leijenhorst, L., Gunther Moor, B., Op de Macks, Z., Rombouts, S. 
 A. R. B., Westenberg, P. M., & Crone, E. A. (manuscript in 
 revision). Brain  development  and risk-taking: Age related 
 changes in the contributions of affective and control regions.  
Van Veen, V., & Carter, C. S. (2002). The anterior cingulate as a conflict 
 monitor: fMRI  and ERP studies. Physiology and Behavior, 77, 
 477-82.
Volz, K. G., & Von Cramon, D. Y. (2006). What  neuroscience can tell 
 about intuitive  processes in the context  of perceptual 
 discovery. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18, 2077-2087.
Volz, K. G., Schubotz, R. I., & Von Cramon, D. Y. (2003). Predicting 
 events of varying probability: Uncertainty investigated by fmri. 
 NeuroImage, 19, 271–280.
Wagner, A. D. , Bunge, S. A. & Badre, D. (2004). Cognitive control, 
 semantic memory and priming: Contributions from prefrontal 
 cortex. In The New Cognitive Neurosciences, (3rd ed., pp. 
 709-726). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wallis, J. D. (2007). Orbitofrontal cortex and its contribution to 
 decision-making. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 30, 31-56.
Wechsler, D. (1981) Wechsler adult intelligence scale – Revised. New 
 York: The Psychological Corporation.
Wechsler, D. (1991) Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Third 
 Edition. San Antonio: The Psychological Corporation.
Welsh, M. C. (2002). Developmental and clinical variations in executive 
 functions. In: D. L. Molfese, & V. J. Molfese (Eds.). 
 Developmental variations in learning:  Applications to social, 
 executive function, language, and reading skills. (pp. 
 139-185). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Welsh, M. C., Pennington, B. F. & Groisser, D. B. (1991). A normative-
 developmental  study of executive function: A window on 
 p r e f r o n t a l f u n c t i o n i n c h i l d r e n . D e v e l o p m e n t a l 
 Neuropsychology, 7 (2), 131-149.
Westenberg, P. M., Hauser, S. T., & Cohn, L. D. (2004). Sentence 
 completion measurement of psychosocial maturity. In M. J. 
 Hilsenroth & D. L. Segal (Eds.), Personality Assessment (pp. 
 595-616) .Vo lume 2 in M.Hersen (Ed . - in -Ch ie f ) , 
 Comprehensive Handbook of Psychological Assessment. 
 Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons.
 References  | 221
Wilson, F. A. W., O’Scalaidhe, S. P. & Goldman-Rakic, P. (1993). 
 Dissociation of object  and spatial processing domains in 
 primate prefrontal cortex. Science, 260,  1955-1958.
Xue, G., Lu, Z., Levin, I. P., Weller, J. A., Li, X., & Bechara, A. (2009). 
 Functional dissociations of risk and reward processing in the 
 medial prefrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 19 (5), 1019-1027.
Zuckerman, M. (1994). Behavioral expressions and biosocial bases of 
sensation seeking. New York: Cambridge University Press.
222  | References
Propositions
Adolescent risky behavior is the consequence of increased sensitivity to 
rewards paired with immature cognitive control. 
Eight  year old children are able to make adult like decisions that  require 
weighing probabilities and potential rewards, this makes it unlikely that 
adolescents take risks because they don't  understand what they are 
doing.
The finding that the ventral striatum responds more to anticipated and 
received rewards in mid adolescence than in childhood or adulthood 
even in the absence of behavior suggests that this reflects a fundamental 
difference in the way this region functions during this time.
The balance between drive and control that underlies risky behavior in 
adolescence is dependent on the context.
It  is important to educate adolescents about  the possibilities they have to 
shape their brains.
Given the development of the ability to judge probabilities, 14 year olds 
who say that they are "never allowed to do anything", and are "always 
misunderstood", probably know that they are wrong.
The development  of fMRI has led to revolutionary new insights in child 
development, and to an enormous number of questions that remain to be 
answered.
Getting children to lie still is often unjustly seen as the biggest 
challenge in developmental imaging research. 
Future studies should aim to understand the relation between brain 
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